Narratives on nature beauty and public land:  A search for an elusive environmental ethics by Harding, James A.
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
2002 
Narratives on nature beauty and public land: A search for an 
elusive environmental ethics 
James A. Harding 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Harding, James A., "Narratives on nature beauty and public land: A search for an elusive environmental 
ethics" (2002). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 9438. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/9438 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films 
the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and 
dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of 
computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations 
and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper 
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized 
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing 
from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.
ProQuest Information and Learning 
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 
800-521-0600
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Maureen and Mike 
MANSFIELD LIBRARY
The University of
Montana
Permission is granted by the author to reproduce this material in its entirety, 
provided that this material is used for scholarly purposes and is properly cited in 
published works and reports.
♦♦Please check "Yes" or "No" and provide signatu re^
Yes, I grant permission 
No, I do not grant permission
Author’s Signature: CT
Any copying for commercial purposes or financial gain may be undertaken only with 
die author's explicit consent.
8/98
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
NARRATIVES ON NATURE, BEAUTY, AND PUBLIC LAND: 
A SEARCH FOR AN ELUSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
by
James A  Harding
B.A University of Evansville, 1988 
M.S. University o f Maine, 1995 
Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Doctor o f Philosophy
The University o f Montana 
May, 2002
Approved by:
Chairperson
Dean, Graduate School
Y -  2 2 - - o ^
Date
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: 3062631
___ ®
UMI
UMI Microform 3062631 
Copyright 2002 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. 
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest Information and Learning Company 
300 North Zeeb Road 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Harding, James A. Ph.D., May 2002 Forestry
Narratives on Nature, Beauty, and Public Land: A Search for an Elusive Environmental 
Ethics.
Advisor: Dr. William T. Borri
Ethics has been a topic of inquiry for over 2,000 years. In general the continuing project 
o f ethics has attempted to determine what is right and wrong or good and bad with 
respect to our fellow humans. More recently, a new breed of philosophers, 
environmental philosophers, have attempted to reconsider the scope of ethics as 
prescriptions concerned either directly or indirectly with non-humans. Various iterations 
o f environmental ethics have been proposed in the past 30 years. Positions including 
animal rights, ecosystem ethics, Deep Ecology and Ecofeminism represent four of the 
standard views today.
Very few empirical treatments o f environmental ethics have been done and even fewer 
have attempted a more pluralistic approach to the topic. For instance, one of the 
persistent views in environmental ethics is that of justice-based obligatory ethics. While 
this view may be reasonable, it excludes other, perhaps, equally deserving views such as 
care-based ethics and supererogatory ethics. In an attempt to address these 
underrepresented areas of ethical inquiry, this study explicitly attempted to document the 
opportunities when both justice and care as well as obligatory and supererogatory ethics 
emerged from narratives. These narratives were constructed in reference to natural areas 
o f varying familiarity.
Four themes emerged from the data that go some ways towards documenting the nature 
of environmental ethics discourse. These four themes are: 1) Beauty in Nature; 2) 
Responsibilities to ‘The Other;’ 3) Public Lands; and 4) On Becoming a Moral Agent. 
Each theme individually highlights some aspect o f environmental ethics discourse that is 
in need of further consideration. Collectively the four themes combine to paint a picture 
o f how environmental ethics is discussed by a sample o f people in southeastern 
Kentucky. But more, this collection o f themes questions some of the foundations of 
existing environmental ethics positions.
The four themes do not simply deconstruct the edifice o f environmental ethics, rather 
they offer a new hope for overcoming some of the challenges environmental ethics 
continues to face. Beauty in Nature and Public Lands are two themes of environmental 
ethics in that they exist within the boundaries of the field. Responsibilities to ‘The Other’ 
and On Becoming a Moral Agent are themes about environmental ethics because they 
combine to challenge those boundaries.
Collectively, the four themes are features of a moral filter. Recalibrating the moral filter 
is one means to overcoming the challenges faced by environmental ethics today. In 
detailing how this moral filter might be recalibrated, a new iteration of environmental 
ethics is proposed.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Ethics has been a topic of inquiry for over 2000 years. Throughout this time, a 
number of ethical theories have been advanced in an attempt to conclude how people 
should behave with respect to other people. In more recent years, the focus o f ethics has 
expanded to include considerations for non-human entities—what we might collectively 
refer to as the environment. It is these environment-directed ethics that are the focus of 
this research. Specifically, the intent was to study how the theoretical framework an 
individual uses to articulate their ethic is contingent upon their relationship with the piece 
o f environment in question. Prior to the data collection, there were three topics of interest 
in this study: ethical theories (care vs. justice), ethical orientations (obligatory vs. 
supererogatory); and finally the degree o f familiarity someone has with a certain place. In 
an effort to explore in greater detail each o f these three topic areas, visitors to the 
Cumberland Falls State Resort Park in southeastern Kentucky and people local to that 
area were interviewed about their ethical relationships to this park as well as to less 
familiar parks. During the course of the interview process and the data analysis, four 
primary themes emerged which seemed to capture each of the original topics.
Additional^, these four themes further illustrated a depth and complexity o f the ethical 
relationship people have with places. The four themes discovered in this research are: 1) 
Beauty in Nature, 2) Responsibilities to ‘The Other,’ 3) Public Lands, and 4) On 
Becoming a Moral Agent.
This research is generally one of ethics, and more specifically environmental ethics. 
That ethics exist in some form for the most part is not questioned. What is questioned is
l
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how we know ethics when we see it. The empirical traditions of the moral development 
theorists, Kohlberg and Gilligan guided the portions o f this research dedicated to 
understanding how the ethical theories are revealed. However, little prior empirical 
attention has been given to discerning between different ethical orientations with regard to 
the environment. That said, some information was gleaned from two researchers (Kahn, 
1999; and Swearingen, 1989) who adopted a KohJbergian approach to documenting 
environmental ethics.
1.1 Definition and Discussion of Tenns
Minteer and Manning (1999) noted that empirically measuring ethics has an 
extremely limited tradition. With the notable exceptions o f Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol 
Gilligan, relatively few other researchers have attempted to scientifically study ethics in 
any context. Even fewer have attempted a study of environmental ethics. Rather most 
investigations into environmental ethics have been philosophical and descriptive ventures. 
Swearingen (1989) and Kahn (1999) are two who have empirically studied environmental 
ethics; however, their conception of environmental ethics was entirely that of an ethic of 
justice (as theory) and ethics as obligatory (as orientation). As I will explain in the 
literature review section, this singularly narrow view of environmental ethics may severely 
limit the scope of what some people consider environmental ethics. As such, my intent 
was to study environmental ethics from two ethical theories—justice and care, and two 
ethical orientations—obligatory and supererogatory.
It is suggested that the degree to which people express concern for and care about 
natural areas is partly dependent on their overall relationship with nature and how this
2
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relationship has developed over time. To wit, there cannot be just one environmental ethic 
for all people across all situations. Ethics, in the scope o f this study, is interpreted as 
doing what is right (read: required) and doing what is considered by most people to be 
good (read: not required, but discretionary). Within this domain o f doing What is right 
reside the ethical theories of justice and care. While one is generally considered a 
universal proscription (justice) and the other considered context-dependent (care), both 
can be said to follow the maxim: Do the right thing. Another class o f ethics concerns 
doing what is good rather than what is right. Doing the good thing flows from the work 
o f Aristotle in his Nichomacheart Ethics, which outlines a virtue-based ethical theory. The 
distinction between the ‘right* and the ‘good* will be taken up in greater detail in the 
literature review. However, at this point, note that doing what is ‘right* represents one 
class o f ethical behaviors and doing what is ‘good* represents a different class.
In the search for definition, environmental ethics have been variously considered a 
simple extension of prevailing social ethics to a reformulation o f fundamental 
responsibilities. However, any pre-requisite to an environmental ethics is the recognition 
o f a relationship between the human and the natural world. Sylvan (1998) suggested that 
environmental ethics might be constructed in one of three ways: 1) Extend a prevailing 
ethic to include non-human entities; 2) Incorporate environmental values into the 
dominant tradition; or 3) Create a  new ethic. While Sylvan’s typology provides a clarity 
o f environmental ethics approaches, this three-part recommendation does not really 
explain what environmental ethics might be in its definitional sense. For this I offer the 
following definition which encompasses a range of ethical theories and orientations.
3
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Environmental ethics represent those responsibilities and inclinations which humans have 
towards elements beyond the exclusively human world.
To date, the most consistent approach to environmental ethics has been the rights- 
based perspective. Someone who promotes extending rights to non-human entities can be 
said to advocate an ethic based on principles of justice. Rick O’Neil (2000) suggests that 
a traditional justice-based environmental ethics works well where the object o f concern is 
something that can be considered aware o f its interests (read: sentient). Our conception o f 
rights tends to be rooted in the ability o f a being to recognize paths which lead away from 
pain and toward the absence o f pain (or in some cases pleasure). That is, beings have 
rights to the avoidance of pain (and, perhaps the pursuit o f pleasure or happiness). 
Additionally, these rights generally flow to beings that have moral standing, or are a 
member o f the moral community. All creatures possessing a central nervous system 
generally have the ability to sense pleasure and pain and act in ways that promote the 
former and reduce the latter. This class o f creatures is known as vertebrates.
However, this definition o f environmental ethics which draws the line at 
vertebrates is quite limited in that there are countless more creatures that have little or no 
ability to feel pain. Moreover, there are collections o f things which do not feel pain and 
pleasure in the traditional sense; things such as species, ecosystems, and ‘nature’ are not 
sentient in the same way that a lowland gorilla or a coyote is. As a result, the rights-based 
perspective, wherein rights are bestowed based upon sentience, excludes the majority o f 
things that might be enveloped in the class of things belonging to nature. The question 
then arises, how should we deal with those objects that lack awareness of their interests? 
The conception of this question is designed to set apart individuals with real interests from
4
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individuals, collections or systems which lack these interests. This is a necessary 
distinction in this study because the general focus of this research is on environmental 
ethics that are directed towards non-sentient collectives: specifically different natural 
areas.
In an effort to accommodate the need for another, perhaps more expansive type of 
ethic, O’Neil goes on to say that “care is also essential to an environmental ethic” (p. 186). 
In this sense, care picks up where a rights-based theory leaves off. That is, a care-based 
ethic extends the moral community beyond the membership found in rights-based ethics 
built on sentience. The most common conception o f a social rights-based ethical theory is 
a theory of justice. Immanuel Kant in the early 19th Century and John Rawls in the latter 
half of the 20U| Century have argued most persuasively for these justice theories. Justice- 
based ethical theories work well with objects that possess moral standing; care ethics seem 
better suited to objects with intrinsic value. Moral standing and intrinsic value should not 
be interpreted to be mutually exclusive. However, they each imply a different class o f 
expectations. A more detailed discussion on the distinction between moral standing and 
intrinsic value will follow in the literature review.
Care ethics grew out o f a dissatisfaction with traditional ethical theories 
(specifically ethics o f justice) to address interpersonal relationships. Talking about the 
rights of one’s spouse, parent, child or close friend ring hollow and insufficient when 
compared to the strong emotions that frequently guide our actions towards those with 
whom we are closest. That is, our notion of what is right behavior is based more on 
sentiment than on a reasoned analysis o f moral community membership. From this some 
would suggest that there are specific natural areas that we hold deep attachments to, and
5
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thus, our ethical relationships to those areas may be better expressed in terms o f care 
rather than justice.
Justice and care are not the only two ethical perspectives, however, they do 
represent two well-defined and competing, if not contrasting, approaches to ethics. 
Additionally, numerous writers have suggested the appropriateness o f either a justice or a 
care approach to environmental concerns (Booth, 1998; Collins-Chobanian, 2000; Curtin, 
1996; Dustin, 2000; Field, 1995; King, 1991; Manning, 1981; O'Neil, 2000; Plumwood, 
1998; Szagun & MesenholL, 1993; Warren, 1998). As justice and care seem to provide 
such a canvassing endorsement of much environmental rhetoric, I therefore chose these 
two theories as the lens through which I analyzed the narratives that people gave to 
various questions associated with protecting public lands. A curious outcome o f this 
widespread endorsement is that to my knowledge, no researchers have attempted an 
empirical evaluation o f environmental ethics allowing for both care and justice 
perspectives. This then was one of my goals of this research.
Additionally, I questioned people about their overall environmental ethical 
orientation (right vs. good), which is designed to gauge the force and clarity o f ethical 
options. So a second goal was to determine if and when people thought environmental 
ethics meant doing something that was right, or when they thought environmental ethics 
was doing something that was good. Where ethical theories (justice and care) presume 
different criteria, principles, and foci of concern, ethical orientations, in this work, 
represent a distinction between doing what is right versus doing what is good. Doing 
what is right is the moral minimum. Doing what is good is going beyond the moral 
minimum. Obligatory ethics is the term that will be used to describe those things that are
6
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meant to achieve ‘the right.’ ‘The good’ is that which is results from one’s 
supererogatory ethics. Thus, obligatory and supererogatory ethics represent another 
contrast. Obligatory ethics are essentially the moral minimum—they are not intended to 
encourage any sort o f exemplary or ideal behavior. On the other hand, supererogatory 
ethics compel us beyond the moral minimum to pursue those courses o f action that would 
be viewed by others as heroic or ideal. The reason for including both obligatory and 
supererogatory orientations is simply to allow for a more complete picture of 
environmental ethics to emerge. Ethics o f justice and care both are essentially obligatory 
ethics in that they both prescribe with some, although varying degrees o f clarity what one 
must do in a given situation; they both outline the morally minimum requirements. Yet, 
little research has attempted an approach to environmental ethics which allows for 
supererogatory ethics. Kahn (1999) is the one notable exception to this; he made an 
explicit recognition of the bias towards environmental ethics being conceived of solely as a 
list o f obligatory ethics. An in depth treatment o f supererogatory ethics is given by 
Bernard Williams (1985) and it is this work upon which Kahn relies in his analysis.
Were this a quantitative multivariate study we might consider the ethical theories 
o f justice and care and the ethical orientations o f obligatory and supererogatory as 
dependent variables. One independent variable would be degree of familiarity with a 
place. But familiarity is a vague term and how it is defined can depend as much upon 
who is defining h as what is being defined. For the purposes o f this research, familiarity is 
concerned with how well someone knows a particular natural area.
The contrast between familiar and unfamiliar areas provides a  unique opportunity 
to understand the ways that people express their environmental ethics. One hypothesis
7
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that has been advanced is that urban and suburban residents tend to care more for and 
recognize greater value in certain idealized natural areas such as National Forest 
Wildernesses than for the more mundane natural areas closer to home (Cronon 1995). 
However, this hypothesis has been challenged by others (Waller 1998). Further, it would 
appear that the degree of familiarity with forest resources affects how the public relates to 
the resource. That is, how familiar people are with certain resources may determine their 
ethical orientations to those resources and this in turn dictates their support for and 
expectations o f forest areas. My proposal is that people who are more familiar with areas 
used for recreational pursuits are more likely to voice a situationally-based ethics such as 
care for the land. While those who are less familiar with some area may rely on justice- 
based reasoning which is, by nature, abstract and not dependent on particular 
circumstances. Similarly, familiarity may affect how one perceives his/her environmental 
orientations—as either obligatory or supererogatory.
The familiar and unfamiliar has been touched on in a number o f recent writings 
dealing with notions and ethics related to place. For instance, Smith and others (1998) 
note the progression of familiarity in discussing the phenomenon o f turning space into 
place. And Robert Sack (1997) posits that as we become more familiar with the places we 
inhabit, so we become more familiar with ourselves. Yet, noted sociologist, Clifford 
Geertz (1996) recognized the troubling aspect of studying those things with which we are 
most familiar, noted “It is difficult to see what is always there” (p. 259). In the context o f 
this research, the familiarity people expressed about specific parks was neither quantified 
nor standardized in any sense. Familiarity was treated as a subjective evaluation from 
which might flow differing degrees o f or variations in moral concern and/or commitment.
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The four main terms defined here are: ethical theories, ethical orientations, 
familiarity and environmental ethics. Within ethical theories, brief descriptions o f both 
justice and care were provided. And within ethical orientations, obligatory ethics was 
defined as ‘the right’ and supererogatory ethics was defined as ‘the good.’ Familiarity was 
explored as a term that might go some ways towards explaining the previous two. A more 
detailed analysis o f these terms will follow in the literature review as will a more thorough 
discussion o f ethics and environmental ethics as defining these two concepts is beyond the 
scope of this introduction.
1.2 Problem Statement
This study concerns the ethical relationship that people express in reference to 
specific places. Specifically, this is a study of environmental ethics, where environmental 
ethics may include theories o f justice and care as well as obligatory and supererogatory 
ethical orientations. The tendency to couple justice with abstraction and care with context 
in social dilemmas would seem to apply to instances of environmental ethics as well. To 
the extent that this coupling exists, we might expect people to express justice-based 
environmental ethics in reference to more abstract examples o f nature. On the other hand, 
we might expect people to express more care-based environmental ethics where the object 
o f concern is quite familiar. Two general goals o f this study helped to direct the original 
research questions: 1) understanding justice and care in reference to parks o f varying 
familiarity, and 2) understanding the roles of obligatory and supererogatory environmental 
ethical orientations as they relate to parks of varying familiarity.
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While the original problem to be addressed was the relationship between familiarity 
with a resource and the expressed ethical theories and orientations, preliminary data 
analysis revealed additional problems which became objects of inquiry. Specifically, 
higher order questions arose about the nature o f environmental discourse in general. And 
a number of assumptions, beyond the aforementioned obligatory and justice biases, were 
challenged. These challenges ultimately reflect the nature o f discussing environmental 
ethics in general. One example of these challenges occurred during the discussion of 
whether environmental issues truly qualify as moral issues in the sense that they represent 
issues o f extreme importance. (A more detailed discussion on defining morality/ethics will 
follow in Chapter 2.) Another example of one o f these challenges occurred when 
distinctions were made between environmental issues on public lands versus private lands 
and on parks versus other resource classifications. The assumption that environmental 
ethics presumes some uniform treatment for all instances o f natural resources was laid 
bare and ultimately discarded.
Thus, two paths converge in identifying the problem statement for this research.
On the one hand the original focus o f study was the attempt to encourage under­
represented areas in environmental ethics. In this regard, language reflecting both care- 
based ethics and the supererogatory ethical orientation were considered as possible 
outcomes of the dialogue especially when the context shifted from the familiar to the non­
familiar. The second path, involves the inadequacy o f standard environmental ethics 
approaches to correspond necessarily to the discourse on natural resource issues. Both o f 
these paths combine to inform the problem statement o f this research, which in previous 
empirical attempts at studying environmental ethics have too severely limited the scope o f
10
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the research. In doing so, these earlier attempts have neglected some important aspects o f 
environmental ethics and they have failed to question some assumptions upon which shaky 
foundations were erected. The most accurate statement o f the problem then can be 
expressed as a search for and a documentation o f the nature o f environmental ethics 
discourse.
1J Justification
Ethics is considered the overriding theory o f human behavior and often guides 
other decision-making principles (Williams 1985). To wit, an understanding o f 
environmental ethics as they relate to specific places is essential to informed management 
o f natural areas. Leopold (1949), too, recognized the power that ethics have over one’s 
approach to the land. To Leopold, viewing our obligations to the natural world simply as 
a proxy for economic considerations results in an object—the environment—which is 
bereft of any moral value. In the economic model, land as property, in fact, discourages 
moral commitments because it tends to confound clear prescriptions of right, wrong and 
good and bad. More, viewing the natural world through only the economic lens renders a 
sterile vision o f should’s and ought’s. Indeed, the vision is clouded when an ethical lens is 
added; yet this additional lens is increasingly needed as more and more people begin to 
recognize the validity o f the many difficult choices arising from competing uses o f the 
natural resource.
Yet, as stated previously, there is no single environmental ethic. Managers who 
encounter resistance to certain actions may fall victim to appealing to principles o f justice 
when principles o f care are more appropriate. Additionally, managers who hope to enlist
u
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
support for their area may find greater sympathy in encouraging people’s supererogatory 
environmental ethics rather than presupposing an obligatory environmental ethic. And on 
another level altogether, managers may fail in defining resource issues as moral issues 
when portions o f their publics subscribe to purely anthropocentric ethical systems.
Numerous authors (Driver et al. 1996) have called for a greater understanding o f a 
more inclusive set o f land management ethics. Peterson (19%), for example, suggests a 
“human value framework needed to achieve ecosystems management” (p. 25). List and 
Brown (1996) emphasize the need for managers to hear and understand a broader array of 
ethics and values. And as a wider segment o f the public participates in land management 
decisions, managers “need to understand how different kinds o f citizens define and relate 
to the public lands. Resource management [today] must become profoundly pluralistic 
and must reflect the many relevant voices in this country” (p. 460). I suggest that a 
greater understanding o f the ethical relationships that the public has towards their public 
lands will help managers see and appreciate the depth and diversity of conviction that the 
public has towards these resources. Additionally, ethics of care and supererogatory ethical 
orientations have been marginalized in the public sphere. In this respect, this research 
purposefully allowed for expressions o f care and supererogatory ethics.
Over 50 years ago, Aido Leopold called for all of us to develop a land ethic as a 
means to temper human influences on our natural resources. One job o f forest recreation 
management is to build knowledge o f natural processes and receptivity for management 
actions in the mind o f the American public (Dustin et al. 1995). However, in order to 
build this receptivity, land managers must first understand a number o f filters that people 
bring with them when considering land management issues. Certainly one o f these filters
12
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is one’s ethics. In advocating the appropriateness of care ethics in public discourse, 
Margaret Urban Walker suggests that “we need not make our obscurity to each other 
worse by unnecessarily unilateral decision[s]. We might just try turning to each other: 
talking and listening and imagining possibilities together” (Walker, 1995, p. 143). Her 
words seem to offer endorsements for two aspects of this study: its plural (rather than 
monist) nature, and the desire to discover meaning and understanding through a discursive 
methodological approach. Walker recognizes that much ethical discourse presumes just 
one approach to ethics (in her example, justice). Additionally, she seems to suggest that 
ethics are best articulated when it emerges from a dialogue.
Thus, the goals o f this research (to understand how obligatory/supererogatory and 
justice/care are expressed in environmental ethics) play an important role in natural 
resource-based recreation management in that these ethical orientations and theories may 
well inform how people perceive their obligations and commitments to those lands open to 
recreation.
1.4 Summary of Research
This study explored the role o f environmental ethics o f people who visit and are 
familiar with a local park, yet also express concern over how distant, less-familiar parks 
are managed. Secondly, this study documented to some extent the use of ethically-based 
language in reference to natural areas and specifically, public land. The depth and 
complexity of commitment to environmental ethics is generally poorly understood, 
particularly as one’s environmental ethics relates to places of differing degrees of 
familiarity. Kaplan (1978) hinted at this briefly when he discussed the trouble we have of
13
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ever knowing anything very well, to the extent that all our knowledge is incomplete. 
Primarily, this study addressed ethical theories and ethical orientations in reference to a 
specifically familiar park and one that is less familiar.
This research was first and foremost exploratory in nature. To my knowledge, no 
one else has conducted a study o f environmental ethics that explicitly allows for accounts 
o f justice and care based ethics as well as the orientations o f obligatory and 
supererogatory environmental ethics. Furthermore, this study explicitly considered the 
role o f familiarity in acknowledgement and discussion o f ethics towards the natural 
environment. I believe this is an important oversight in the field of empirical ethical 
inquiry and in the field o f environmental ethics—a more complete picture o f any ethics, 
including environmental ethics, must allow for a plurality o f perspectives. As such, the 
implications for this research are potentially wide reaching.
This study used an interpretivist testing logic in which the researcher analyzed 
narratives and discourses on ethics generated by guided interviews. These interviews were 
guided by questions designed to solicit information on ethical theories of justice and care 
and ethical orientations of obligatory and supererogatory and the role o f familiarity. Thus, 
it was hoped a concise and convenient conclusion to the study would reveal primary 
themes consistent with the three original topic areas. However, this was not the case. 
While a number o f insights were discovered with respect to the original topic areas, the 
four primary themes that emerged ultimately yielded a more coherent explanation of the 
phenomenon o f discussing environmental ethics in reference to areas of public land. 
Further, the four primary themes subsumed the original topic areas in a nested hierarchy 
that, in the end, gave greater meaning to ethical theories, ethical orientations and
14
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familiarity. In other words, ethics o f justice and care and obligatory and supererogatory 
orientations seemed to make more sense when considered in the context o f the four 
primary themes. Viewed in this light, the interplay between ethical theories, ethical 
orientations, and degree o f familiarity combined to provide the door through which more 
meaningful environmental ethics themes could be accessed.
In summary, the four primary themes to emerge from the narratives were: 1) 
Beauty in Nature; 2) Responsibilities to The ‘Other’; 3) Perceptions o f Public Lands; and 
4) On Becoming a Moral Agent. These four themes are not perfectly discrete from one 
another, particularly with respect to some of the subthemes that seem to subtly drift back 
and forth between different thematic meanings. Nor do these themes individually or 
collectively canvass any meta-ethical view o f the environment. However, each primary 
theme is robust in its core and the general meanings each is meant to convey. The 
common element binding all four o f the themes together is that they all relate in some way 
to an ethical relationship to a place. So, what we are left with now is a pre-interview 
conception of the study boundaries and a post-interview analysis o f the phenomenon.
In diagramming how the pre-interview topic areas relate to the post-interview 
themes, it is important to note that this evolved understanding is less a failure o f the 
research process as it is an insight into the nature o f discussing environmental ethics. 
Whereas, the pre-interview topics were focused on specific theories and bound by 
conventions of previously conducted research, the post-interview themes emerged as 
valuable objects o f ethical inquiry which shed light on the general phenomenon of 
discussing environmental ethics in the context of familiar and unfamiliar places. More, the 
post-interview themes expanded beyond the boundaries o f the original study in such a way
IS
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that one might conclude that within the themes resides more relevant aspects of 
environmental ethics. This last point will be returned to numerous times in the final three 
chapters o f this document.
Emergent Themes
Original 
Topic Areas
Figure 1: Venn diagram illustrating the relationship between the original pre-interview 
topic areas and the post-interview, emergent themes.
The Venn diagram is meant to be roughly accurate in terms of scale between the 
pre-interview topics and the post-interview themes. The domain o f interest in this figure 
represents the evolution and direction o f my understanding o f the general phenomenon o f 
environmental ethics as it relates to specific places. Note that the set containing the 
original, pre-interview topics does not fell entirely within the set o f the post-interview 
emergent themes. This might suggest one o f two things: 1) that a portion of the pre­
interview topics was inaccessible through the interviews; or 2) that the narratives led to a 
somewhat different path of inquiry as that originally conceived around the pre-interview 
topics. I will return to this discussion in the Results chapter (Chapter 4) and again in
16
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Chapter 6 in which I discuss the nature of environmental discourse and how well this 
research reflects some of the traditional positions. However, at this point I’ll suggest that 
both inaccessibility and new directions of inquiry resulted in the relationship illustrated in 
Figure 1.
1.5 Outline of Remaining Chapters
The singular purpose o f this manuscript is to document all aspects of the research 
conducted for this study. One challenge in presenting a lengthy yet coherent document 
from beginning to end is to maintain consistency throughout. However, as just mentioned, 
those topics that framed the study proposal, were enveloped and overshadowed in the 
course of the data analysis by the four primary themes. So, the question then, is how to 
integrate both these topics and the themes into one document? Had the themes been 
coincident with the original topics, all could be covered sufficiently in the literature 
review. Yet, there is enough substantial difference between them, that I have opted to 
maintain a different literature treatment for each. In an effort to attend to the vastly 
different resources of supporting literature, I will partition the theoretical literature across 
two chapters. In Chapter 2 o f this document, I will present and discuss the literature 
relevant to the original three topics. As these topics were foundational to the study and to 
the extent that they represent current notions of environmental ethics, their treatment 
through the literature remains necessary. At the same time, the four emergent themes 
deserve their own supporting literature, although for different reasons. While I searched 
the literature to justify the original topics as objects o f inquiry, the themes demanded some 
attention to the literature to put into context this new information. I have, therefore,
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opted to present the theme-associated literature in Chapter 5 of this document to fully 
elucidate and explore these emergent themes o f ethics of natural areas.
Chapter 2 is the literature review devoted to much of the important points 
associated with the ethical theories of justice and care and the ethical orientations o f 
obligatory and supererogatory Additionally, a review and guide to the standard 
environmental ethics positions concludes this chapter. Chapter 3 is devoted to the 
iterative methodology of this study—iterative due to the evolution o f the interview guide. 
The interview guide with which I began this research evolved into a different series o f 
questions as more was discovered about this phenomenon. Additionally, attention will be 
afforded sampling and methods o f data analysis. In Chapter 4 ,1 present the results o f the 
analysis of the narrative interviews. The results are essentially excerpts from transcripted 
interviews where each excerpt is meant to illustrate a specific point. Collectively, these 
points come together to make subthemes, which themselves coalesce into one of the four 
primary themes. Chapter 5 returns to the literature informed and interspersed with 
commentary on the relevance of the emergent themes. Finally, this document ends with 
Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations. In this last chapter, I offer a multi-part 
discussion of this research and what direction future empirical studies might take. 
Additionally, I will survey the contribution o f this research to the broader field of 
environmental ethics by determining the extent and scope to which this research relates to 
the standard environmental ethics positions. And finally, I explore my own evolving 
understanding of many o f the aspects o f  this research, environmental ethics, and outdoor 
recreation.
18
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The question of how and why people express an environmental ethic can be 
broadly conceived o f as a study o f environmentalism. Any number o f researchers have 
approached environmentalism as a topic worthy of inquiry, however, very few have 
attempted an empirical treatment o f the ethical aspects o f environmentalism. For the 
purposes of this research, I began with a focus at the intersection o f familiarity with 
different parks, the ethical theories o f justice and care and the ethical orientations of 
obligatory and supererogatory. While this research is not historical, per se, the discussion 
of narratives which follow in the results need to be juxtaposed with the common, but 
different ways that nature is considered today.
In an effort to set the context for a discussion o f the narratives, in this chapter I 
will outline a number of different ways in which the human relationship with nature has 
informed and contributed to the variety o f approaches in environmental ethics. It is far 
beyond the scope o f this work to catalogue all notable meetings between the human world 
and the natural world. That said, there are a few important landmarks worthy o f 
discussion; these landmarks will be noted in the first large section o f this chapter. In total, 
four large sections make up this chapter: 1) Relationships between Humans and Nature; 2) 
Knowing Nature (An Ontology o f Familiar and Unfamiliar Natural Areas); 3) Standard 
Contemporary Views in Environmental Ethics; and 4) A Consideration of Ethics. The first 
section is meant primarily as a review o f several major junctions in the human-nature 
relationship It is less a comprehensive survey as it is an identification of the more 
noteworthy shifts in thinking about how humans view the natural world. The second
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section explores the notion that nature or the environment may not be a uniform thing, but 
rather it varies in meaning and importance depending on how familiar one is with it. The 
extent, that unfamiliar nature is somehow different (in meaning, value, etc.) from familiar 
nature, provides the basis for the suggestion that ethical prescriptions may vary 
accordingly. The third section o f this chapter is devoted to a treatment o f the various 
views o f environmental ethics as discussed in the literature today. The first two sections 
invariably inform the third, yet the third section should be considered as that which is most 
germane to an analysis o f the narratives in this study. It is with these standard views in 
mind that one evaluation o f the contribution of this research can be made. In other words, 
one measure o f the value o f this research is how it relates to the standard positions in 
environmental ethics. (This evaluation will follow in the last chapter of this document.) 
The final section explores the specifics o f justice, care, obligatory and supererogatory 
orientations as well as the more general notion of ethics.
Collectively, the four sections in this chapter are intended to outline the history, 
scope and domains of interest o f this thing called environmental ethics. As this research is 
fundamentally one o f environmental ethics, the subsequent literature review should offer a 
clear and complete picture o f environmental ethics. And finally the conclusion o f this 
chapter should lay the foundation for the research approach and results o f the narratives 
which follow.
2.1 Relationships between Humans and Nature
As mentioned previously, simply because there exists a human-nature relationship 
does not presuppose that this includes an ethical relationship. However, the existence of a
20
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relationship is necessary for some formulation of environmental ethics. Much has been 
written on the evolving perspective of our relationship with the natural world. Therefore 
any attempt to give a complete account of this relationship would suffer from thinness 
given the focus o f this study. However, what may be useful is a brief overview of some o f 
the more noteworthy events in recent human history each o f which is a legacy to some 
aspect of current environmental thought. Modernism is one such important turn in how 
the natural world is perceived and defined.
The tone and type o f settlement seen on the North American continent was both an 
indicator and a harbinger o f a relatively new way o f looking at the natural world. 
Borgmann (1992) identifies the 17th Century ideas o f Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, and 
John Locke as the foundations o f modernity. Perhaps this era o f modernity was nowhere 
more apparent in the processes used to create settlements out o f untamed land. That is, 
the settlement ofNorth America can be viewed as a prime example o f the ushering in of 
the modem era. The modernist view of nature saw the wilderness, for example, as 
objectively knowable, and an incomplete work awaiting human improvement. More, 
Locke (1690/1952) prescribed some of the ‘rules’ o f conquest in turning the unowned 
land ofNorth America in parcels of personal property. This notion o f ‘settling the 
wilderness’ persists in this region through which Daniel Boone passed over 200 years 
earlier. Indeed, this idea o f civilizing nature emerged as a subtheme in the narratives, and 
will be discussed more in Chapter Four.
The documented history of this settlement varies across fields o f interest, but a 
number of common themes seem to emerge across the different accounts o f early- 
American history. First, the strength of the individual eking out a living on unfamiliar and
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occasionally, inhospitable ground was valued as a virtue. Thus, a good or ethical 
relationship to nature had an emphasis on human perseverance in the face of a harsh and 
hostile natural world. As far as this idea goes, there is perhaps no more clear an 
application o f the premise of natural law than that process involved in creating property 
written by John Locke. In The Second Treatise o f Government, John Locke (1690/1952) 
wrote that,
God, when he gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded man to 
labor, and the penury of his condition required it o f him. God and his reason 
commanded him to subdue the earth, i.e., improve it for the benefit of life... (p.
20).
With this statement, Locke firmly affixes his belief that the natural world exists in order to 
be used by humans. Further each human, individually, carries the responsibility of taking 
the rawness of the uncivilized earth and making some part o f nature fit for his own 
survival.
This individualism evolved into a type o f centering o f humans in the natural order 
which then gave way to the idea of Manifest Destiny. This human-centered view was 
essentially an extension o f religious beliefs, specifically the Christian perspective that 
humans were God's premier act of creation. If, in feet, God created humans to sit atop 
the throne in the natural world, then the natural world held lesser status. When Locke 
noted that God commanded and circumstances demanded that all o f mankind labor in 
order to survive, this charge was founded on the voice of a supreme authority. And it was 
this appeal to a divine authority that gave good reason to treat nature purely 
instrumental^ and as a means to both worldly and other-worldly ends. Nash (1982)
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similarly explores this line o f thinking in his book Wilderness and the American Mind,
where he discusses the Puritan notion of wilderness.
The Puritans, seldom forgot that civilizing the wilderness meant far more than 
profit, security, and worldly comfort. A manichean battle was being waged 
between ‘the clear conscience of the Gospell’ on the one hand and ‘thick 
antichristian darkness’ on the other. Puritan writing frequently employed this 
light-and-dark imagery to express the idea that wilderness was ungodly (pp. 36- 
37).
In this reading, European colonists in North America did not view the wilderness as just 
an impediment to progress but was moreover a symbol o f the absence of God. Thus, a 
good or proper relationship with nature reflected efforts to reclaim chaotic evfl wildlands 
and baptize them holy through godly pursuits.
A second theme o f relationships between humans and nature grew out of the first: 
humans on the one hand and everything else on the other hand. For example, this 
distinction was echoed in the early 1900’s by Gifford Pinchot, the first Chief of the U.S. 
Forest Service, when he noted that “There are only two things in the world, humans and 
resources.” Central to this perspective is the philosophy o f utilitarianism, where the moral 
community spreads no further than human beings and as such, resources should be used to 
maximize the good for only those within the moral community.
Thirdly, the European settlement ofNorth America was perceived to have 
primarily advanced through science rather than superstition. European settlers carried 
with them the legacy of Columbus’ successful navigation o f the Atlantic and Bacon’s New 
Atlantis to remove the dark mystery of what lay beyond the horizon and expel the fear that 
once was hidden within a simple woodland. Referring to the Enlightenment, Borgmann 
(1992) paints it as “the liberating dawn of reason that dispelled the darkness o f medieval
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superstition and dogmatism, oppression and authoritarianism” (p. 25). However, as a 
result, the natural world was seen as some object to be used, conquered or ignored, as 
evidenced in the first two themes. An unfortunate byproduct o f an objective science has 
been the fervent separation o f fact and value, which some have suggested has lead to 
diminished capacity to discuss matters of moral import (Sack, 1997). Despite the 
permeation of science into the cultures during and following the Enlightenment, religion 
continues to play a prominent role in the lives of many people, particularly when one 
searches for the source o f one’s ethics. It was this centrality o f religion that led Lynn 
White (1967) to suggest that European settlers, carrying with them an embedded Christian 
tradition, used their theology as a justification for the “control o f nature.”
Clearly these three historic views of the natural world do little to support our 
present fascination with the environment. At the core o f all o f those views is the idea of 
nature possessing only pure instrumental value. So why introduce them at all? Well, as 
will be discussed in Chapter Four, some of these perceptions o f nature (human/nature 
dichotomy, individualism and property ownership) remain in the consciousness o f at least 
a few o f the people interviewed in this study. In many ways, nature continues to exist as 
something apart from us and further it exists first and foremost for human benefit. As 
some approaches to environmental ethics will illustrate, one’s ethical relationship to a 
specific place may contain backward glances at one or more o f these three historic views. 
For instance, an environmental ethic anchored in human utility (e.g. “I care about this 
place because it is therapeutic to me”) may suggest a view of nature as something that 
exists primarily for human use, albeit a use that engenders a thoughtful and caring 
approach.
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Given our rather dismissive outlook on natural areas, until relatively recently, it 
would seem almost absurd that so many Americans now place such high value on nature 
for, arguably, non-instrumental reasons. Recreational use of National Parks, National 
Forests and other natural areas is at an all-time high (Zinser, 1995). A recent national 
survey conducted by the US Forest Service indicates that well over 95% o f Americans 
participate in some outdoor recreation pursuit during the past year (NSRE, 2002). Every 
year countless Americans flock to local, state and nationally managed natural areas. This 
rise in appreciation for natural environments might be attributed to any number o f factors, 
including the associated environmental movement and the Biophilia Hypothesis, which will 
be discussed later in this chapter. Conversely, the increasing popularity o f various 
environmental causes may be attributed to the steady increase in outdoor recreational 
pursuits following the Second World War (Douglass, 1999). As a result, both issues of 
environmental concern and outdoor recreation find themselves following similar paths of 
growth in American consciousness.
2.1.1 A Brief History o f Environmentalism and Outdoor Recreation
Certainly there are many aspects o f environmentalism ranging from local concerns 
such as zoning for open space and cleaning up a littered park to more global concerns 
such as protecting the rainforest and reintroducing keystone species into ecosystems. The 
intersection of environmentalism with outdoor recreation has been a confusing one. On 
the one hand outdoor recreation is the most convenient means through which we come to 
know an area. On the other hand, there do not seem to be strong correlations between 
outdoor recreation participation and environmental ethics. A number o f earlier
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researchers have attempted to illustrate connections between participation in outdoor 
recreation activities and environmental concerns (Dunlap & Hefleman, 1975; Geisler, 
Martinson, & Wilkening, 1977). To date, no association has been statistically 
substantiated concerning this relationship. More recently, Nord, Luloff and Bridger 
(1998) found only weak associations between frequency of visits to forested areas and 
environmental concerns.
Hays (1987) distinguishes between the conservation movement during the early 
part o f the 20th Century and the environmental movement that gained prominence only 
after World War II. It is well known that utilitarian ethics characterized the first half of 
the 20th Century; it is less well-documented what ethical theories have defined 
environmentalism since then. Assorted positions from animal rights to ecocentric holism 
to ecofeminism to deep ecology all rest upon different, and sometimes competing, ethical 
foundations. And therefore any ethical relationship to place, if reflective of an overall 
environmental stance, may rest upon any number of differing ethical foundations. 
However, any treatment of environmentalism must consider factors beyond just ethics, 
because environmentalism, as a movement, draws its strength from many aspects of 
human life net just our ethics. One o f these other aspects was the changing ways that 
Americans were living in the post war years. The rise in environmentalism during the 
second half of the century was coincident with the creation o f suburban America and the 
desire to retreat from crowded housing developments in the urban centers. Hays (1987) 
suggests that the years immediately following World War II were characterized by 
rhangmg values associated with natural areas that were tied to concerns for quality of life. 
“Millions of urban Americans desired to live on the fringe o f the city where life was less
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congested, the air cleaner, noise reduced, and there was less concentrated waste from 
manifold human activities” (p. 149). Leopold (1949) happily noted that many Americans 
consciously sought out outdoor recreation during those post WWII years; yet he was 
equally disappointed in their mode o f travel: “to cap the pyramid o f banalities, the trailer” 
(p. 166). Notwithstanding the critique o f a vacuous suburbia, or the “pseudopastoral 
landscape” (Borgmann, 1992 p. 129), suburban America indicates a conscious shift in 
preferences for what people consider more aesthetically pleasing. Other writers have 
suggested that those natural areas we envelop in our cultural worlds are prime examples of 
the beauty we value in unbounded nature (Eaton, 1997; Meine, 1997; Nassauer, 1997). 
That beauty and environmentalism are linked is not surprising, however, I will offer a 
more complete treatment o f beauty in Chapter 5.
Although Leopold used natural beauty as an ecological indicator, much discussion 
of natural beauty confines any ethical prescription as that which is decidedly 
anthropocentric, meaning beauty in nature is good only because we say it is. The 
utilitarian outlook o f nature as a thing to please our visual senses may seem at odds with 
more contemporary views o f environmentalism. However, it can be argued that the subtle 
changes in lifestyle preferences represent a prerequisite for any culturally cohesive 
environmental ethic. It is also valuable to note that pro-environmental opinions in general 
are “stronger in the city than in the countryside” (Hays, 1998 p. 70). The suggestion is 
that urban and suburban residents not only have stronger opinions about the natural 
environment, but also through their conscious decisions to mold urban and suburban 
landscape they imprint the expectation o f natural beauty into lawns, parkways and outdoor 
playgrounds. As a result, our parks and natural areas open for outdoor recreation are
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themselves manifestations o f environmental ethics and simply based on utilitarian 
arguments.
The migration o f Americans from the cities to the suburbs was not just an indicator 
o f health concerns. Outdoor recreation too became an integral component o f a good life 
for many in the post World War II years. The importance o f outdoor recreation in 
America is perhaps best illustrated by the quick appearance of research devoted to this 
topic in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s (Manning, 1999). Runte (1997) traces the 
evolution of America’s National Parks and this review further illustrates the growing 
popularity of outdoor recreation during those years following the Second World War. 
Catton (1971) too provides a thorough summary o f the evolution of outdoor recreation 
over the years. Clearly natural areas were viewed by many beginning in the post WWII 
years as tremendous sources o f recreational value.
2.1.2 Grappling with “Unnatural” Nature
Part o f our human-nature relationship concerns identifying and assigning 
membership into the category of nature. This is not as simple a task as it might appear. 
Questions arise as to what is nature and what features must be present in a landscape, 
park, or open area for it to be considered nature. This debate is informed by 
distinguishing the natural from the unnatural, as the former gains membership into the 
class of nature, while the latter tends more towards that class of things human. In order to 
understand how this distinction between the natural and unnatural occurs, it may be 
helpful to consider under what circumstances people come in contact with different parts 
o f nature and from this how that contact informs values. To contextualize the following
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discussion, I will offer the term wilderness as that which is largely defined as being natural 
So wilderness ends up being our template for the natural and it is from here that we can 
work our way outwards towards those things less natural.
Wilderness, like Yellowstone, is often set upon some pedestal high above other 
‘less-worthy’ icons o f environmental concern, such as state parks, county forests, and 
greenways. The importance many people assign to wilderness speaks to the value they 
assume is inherent in all wilderness areas: naturalness. This discussion o f wildness is not 
specifically about those approximately 91 million acres in the National Wilderness 
Preservation System (NWPS); however, the contrast between familiar/nearby and 
unfamiliar/distant inevitably reduces to some such comparison particularly where the 
people interviewed for this study have very limited access to what might be unequivocally 
considered a truly natural area.
The population distribution of the United States puts approximately 62% of the 
people east of the Mississippi. This same area contains less than 6.5% o f the lands in the 
National Wilderness Preservation System (NWPS) (Hendee, Stankey, & Lucas, 1990). 
Lands east of the Mississippi have generally known industrialized settlement longer than 
lands in the western half o f the country have. Thus, by many criteria the land included in 
the NWPS are found more frequently in the western half of the country. One of the 
preeminent criteria for wilderness is naturalness (P.L. 88-577). But naturalness is an 
elusive term particularly when the converse, ‘artificial’ presumes some level of human 
manipulation. Few areas described as natural can boast o f no human influence in some 
sense. Environmental philosophers have leapt onto this distinction and the terms natural 
and artificial have been used widely to debate the varying degrees o f moral commitments
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that each might have (Elliot, 1998; Katz, 1997; Michael, 2001). In brie£ some feel that 
greater responsibilities are owed to natural areas because, by definition, they cannot be 
created and are thus a dwindling resource. Others contend that natural areas have intrinsic 
value while unnatural or artificial areas have only instrumental value.
What is familiar (using geographic distance as a proxy) to many people in this 
country might also, in some sense, be artificial, or at least less natural as a result o f a 
simple equation whereby most people in the U.S. do not live near wilderness areas. By 
the same token, what is less familiar to many people might be described as natural, or 
lacking in human influence. Indeed, this is the case with the lands in this study. When the 
Cumberland Falls State Resort Park was established in 1931, several commercial 
enterprises had previously operated on the lands in and around what is now the park. The 
land was clearly used, manipulated and altered through these commercial ventures. 
However relative a term ‘naturalness’ is, it may well correlate negatively to the familiar 
and positively to the less familiar for those people interviewed for this study.
2.I.2.1 The Legitimacy of Restoration
Some philosophers have attempted to draw distinctions between different types o f 
“natural areas” based on the role humans have assumed working on and with the land 
(Elliot, 1998; Katz, 1997). While the main concern for both Elliot and Katz is the 
legitimacy o f environmental restoration, their arguments can contribute to the discussion 
o f familiar and less familiar above. Katz (1997) strongly criticizes attempts to consider 
humanly manipulated environments in the same way we conceive o f completely natural 
areas. In short, he considers areas that have seen human manipulation of or intervention
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into natural process as artifacts. And as artifacts these areas are ontologically different 
than natural areas. In the context o f this study, nearly all the land in and around 
Cumberland Falls would be considered as an artifact and therefore ontologically and 
morally distinct under Katz’ framework. In drawing a distinction between natural areas 
and artifacts Katz considers artifacts to lack moral considerability. To wit, if Cumberland 
Falls lacks moral considerability, but less-familiar areas out west are appropriately 
considerable, a problem of ethical comparison would arise. However, there is ample 
evidence to consider all the natural areas in this study as objects o f like ethical concern. In 
other words, Katz’ critique may not apply to the comparisons in this study.
Using Katz’ terms o f artifact and natural, many o f the less familiar natural areas, 
such as Yellowstone, would likewise be considered as artifacts since management efforts 
to control fire, to reintroduce certain species and to rehabilitate areas where recreationists 
have impacted the resource have been the norm since the Park’s inception. Krieger (1998) 
further notes the gradations o f naturalness (and not its absoluteness) by stating “[w]hat is 
considered a natural environment depends on the particular culture and society defining it” 
(p. 218). Thus, considering the variety o f cultures and societies, “naturalness” as 
advocated by Katz does not necessarily represent a real thing in the world. Perhaps the 
most persuasive argument against Katz’ position is articulated in recent discussions in the 
journal, Environmental Ethics. Lo (1999) presents three arguments against Katz’ 
position: 1) that restored natural areas need not be considered different from other areas; 
nor 2) should they be considered artifacts lacking intrinsic value; and 3) that there is no 
basis to assume that a restored natural area is in any way morally inferior to a natural area. 
In brief, Lo’s argument challenges Katz to explain why some human activity seems benign
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or even good and why human benefits seem to trump all other benefits. In other words, 
the instrumentality  o f nature as artifact which is so odious to Katz is without basis.
2.1.2.2 Authenticity and the Natural
Another interpretation o f this argument is one o f authenticity. Dovey (1989) 
extends the concept of authenticity to the natural world by suggesting that “natural” areas 
can be classified as authentic or inauthentic with the inauthentic representing something 
morally inferior to the authentic. In this study, some might argue that Cumberland Falls is 
somehow less authentic than Yellowstone for example, and therefore less worthy o f moral 
consideration. The difference in this case is not a function of geography but one o f scale 
and history. Cumberland Falls is substantially smaller and has a more checkered history of 
human influenced change than does Yellowstone. Less-familiar areas out west, 
conversely, are viewed by many as sufficiently large in size to represent intact ecosystems 
(e.g., Yellowstone) and they lack the history o f human manipulation that some might 
consider a sign of inauthenticity.
In response to this concern, Dovey notes that the inauthentic or “fake” need not be 
entirely dismissed as a bad thing. In reference to the inauthentic, he says “fakes often have 
quite authentic aspects about them, most notably their role in protecting the truly 
authentic” (Dovey, 1989, p. 48). This argument has been used as a justification for zoos 
in protecting animals in the wild. However, this justification is not without its critics 
(Jamieson, 1985/2001). This conception of authenticity puts the inauthentic in an 
unenviable role o f the means by which the truly authentic is protected. However, I’d 
suggest that this level o f intellectual analysis may not come up in the lexicon o f many
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people’s ethics. Nonetheless, this seems to be another possible response to the concern of 
some ontological difference between the familiar and less familiar nature, which will be 
taken up shortly.
Taking a slightly different argument, Field (1995) explicitly states that people can 
and do have moral relationships with artifacts and thus any distinction between the natural 
and non-natural is, pardon the pun, artificial. Peterson (1999) offers a concise conclusion 
to the subject o f the natural, as well as this overall discussion of the human-nature 
relationship:
Nature can be understood as socially constructed in two senses: in different 
cultures’ interpretations of the nonhuman world and in the physical ways that 
humans have shaped even areas that they think o f as ‘natural’ Both 
understandings are important for environmental ethics insofar as they highlight the 
diversity o f ways of viewing and living in nature (p. 339).
In this analysis, a social construction o f nature presumes some attention to naturalness
and/or authenticity. Rightly or wrongly, if naturalness and/or authenticity correspond to
degrees o f familiarity, then we might identify a difference in moral evaluations between the
familiar and the unfamiliar.
Up to this point, the focus has been on understanding the nature o f different
natural areas. Much, though not aU, aspects o f environmentalism are place specific. This,
despite the notion that place may not always be this grounded concrete entity, rich with
specificity and meaning. Kunstler (1993) suggests as much in his aptly titled, The
Geography o f Nowhere. In this book, Kunstler suggests that some nefarious monoculture
form of development has swept aside any notion that places can be truly distinctive any
longer. Yet, as stated earlier, this is a study about environmental ethics with regards to
natural places. Kunstler’s concern was with commercial and residential development, less
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with parks. Therefore, conceiving of different parks as different objects o f moral concern 
may leave us immune to Kunstler’s charge that places have become essentially 
indistinguishable by means other than longitude and latitude.
Allowing for the possibility that parks are perceived differently by different people 
gives us the freedom to consider variations in environmental commitment. With this we 
can examine how we come to know specific places. After all, the process of knowing an 
area is informed by and informs our ethical commitments to that area. Further, knowing 
nature is serendipitously tied to a discussion of the familiar and the unfamiliar.
2J2 Knowing Nature (An Ontology of Familiar and Unfamiliar Natural Areas)
The contrast between the familiar and the unfamiliar allows for different 
expressions and emphases o f underlying ethical relationships. Throughout this study, 
distance was used as a proxy for familiarity. It is not a perfect correlate, however, the 
responses in the interviews tended to uphold this assumption. Thus, implicit in my intent 
to interview people at Cumberland Fall State Resort Park was the belief that they would 
be more familiar with this area than some other area at a greater distance. Yellowstone 
was used as the example of the distant (read: less-familiar) resource for nearly all o f those 
interviewed. Yellowstone is perhaps the best example o f an archetypal mythical west and 
perhaps symbolic of what nature should be to some extent. Yet, in order to understand 
how people respond to specific examples o f nature, we should gain some perspective on 
the essences of those places people are discussing.
Ontology is concerned with questions o f existence or reality. True to the nature of 
ontological questions, they do not lend themselves well to experimental research or
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unwavering proof Rather, these questions attempt to cut to the essence of a thing which
may or may not even exist (Palmer, 1996). Here, the question surrounds a difference
between familiar and unfamiliar natural areas. Within this question rest assumptions about
the meanings, values and expectations of the familiar and the unfamiliar. Considering that
the familiar and unfamiliar are the objects o f concern here, we end up with a curious
blending of the ontological with the epistemological due to the fact that familiarity is, at its
core, a function of knowledge (Kaplan, 1978). Drawing on Plato’s (1956) Simile o f the
Line, the familiar and the unfamiliar represent concepts in the Intelligible World. For the
purposes of this research, we presume that the familiar and the unfamiliar are, indeed, real
and distinct things. This premise is based on the belief that no one can ever know (in the
epistemological sense) everything. Thus, all o f us should be able to describe which things
are familiar and which are unfamiliar, particularly when pairing two things together. For
example, asking someone if they are more familiar with baseball or soccer should yield an
intelligible response. By the same token, asking someone if they are more familiar with
Cumberland Falls or Yellowstone should yield a similarly intelligible response. It is
important to note that unfamiliar is not coincident with lack o f any knowledge about some
object. Familiar and unfamiliar represent but varying degrees upon a single axis.
The research task o f separating the familiar from the unfamiliar is a challenging
one. Kaplan (1978) writes,
But to say, then, that people in fact know little or nothing is hardly helpful. The 
long-time resident o f a given city ‘knows’ a great deal that the first-time visitor 
does not, even though this ‘knowing’ is necessarily flawed (p. 55).
Similarly, the frequent visitor to Cumberland Falls may know much more about that area
than he or she does about Yellowstone. Psychological researchers have noted that
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frequency o f exposure to some object results in the mapped storage o f that object into 
memory (Attneave, 1957; Bruner, 1957). In an effort to draw on the psychological 
traditions associating knowledge with frequency, this research substituted geographic 
distance as a proxy for familiarity.
At this point, we might ask philosophically whether nearby nature can even be 
compared with distant nature or are these two things o f different types altogether? In 
general terms, in order for a local resource to be ethically comparable to a more distant 
resource both should be, at a minimum, objects of moral concern. Justice accounts of 
morality tend to erase boundaries and distances. In this respect, nature is nature is nature 
and duties toward one example o f nature would lead to duties to all examples o f nature. 
Thus, a duty that one might have to Cumberland Falls State Resort Park would be no 
different than a duty to Yellowstone National Park, so long as both are considered on 
equal moral ground. Conversely, an ethic of care would not attempt to erase boundaries 
or distance, but would instead recognize and embrace distinction. Caring for a nearby 
area presumes some relationship with that area, which may not be available when someone 
considers caring for a distant area that one has never previously visited (Booth, 1998; 
Curtin, 1996; Field, 1995; King, 1991; O'Neil, 2000; Warren, 1998). In this view, the 
distant is unknown and unfamiliar, thus, care (in the ethical sense) cannot be truly achieved 
until one is able to know that area in the same way that one knows the local area they 
spend a good deal o f time in-
But geographic distance is certainly not the only feature that distinguishes 
Cumberland Falls State Resort Park from Yellowstone National Park. The issue o f scale 
was another point o f departure: Cumberland Falls is approximately 1,800 acres compared
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to Yellowstone’s 2.2 million. Is there anything to suggest that a larger area is somehow 
morally considerable whereas a smaller area is not? Or perhaps that a larger area is more 
morally considerable than a smaller area? This distinction may bear on one’s moral 
outlook both directly and indirectly. In the direct sense, a large area may seem more 
morally considerable because it’s largesse results in its membership of a very small 
fraternity. Very few areas o f the size o f Yellowstone National Park exist anywhere in the 
world. Thus, the scarcity o f areas this size creates value in them because o f their small 
numbers. Measuring Cumberland Falls in acres yields nothing too impressive. The effects 
o f both geography and scale will be taken up again in Chapters Four, Five and Six.
2 3  Standard and Substandard Views in Environmental Ethics
Focusing the discussion downward from a general treatment of environmentalism,
I now turn to a review o f the handful o f standard and substandard positions in 
environmental ethics. The following discussion will focus on four standard views and two 
substandard views. The term substandard is used to indicate that these views have yet to 
receive the attention o f the other four more standard views; yet this may just be a function 
o f discussing these ever-evolving views as a snapshot frozen in time. While this research 
will only address a portion of these standard views, all are offered as a reference to the 
diversity of thought that has contributed to the nascent field of environmental ethics. 
Moreover, environmental ethics is not so narrow a field that a single term means the same 
thing to all people. In feet, environmental ethics is sufficiently broad so as to capture 
sometimes conflicting responsibilities to nature: witness the tension between animal rights 
and ecocentric ethics (Callicott, 1980).
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This review o f six different views is intended to provide the reader with a sense o f 
the scope of the overall field o f environmental ethics. As mentioned previously, 
environmental ethics is not a monolithic concept. To suggest otherwise would be akin to 
suggesting that “religious” is a sufficiently descriptive term to understand someone’s belief 
in a higher power and the afterlife. Clearly Muslims, Jews, Hindus, and Buddhists all 
might be described as religious, but there is little agreement between some o f the most 
fundamental aspects o f their respective belief systems. Shifting back, to affirm that one 
has an environmental ethic informs the dialogue little. What is needed is a specific 
treatment of the varieties or flavors within environmental ethics. This section is divided 
into six subsections—four devoted to the standard views and two devoted to the 
substandard views—each o f which is meant to underscore the distinctiveness o f different 
environmental ethics views.
Richard Sylvan (1973/1998) provided some much needed direction to the 
burgeoning field o f environmental ethics in the early 1970’s when he thoughtfully asked 
the question, “Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?” Sylvan noted that basic 
human chauvinism is essential to all o f the big western ethical theories. To overcome this 
chauvinism, he recommended three ethical options: 1) extend a prevailing ethic to include 
non-human entities; 2) incorporate environmental values into the dominant tradition; or 3) 
create a new ethic. Accordingly, different views within environmental ethics can be 
classified into one o f these three options. Following which, I will use Sylvan’s possibilities 
to clarify each o f the four standard views and the two substandard views.
Discussing standard views in environmental ethics seems a peculiar notion—that 
there are any standardized views in a field with a mere 30 or so years of discourse.
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Despite the youthfulness o f environmental ethics, a  brief review of three popular 
anthologies revealed a few thematic consistencies. These thematic consistencies appeared 
as either stand-alone chapters or as entire sections within each of these three books. As 
such, I have treated these consistencies as standard views in the field o f environmental 
ethics. Table 1 illustrates standard views as they appear in each book.
Zimmerman et aL (eds.) Pojman (ed.) Van de Veer and Pierce 
(eds.)
Individual-based ethics Animal Rights Animal Rights
Holistic-based ethics Biocentric/Ecocentric Ethics Biotic Community Ethics
Deep Ecology Deep Ecology Deep Ecology
Ecofeminism Ecofeminism Ecofeminism
Political Ecology Intrinsic Value Social Ecology
Table 1: Comparison of environmental topic areas across three environmental ethics 
anthologies (Pojman, 1998; Van de Veer & Pierce, 1998; Zimmerman, Callicott, Sessions, 
Warren, & Clark, 1998).
Adjusting for slight differences in language, the four standard views are:
•  Animal Rights/Liberation
• Holistic/Community-based Ethics
•  Deep Ecology
• Eco feminism
Despite a personal fondness for political/social ecology, I have not chosen to treat 
this view as one o f the standard views for two main reasons. First of all, political/social 
ecology is not as concisely packaged at the four views listed above. This view 
incorporates vastly different perspectives from free-market capitalists to green socialists,
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from bioregionalists to ecoterrorists. In short, the common thread to this view is not as 
straight and well-defined as the other four threads. Secondly, some elements o f the 
political/social ecology view can be found in the other “standard” views. For instance, 
pieces o f Gary Snyder’s and Kirkpatrick Sale’s bioregionalism can be found in deep 
ecology and ecofeminism as well as a holistic ethics.
In addition to these four “standard” views, I would suggest that there exists at 
least two other “substandard” views that deserve some mention:
• Environmental Pragmatism
• Ecological Virtue Ethics
Environmental pragmatism might be defined as an urgent call to action, less a denial o f the 
standard views, than an imperative to cease with the theorizing and ‘just do it” so to 
speak. I offer this view in light of its contributions to a context ually-dependent 
environmental ethics giving rise to an ethics o f care. As I will explain more folly, 
environmental pragmatism is an important, albeit fairly recent, approach to environmental 
ethics that should not be neglected simply because it lacks the history of some o f the other 
views. Further, as implied by its defining terms, environmental pragmatism is prepared to 
deal with a substantial range of environmentally ethical issues including: animal rights 
(Rothenberg 1996), wetlands protection (Schiappa 1996), and Leopold’s Land Ethic 
(Norton 1996).
Ecological virtue ethics represents a bridge between the Ancient Greek conception 
o f ethics and the contemporary field o f environmental ethics (van Wensveen 2000). This 
“substandard” view is included in this discussion for three reasons. First, within the four 
standard views, one finds hints of virtues. In some instances, these virtues are explicit as
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in the case of Leopold’s “integrity, stability and beauty” (Shaw 1997). In other cases, 
though, virtues are encouraged as an ideal character trait or behavior but are not explicitly 
acknowledged as virtues (Hill Jr. 1983). The second reason to include this discussion of 
ecological virtue ethics is the relationship this view has with a supererogatory ethical 
orientation towards the environment. All virtue ethics are very much self-directed, rather 
than act or other directed. In this sense, the ‘good’ that comes about from practicing 
virtue ethics extends to others only as a byproduct of what one does for oneself. By this 
measure, environmental virtue ethics are very much anthropocentric. Lastly, there exists a 
close association between a virtue-based ethic and a care-based ethic (Spelman 1991; 
Groenhout 1998).
2.3.1 The Four Standard Views
Environmental ethics, like the general field o f ethics, has a definitive reactive 
component to it. In other words, ethics might be viewed as a discipline o f iteration, 
addition and reformulation. Ethical theories seem to grow from someone’s dissatisfaction 
with some other theory. As a result new views are continuously advanced. This is plain 
to see when collectively examining the four standard views. However, it is not correct to 
consider one view as necessarily growing out o f the one(s) preceding it. For example, it is 
not entirely accurate to consider the Holistic/Community-based ethics as naturally 
evolving from the Animal Rights/Liberation view. Rather the former view is, in some 
respects, a response to the latter view, yet ill-defined, and uncertain holistic views 
predated much of the work done on animal rights. Thus, a temporal, linear relationship 
should not be inferred by the order in which these four views are presented.
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23.1.1 Animal Rights/Liberation
I use the term Animal Rights/Liberation only for convenience. The three positions 
explained within this subsection all share a  common concern for the well-being of non­
human animals. The choice to refer to a standard view in this way was made in an effort 
to capture and identify a more recognizable term than that which more precisely defines 
this standard view: an emphasis on individual animals. Thus, the views discussed in this 
subsection may be more precisely defined as Individually-Based Ethics.
This view really spans two rather different, but related, perspectives. The 
perspective that non-human animals possess rights and the perspective that non-human 
animals can experience pain are the bases for this view o f environmental ethics. In 
addressing the different conceptions o f this view I will primarily draw on the works of 
three authors: Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and Paul Taylor. The common thread that unites 
each of these writers and their respective positions is their emphasis on the individual 
animal rather than groups or communities o f creatures. This point will become clearer 
through a comparison to the Holistic/Community based ethic in the next subsection.
Recalling Sylvan’s “three possibilities” for an environmental ethic, each of the 
positions presented in this section on Animal Rights/Liberation attempts to extend the 
moral community beyond Homo sapiens. Thus, Singer, Regan and Taylor all attempt to 
overcome basic human chauvinism by giving non-human, living creatures moral 
consideration. However, the degree to which each writer’s community extends depends 
on his conception o f the primary criteria needed to be morally considerable.
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2 J .l.1 .1  Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation
Consider the work o f Peter Singer. Singer is fundamentally a utilitarian who wants
to extend moral considerability to all o f those entities that can experience pain (Singer
1998). Singer does not maintain that no differences exist between humans and other
animals; however, he does not contend that any of those differences count towards a
difference in basic moral considerability.
There are important differences between humans and other animals, and these 
differences must give rise to some differences in the rights that each have. 
Recognizing this obvious feet, however, is no barrier to the case for extending the 
basic principle o f equality to non-human animals (Singer 1998 p. 27)
According to Singer, what makes someone or something morally considerable is its ability
to experience pain. Traditionally, measures o f pleasure and pain relate to human
experiences. More recently, it has been acknowledged that other creatures most certainly
do experience pain based on our knowledge of the central nervous system which is the
defining feature o f all vertebrates. This use of pleasure and pain as evaluative tools
judging rightness or wrongness o f an action refer back to the lucid treatise by John Stuart
Mill, Utilitarianism. In this essay, Mill notes that:
The utilitarian doctrine is that happiness is desirable, and the only thing 
desirable, as an end; all other things being only desirable as means to that 
end (Mill 1861/1991).
It should be noted that happiness is often misconstrued to mean simply pleasure. In feet
some have illustrated that happiness as an ethical state is not the same as happiness as a
psychological state (Adler 1985). Conversely, the antithesis o f happiness need not be
confined just to aspects o f physical pain. That said, Singer’s conception of moral
considerability lies exclusively with a subject’s ability to experience physical pain.
43
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Singer’s views, like those o f all utilitarians can be described as consequentialist. 
Consequentialist ethics rest not on principles derived from reason, but on expected 
outcomes. A consequentialist ethic eschews rights-talk in favor o f discourses of good and 
well-being and benefit. The founder o f utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham (1843), thought 
that ethics that were non-consequentialist or based on notions o f abstract right and wrong 
were nothing but “nonsense on stilts.” Thus, utilitarianism stands in marked contrast to 
other ethics, particularly those espousing rights for members o f the moral community.
23.1.1.2 Tom Regan’s Subject of a Life
Tom Regan differs from Peter Singer in that he rejects the consequentialist nature 
o f utilitarianism in favor o f a deontological theory in which non-human animals are 
assigned rights. While Regan doesn’t disagree with convictions o f Singer and other 
utilitarians, he simply believes that their argument lacks rigor when held up against a 
rights-based justification (Regan 1996; Regan 1998). Regan also disagrees with the 
Kantian admonition against harming animals because it makes one more prone to harm 
human beings. However, Regan does not dismiss Kant entirely as I will show in the 
following paragraph. Finally, Regan disagrees with the suggestion that harming animals is 
simply an expression o f cruelty. In his view, people who purposefully inflict pain are not 
necessarily cruel—witness the actions o f doctors, dentists and veterinarians, all o f whom 
must harm in some respect in order to help.
Instead, Regan’s position hinges on what he has alternatively referred to as 
inherent (1998) or intrinsic (1985) value. Regan uses these two terms interchangeably, 
however, others have drawn a distinction between them. Norton (1991) in particular
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considers inherent value to require a human valuer, whereas intrinsic value exists absent 
any entity that can assign value. This distinction notwithstanding, Regan notes that “the 
fundamental wrong in the system is that it allows us to view animals as our resources” 
(Regan 198S p. 46). Treating animals with only such an instrumental value is in direct 
conflict with allowing them inherent or intrinsic value. Stated this way, we can glimpse 
Regan’s return to one interpretation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative: “Act in such a way 
that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, 
never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end”(Kant 1801/1964 p. 96). 
Said another way, I should never treat other morally considerable beings only as means 
but always at least as an end.
But how does something come to have inherent/intrinsic value? According to 
Regan, this value is coincident with being a subject-of-a-Iife—“each o f us, a conscious 
creature having an individual welfare that has importance to us whatever our usefulness to 
others” (Regan 1985 p. 50). This criteria of a subject-of-a-life extends the moral 
community further than that of Singer. However, consciousness, or self-awareness that 
defines the subject-of-a-life seems a bit more arbitrary. To a certain extent, Regan seems 
to recognize this fuzziness and the problems that go along with it, but he still maintains 
that this position where “rights are based on the value o f the individual” (Regan 1998 p. 
50) is superior to some confusing and complex notion o f utilitarian calculus.
While Regan finds gaps or insufficiencies in Singer’s position, others have been 
critical of the “strong” approach taken by Regan. Specifically, Mary Warren (1998) 
suggests that a “weak animal rights theory” is much more tenable in light o f Regan’s 
reliance on inherent value. This weak position differs from Regan in that Warren identifies
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“compelling realities” that sometimes require that we kill other animals where we could 
not justify killing another human being. For example, consider a scenario where two 
people are stranded on an island on one o f the people decides to kill a feral pig rather than 
the other person so that he/she can eat. Singer would cry “speciesism” (akin to racism or 
sexism at the species level) with this example, but Warren believes that humans are 
qualitatively different in a morally relevant way from other animals. Warren seems to 
embrace Kant a bit more than Regan does in that she returns to the value o f human reason 
as a morally relevant condition that sets humans apart from animals to a certain degree 
(i.e., animals are less morally considerable since they lack the capacity for abstract 
thought). Although, she does concede that the “weak animal rights position may seem an 
unstable compromise between the bold claim that animals have the same basic moral rights 
that we do and the more common view that animals have no rights at all” (Warren 1998 p. 
55).
In application, the primary difference between Singer and Regan can be illustrated 
with a fundamental difference between utilitarian ethics and deontological ethics: means 
versus ends. The consequentialist nature o f utilitarianism allows for morally specious 
means so long as the result, or the end, is a state of maximized happiness/pleasure/good, 
or alternatively, minimized unhappiness/pain/bad. Conversely, deontological ethics are 
decidedly non-consequentialist. That is, it matters not what the end result o f someone’s 
actions are so long as they were done for the morally right reasons. A convenient example 
illustrating these two approaches can be seen in a case of lying. A utilitarian ethic may 
allow someone to lie if one suspects that the outcomes following the lie will result in a 
greater good than if the lie wasn’t told. With deontological ethics, lying is wrong in all
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circumstances because it is wrong in principle and no amount of justifying will make the lie 
a moral, or even a non-moral act.
Where both Singer and Regan appear to fall short (Singer more so than Regan) is 
in their respective attempts to define the moral community. Recall that Singer’s criteria 
rests on what he termed sentience, referring to a creature’s ability to experience pain 
through the central nervous system. Thus, Singer draws his line o f consideration 
somewhere between a shrimp and an oyster. Regan’s subject-of-a-life refers to an entity’s 
ability to experience a sense of identity. With this definition, Regan would include more 
creatures than Singer in his extended moral community, such as mollusks and sea 
anemones. However, neither o f these two positions are ideally or practically tenable in 
that they are not able to adequately deal with non-sentient, non-self aware beings: 
specifically insects and plants. This, then, leads us to Paul Taylor’s biocentric 
egalitarianism.
2J.1 .1J  Paul Taylor’s Biocentric Egalitarianism
Taylor avoids using terms such as “interests” because this implies consciousness. 
Also, he disavows sentience as the determining factor in moral considerability. In each of 
these respects Taylor is reaching substantially farther in extending the moral community 
than either Singer or Regan do. Taylor’s position might appear misplaced in this 
individually-based ethics section; however, a closer examination of his biocentric position 
simply expands the moral community to a wider range o f individuals and not to any 
holistic concept of morality. In feet Taylor is quick to point out that a holistic 
environmental ethic directed towards ecosystems or some such thing carries no moral
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weight—there is no normative power in promoting the protection of something as abstract 
as an ecosystem.
The ‘balance of nature’ is not itself a moral norm, however important may be the 
role it plays in our general outlook on the natural world that underlies the attitude 
o f respect for nature. I argue that finally it is the good (well-being, welfare) of 
individual organisms, considered as entities having inherent worth, that determines 
our moral relations with the Earth’s wiki communities o f life (Taylor 1998 p. 71). 
(emphasis added).
Taylor relies on Albert Schweitzer’s concept o f “reverence for all life” as a guiding 
principle in his biocentric egalitarianism. Note that biocentric should not be confused with 
ecocentric. The former refers to a life-centered perspective where all things living are o f 
importance, while the latter refers to a system-centered perspective, specifically 
ecosystems. As a result, Taylor remains grouped with the individually-oriented theorists 
such as Singer and Regan.
Taylor, too, uses the term inherent value in much the same way that Regan 
employs it; Taylor simply believes that value inheres in all things living. Thus, all things 
living possess inherent worth. This point is echoed in a four-point stance that Taylor 
refers to as “The Biocentric Outlook on Nature.” The four points of this outlook are as 
follows:
1. Humans are thought o f as members of the Earth’s community of life, holding 
that membership on the same terms as apply to all the nonhuman members.
2. The Earth’s natural ecosystems as a totality are seen as a complex web of 
interconnected elements, with the sound biological functioning of each being 
dependent on the sound biological functioning o f the others.
3. Each individual organism is conceived o f as a teleological center o f life, 
pursuing its own good in its own way.
4. Whether we are concerned with the standards o f merit or with the concept of 
inherent worth, the claim that humans by their very nature are superior to other 
species is a groundless claim and, in the light o f elements (1), (2), and (3)
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above, must be rejected as nothing more than an irrational bias in our own 
favor (Taylor 1998).
Rather than explain each o f these four points in more detail, I’ll simply offer that these 
four points collectively constitute Taylor’s biocentric outlook that necessarily leads to 
foundational attitude o f respect for nature, which in turn leads to an ethic.
The actual ethic that Taylor proposes plays out in four parts as well First, he 
proposes a non-malfeasance rule of conduct. Essentially this is a negative duty to do no 
harm to things that have a teleological center o f life (things that can pursue their own 
good, in their own way). The second component is a non-interference rule of conduct. 
This too is a negative duty that tells us we must not interfere with individuals that are 
pursuing their own good. Fidelity is the third component and this can be either a positive 
or a negative duty. In the positive sense I am compelled to maintain established, 
dependent relationships (e.g., act so as to protect critical habitat). The negative duty 
compels me not to deceive something that can be deceived. Finally, the fourth component 
o f this ethic is restitutive justice. Essentially what this means is that if any of the first 
three rules of conduct are violated, I am obliged to undo the damage.
23.1.1.4 Summary of Individually-based Ethics
All three o f the positions represented in this subsection are somewhat internally 
inconsistent in terms o f two important points. First o f all neither Singer, nor Regan, nor 
Taylor are able to adequately explain why there is a difference between pain experienced, 
or rights violated in the wild and these same events occurring in the domestic arena. All 
argue against humans mistreating animals, particularly domestic ones. However, none of
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these three positions sufficiently deals with the problem of pain or a violation of rights in 
the wild between two animals. Citing the fact that only humans can act morally or 
immorally seems wholly inadequate when responding to real world situations. While 
Singer and Regan mostly concern themselves with injustices heaped upon domestic or 
laboratory animals, Taylor most o f all seems overly concerned with the well-being o f wild 
plants and animals. As a result, Singer and Regan are largely silent on issues concerning 
wild animals and Taylor largely silent on domestic animals, which he considers to be 
artifacts, and thus less worthy o f moral consideration. The second point where all three o f 
these perspectives waver is in reference to the establishment o f a more integrated ethic 
that does not focus solely on the individual but rather focuses on the system. Taylor, 
perhaps most clearly explains why a holistic ethic is not needed, but one can’t help feeling 
that an ecosystem is something greater than the sum of its parts and as a result might be 
entitled to some consideration. Additionally, it isn’t exactly clear if an environmental 
ethics (a term itself elucidating a collection) can ever be achieved by focusing our efforts 
and energies on such a fraction of the entire picture.
A final point about Singer and Taylor. It might be tempting to extend Singer’s 
utilitarianism or Taylor’s biocentric egalitarianism to apply towards ecosystems as well. 
However, doing so requires several leaps o f logic each resting on a number of 
questionable assumptions. First with Singer’s utilitarianism, the notions of pleasure and 
pain must be expanded to include terms more suitable for the units in question: 
ecosystems. Few people would argue that ecosystems can and do become damaged from 
various human activities: acid rain, overcutting o f forests, and displacement of keystone 
wildlife species. If these ecosystems can become damaged, they do not function as they
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would otherwise. One could extend this line of thought to say that if they do not function 
as they would otherwise, then they are not functioning as “optimally” as they should (note 
the normative evaluation here). “Optimally” here refers not to energy output, but rather to 
some concept o f telos. At this point we are required to move beyond Singer’s concept o f 
harm to something more akin to Taylor’s concept o f “good”. In essence, we require 
another leap to say that an ecosystem is harmed, if by harm we mean that it is inhibited 
from achieving a natural telos, or its good. Conversely, ecosystems that are undamaged 
by human actions can be said to functioning normally. O f course this whole supposition is 
premised on the belief that there is indeed a telos for ecosystems. The science of 
evolutionary biology has all but answered this question in the negative by considering both 
species and ecosystems as naturally occurring responses to environmental changes, but 
neither can be said to be progression towards some optimal or perfect end. Michael 
(2001) takes up this argument in much more detail in his work on the morality of 
interference with objects and systems in the natural world. Clearly, this metamorphosis is 
for removed from Singer’s and Taylor’s original focus on individual animals, but it is 
useful to set the context for the next standard view: Holistic/Community-Based Ethics. In 
the next section consider the comparison between an environmental ethics that focuses on 
the well-being of individuals versus one that focuses on the well-being of collections or 
groups of things.
2.3.1.2 Holistic/Community-Based Ethics
This holistic or community-based view is in direct contrast to the individually- 
oriented views proposed by Singer, Regan and Taylor. Within this subsection, we find the
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focus is much more on systems or collections rather than on individuals. Recall that the 
Animal Rights/Liberation positions represented an extension o f the prevailing ethic to 
include non-human entities. The positions presented in this subsection, all essentially 
argue for a new ethic altogether. The most obvious choice for inclusion in this subsection 
is Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic. In fact, the Land Ethic holds a prominent position in the 
writings o f the other three people to be discussed in this subsection: Holmes Rolston and 
his multi-scalar application of intrinsic value, Kenneth Goodpaster with his concept o f 
Ecocentric Holism, and J. Baird Callicott’s Darwinian approach. However, let’s begin 
with a brief review o f Leopold’s Land Ethic.
13A.2.1 Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic
Perhaps the most concise and eloquent statement to date of an environmental ethic
can be found in Aldo Leopold’s A Sand Countv Ah**™**.-
A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty o f the 
biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise (Leopold 1949 pp. 224 - 
225)
It is this simple phrase that shifts the singular attention away from individual interests to 
community interests. As a result, the land ethic is something that compels moral agents to 
act in such a way so as to preserve the complex system that comprises the ‘land’ also 
known as the biotic community. Tallmadge (1987) suggests that there are three 
archetypal images in A Sand Countv Almanac. 1) Land as community; 2) Nature as 
language that we can listen to; and 3) Leopold as an example of how we ought to live. 
These three images combine to illustrate how we can and should interact with the natural
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world. In reference to this term community, though, some concern has been raised. 
Community entails boundaries (something within the community and those things outside 
the community). If  indeed these boundaries are real, then the argument could be made 
that the land ethic is not truly holistic, because it necessarily excludes some things. I don’t 
agree that this is a significant criticism due to the feet that there is no reason that 
community boundaries cannot be as fluid, flexible and nebulous as ecosystem boundaries.
In writing about Leopold’s intellectual heritage, Roderick Nash refers to the work 
ofCharles Darwin and how Darwin broadened the meaning o f kinship (Nash 1987). It is 
this broadened sense o f kinship that Leopold attempts to emphasize throughout his book. 
That is, that humans are a part of the natural community and not apart from it. However, 
problems arise with this notion of kinship. Are there degrees o f kinship? Are some other 
beings closer kin with us? And if so, then do we have different sorts o f obligations to 
them?
Although A Sand Countv Almanac, in general, appears to offer unflinching clarity, 
it is not above scrutiny. In feet, the simplistic beauty of Leopold’s prose has allowed any 
number of people to second guess the meanings behind the words. What exactly does 
stability mean? How does one observe integrity? By what standards should we measure 
the beauty o f the biotic community? Each o f these represent troubling questions in 
reference to applying this land ethic to policy decisions. Certainly Leopold’s land ethic is 
not alone in this respect, however, the problem remains: ought implies can. Stated 
another way, if I ought to act so as to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the 
biotic community, I should have clear choices that will allow me to do that. The critiques 
of Leopold generally center on this ambiguity. However, others have discovered more
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theoretical differences of interpretation. For instance, Callicott (1987) and Norton (1996; 
1996) interpret the land ethic very differently. Table 2 illustrates their respective 
viewpoints.
Callicott Norton
The land ethic is essentially biocentric The land ethic is essentially anthropocentric
The land ethic is based on inherent value The land ethic is based on instrumental 
value
Holism is normative considerability Holism is descriptive, not normative
Concedes a problem in duties to  close kin Admit that it’s okay to have multiple duties
Table 2: A comparison o f Callicott’s and Norton’s interpretations o f Leopold’s Land 
Ethic.
Another criticism o f holistic/community based ethics in general, and specifically the 
land ethic, is a tendency towards misanthropy or ecofacism. In brief Leopold has been 
accused o f ecofacism which occurs when a human-based ethic attempts to include other 
beings. More precisely, ecofacism occurs when the interests o f the individual are always 
considered after preserving the integrity of the whole. However, the reply is that we do 
not necessarily abandon all o f our other human-centered ethics. As a result, it is not 
entirely accurate to label Leopold an ecofacist.
Above all, Leopold felt that ethics was evolutionary, moving from an ethics of 
individuals, to a social ethics, and we now find ourselves on the verge of an ecological 
ethics. However, like Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs (Maslow, 1968), it is suggested we 
cannot progress to the next level until we have satisfied the lower level So, we have not 
satisfied our social ethics and therefore we are held back from successfully meeting an 
ecological ethic. Some might argue that this just represents an extension of the prevailing 
ethics rather than the creation o f a new ethics. However, Leopold notes that with the land
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ethic we are redirecting our sentiments to include the biotic community. It is this shift in
sentiments that makes this a new ethic.
In terms of philosophic traditions, Leopold draws some from Lockean notions of
the land as property. Clearly, Leopold finds much fault in these notions, as evidenced by
another oft-cited phrase:
In short, a land ethic changes the role o f Homo sapiens from conqueror o f the 
land-community to plain member and citizen o f it (Leopold 1949 p. 204).
John Locke relied on Natural Law Theory to outline four basic premises that ultimately
resulted in the perception o f land as property.
1 (a). One has the right to one’s own body.
(b). If (a), then one as a right to one’s labor.
(c). If (b), then one has a right to the fruits o f one’s labor.
2. God has given the earth to mankind in common.
3. God commanded (and circumstances demanded) that man labor in order to 
survive.
4. God commanded man neither to destroy nor to spoil or waste.
These four premises, particularly the first two, exhibited revolutionary thinking in the 
1690’s. However, over the course of a couple hundred years, they became fairly 
entrenched into western, and especially American, society. As a result, when Leopold 
wrote A Sand Countv Almanac, urging people to view the land not as property, but rather 
as a member of a community, this represented another radical shift in people’s thinking.
2 J .l.2 .2  Holmes Robton's Systemic Value
Holmes Rolston HI has taken the fundamentals o f Leopold’s holism and offered 
substantial depth to it. Rolston continues with the theme of intrinsic value as evident in 
individuals. However, in order for Rolston to be considered a holist, he must expand this
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notion somehow. He does this through an ontological account of ecosystems (Rolston 
1987). In this essay, Rolston explains how ecosystems are real things and from this that 
they have value. The context o f ecosystems along with animals, organisms and species 
becomes clearer in a subsequent essay (Rolston III, 1998). The following diagram 
illustrates Rolston’s framework.
SpeciesHigher
Animals
Organisms
Figure 2: The progression o f value. Adapted from (Rolston 1998).
In this framework, Rolston refers to higher animals as participating in an “I-Thou” 
relationship, or a relationship that exists when each member takes note o f the potential of 
the other. He notes this by the presence o f something that returns our gaze. At the 
organism level, Rolston offers a three-part reinterpretation of DNA: 1) DNA is a linguistic 
molecule with instructions; 2) DNA is prepositional offering potential; and 3) DNA is 
normative, containing a moral ought. Rolston differentiates organisms from species by 
referring to tokens and types respectively. Types are more important than tokens because 
tokens, or individual organisms, are ultimately just representations o f a type, or species, 
which spans space and time. At the ecosystem level, Rolston suggests that ecosystems are 
real things, in the sense that any organization that “shapes the behavior o f its members” 
can be considered something that is real (Rolston 1998 p. 139).
What does all this mean in terms o f Rolston’s holism? Rolston is a moral realist in 
that he believes that values actually exist in the world—they are real things. In this sense, 
things (individuals, species, ecosystems) can be said to have value. Rolston differs from 
Callicott and Norton on the notion of inherent versus intrinsic value. Rolston does not
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believe that it takes a human to assign value to something. However, Rolston does 
acknowledge different types of values: instrumental, intrinsic, and systemic. Instrumental 
value naturally deals with the relative utility o f something. Rolston distinguishes between 
intrinsic value and systemic value in that intrinsic values tend be associated with 
individuals, where a systemic value seems to apply to composites o f things.
Rolston avoids charges of ecofacism that were leveled at Leopold by maintaining a 
fairly significant split between culture and nature. For Rolston, human-human 
relationships are fundamentally different than human-nature relationships. Culture is richer 
than nature and humans have the most qualitatively rich experiences. However, Rolston is 
not without his critics. One criticism o f Rolston is his tendency to run roughshod over the 
naturalistic fallacy. A simple statement o f the naturalistic fallacy is that “no ought can be 
derived from an is.” Stated another way, one cannot determine a normative prescription 
from a factual description. While it is true that violating the naturalistic fallacy is a 
consistent problem in environmental ethics, Rolston seems to lead the charge. Recall his 
contention that DNA is normative as witness to this problem. A growing criticism 
directed towards Rolston is similarly directed towards a host of environmental 
philosophers, but Rolston’s fuzzy logic o f intrinsic and systemic values seems to be the 
most recognizable target. This criticism mostly comes from a group of environmental 
pragmatists who feel that any talk o f intrinsic values unnecessarily stymies productive 
efforts to solve real environmental problems (Norton 1991; Light and Katz 1996; Norton 
1996; Weston 1996; Minteer 1998).
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23 .1 .23  Kenneth Goodpaster’s Ecocentric Holism
The ecocentric holism o f Kenneth Goodpaster (1998) is inchided here primarily to 
clarify how an ecosystem can be viewed as morally considerable. His theory on this 
matter is far less developed than either o f those by Leopold or Rolston, but he does 
contribute something towards conceiving of ecosystems as something of moral value. 
Goodpaster suggests that we consider certain distinctions that should help us see the 
potential of including ecosystems in our moral community. These distinctions can be 
reduced to four different suggestions.
1. We should recognize the distinction between moral rights and moral 
considerability and opt for moral considerability as that which offers clearer 
guidance in ethical dilemmas.
2. We should distinguish between a criterion o f moral considerability and moral 
significance. Moral significance allows for comparative judgments o f moral 
“weight” in cases o f conflict.
3. The third suggestion surrounds our ability to differentiate what we say is 
morally considerable and what is in fact morally considerable.
4. Finally, it should be acknowledged that there are cognitive and psychological 
thresholds beyond which we become morally blind.
These four suggestions o f Goodpaster contribute to a clearer ethical direction in instances
where abstract entities, such as ecosystems, are recommended to become a part o f the
moral community. He seems ready to concede that there are real-world limitations and
true gradations between things. As a result, one might argue that Goodpaster is a
practicing pragmatist as well
23.1.2.4 J. Baird Callicott’s Evolutionary-based Ethics
Callicott’s holism rests firmly on the foundation of Leopold’s Land Ethic. 
However, Callicott blends a healthy measure of evolutionary theory into his ethic. The
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contributions of evolutionary theory to environmental ethics have been slow to come.
This hesitancy might be attributed to the recurrent dangers o f the naturalistic fallacy or it
might simply be a failure o f some philosophers to embrace the natural sciences as a source
of value rather than simply a descriptive list of the way the world is.
Callicott (1987a) at once acknowledges the power o f the Land Ethic and the
tension it causes when coupled with Darwinian evolution.
...given the unremitting competitive ‘struggle for existence’ how could ‘limitations 
on freedom of action’ ever have been conserved and spread through a population 
of Homo sapiens or the evolutionary progenitors? (p. 189)
Since, evolutionary theory would seem to discourage ethics as an inhibitor to survival,
how can ethics ever be considered evolutionary? What isn’t directly acknowledged is the
evolutionary benefit o f ethics. It is inaccurate and presumptive to consider ethics, any
ethics, as simply some rein on freedom which prevents individuals from pursuing their
natural fecundity. Quite the contrary, ethics, as a tool for social functioning can often
promote greater reproductive success than a system in which individuals act more
Hobbsian in their social commitments. Any social tool that discourages decreased
reproductive success can be said to be evolutionarily valuable.
In discussing the work o f  Darwin, Callicott suggests that ethics became an
outgrowth of natural sentiment that one has towards other like beings. And further, ethics
could very well be “naturally selected, by the advantages for survival and especially for
successful reproduction, afforded by society” (Callicott, 1987a p. 191). And far from
being a genetic quirk that we unwittingly propagate, ethics need not be just egoism
disguised as altruism; rather, “altruism and eventually ethics may have evolved to serve
selfish genes, but that fact does not necessarily limit them to the purpose for which they
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evolved” (Callicott, 1998 p. 154). Therefore, all that we have sentiment toward, be it our 
own kin, a single elk, the species Cams lupus or an ecosystem, can rightly be understood 
as an object o f our moral consideration. Yet, true sentiment as a function o f attachment 
or relationship seems somewhat ill-fitting when applied to species or ecosystems. In other 
words can humans verily feel a connection to an entire species or an ecosystem in the 
same way we feel connections to individuals?
23.1.2.5 Summary of Holistic/Community-based Ethics
While a holistic ethic seems to offer a more advanced ethic when compared to 
individually-based ethics, there exist some fundamental problems in just how a holistic 
ethic is supposed to work. In reference to the ecofascism charge leveled against Leopold, 
privileging the group over the individual to such an extreme is distasteful at best to many 
people. And at worse it seems to strike at the core o f what it means to be human—an 
autonomous individual. Further, the holistic or community based ethics suggest that all 
we must do is redirect our sentiment towards these greater collections o f things. This is a 
task, I submit, that is easier said than done. If Callicott is right, that ethics may indeed be 
an evolutionary adaptation, it does not stand to reason that we can simply choose to have 
a sentiment towards species or ecosystems. On the other hand, if Rolston is correct, and 
systems have their own intrinsic value, then how do we prove this any more than we prove 
the existence o f intrinsic value in anything? The holistic/community-based ethics of 
Leopold, Rolston, Goodpaster, and Callicott offer a new ethical system whereas the ethics 
o f Singer, Regan and Taylor can be said to extend the moral community to include non-
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human entities. Similarly the next two subsections o f Deep Ecology and Eco&minism will 
likewise illustrate new ethics.
2J .1 J  Deep Ecology
Over a decade ago, Kirkpatrick Sale (1990) wrote about a division within the 
environmental movement. On the one hand were people concerned with overpopulation, 
nuclear power, air and water pollution among other things. On the other hand were what 
Sale called the “new ecologists,” soon to become the deep ecologists. These were people 
who questioned the assumptions under which human-nature relationships had evolved 
during the industrial age. Foremost among this latter group were those associated with 
Deep Ecology: Arne Naess, who coined the term “deep ecology” and George Sessions 
and Bill Devall, who went on to author a book of the same name. Gary Snyder is 
sometimes likewise grouped with these “new ecologists” however, since his focus is more 
towards bioregionalism, his ideas will not be discussed in any depth here.
According to Naess, (1998) deep ecology contrasts with, so-called, shallow 
ecology on a number of practical fronts. Table 3 illustrates these contrasts.
Deep Ecology Shallow Ecology
Pollution is evaluated on the scale o f the 
biosphere
Pollution is managed though the use o f 
technology.
Resources and habitats should be available 
for all life forms for their own sake.
The emphasis is on resources for humans.
Excessive pressures on the planet's life 
forms stem from the human population 
explosion.
Human “overpopulation” is primarily a 
problem in developing countries.
Protect cultures in non-industrial countries. The Western model of industrialization 
should be the goal of developing countries.
Table 3: Contrasts between deep and shallow ecology (Adapted from Naess, 1998).
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Deep ecologists’ most potent argument is a challenge of the anthropocentrism of 
Western ethics. They support this argument by pointing out that “throughout the long 
existence of the human race (say approximately 1.2 million years) only a minority of 
humanity has held an anthropocentric view of the universe. Most hunter-gatherer societies 
had ‘ecocentric’ religious views involving a sacred sense o f the earth” (Palmer 1996 p. 
300). This anti-anthropocentric stance is evidenced through the, now well-established, 
Eight Point Platform.
1. The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman life on Earth have 
value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent worth). These values 
are independent of the usefulness o f the nonhuman world for human purposes.
2. Richness and diversity o f life forms contribute to the realization o f these values 
and are also values in themselves.
3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy 
vital needs.
4. The flourishing o f human life and cultures is compatible with a substantially 
smaller human population. The flourishing o f nonhuman life requires a smaller 
human population.
5. Present human interference with the nonhuman world is excessive, and the 
situation is rapidly worsening.
6. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, 
technological and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be 
deeply different from the present.
7. The ideological change will be mainly that o f appreciating life quality (dwelling 
in situations o f inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher 
standard of living. There will be profound awareness of the difference between 
bigness and greatness.
8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or 
indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes (Naess 1998 pp. 196 - 
197).
Each o f these eight points has been subject to much scrutiny. However, at this point I will 
simply offer a few comments on some o f the more controversial statements. In reference 
to the first point: Naess encourages us to take a “more comprehensive, non-technical” 
view of the term ‘life’. In this respect, life is not just limited to the traditional definition
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but also includes letting things live such as rivers, mountains, landscapes and ecosystems. 
The term ‘vital need’ in point number three, ‘is  left deliberately vague to allow for 
considerable latitude in judgment” {ibid. p. 198). As one can imagine, this ambiguity has 
received much criticism. The call towards downsizing the human population, point 
number four, is expected to take hundreds o f years. In the fifth point, the term “non­
interference” does not imply that humans should not modify some ecosystems, as do other 
species. “Humans have modified the earth over their entire history—at issue is the nature 
and extent o f such interference” {ibid. p. 199).
While these eight points lay out the deep ecology platform fairly clearly, the deep 
ecology movement is characterized by a wider set o f assumptions. It can be described as a 
logical progression through four different levels where consistent, “deep”, questions are 
urged throughout the progression.
• Level 1: Ultimate premises and ecosophies
• (e.g., Buddhist, Christian, Philosophical).
• Or other personal maxims: “Do God’s will”, “Find peace in oneself’
• Level 2: The Eight Point Platform of Deep Ecology
• As listed above
• Level 3: General normative consequences and “factual” hypotheses
• (e.g., “Preserve wilderness” or “Protect biodiversity”)
• Level 4: Particular rules or decisions adapted to the particular situations
• How ultimate premises are operationalized
• This represents a specific behavioral direction.
The complexity o f deep ecology should not undermine its applied potential.
Hidden within are a number o f important features. First o f all, Naess “rejects the 
fact/value distinction as an arbitrary philosophical conceit” (Palmer, 1996, p. 303). In the 
sense that Naess believes values are hidden within facts, he is (arguably) able to avoid the 
naturalistic fallacy. (Note that Rolston too embraces this union o f fact and value). A
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second contribution o f deep ecology is the reconsideration of the skin as the boundary that 
separates ourselves from the rest o f the world. In Naess’ view, our skin is a sensuous 
surface connecting us to the rest o f the world rather than separating us from it. This is 
fundamental to the idea of self-in-Self where we see ourselves as a part of a larger whole. 
In other words, each of us as individual human beings are more importantly considered 
parts of something o f greater identity—the earth. Finally, the Aristotelian notion o f self- 
realization plays a central role in deep ecology which allows for the traditionally staid field 
o f virtue ethics to creep back, however, slightly, into environmental philosophy. Despite 
these strengths, deep ecology is not without its critics. Most notable among these critics 
are Murray Bookchin and Ramachandra Guha.
Bookchin’s (1998) criticisms o f deep ecology are pointed and forceful and are 
primarily rooted in its supposed ignorance o f real social problems (ecofeminists too attack 
deep ecology on this point). This point is concisely stated as, “deep ecology, despite all its 
social rhetoric, has no real sense that our ecological problems have their roots in society 
and in social problems” (Bookchin 1988 p. 13). Bookchin accuses deep ecologists o f a 
kind of eco-brutalism that views humanity as a cancer and famines as nature’s population 
control. He goes on to refer to deep ecologists as “deep Malthusians”, after Thomas 
Mahhus who sounded the alarm o f overpopulation in 18th Century Great Britain.
Bookchin though, identifies the dark side o f Malthusianism—that o f an often explicit 
endorsement of social Darwinism where those in power (typically white, Western, males) 
are more fit to be on top and efforts to assist those disenfranchised is morally wrong. This 
last point is designed to underscore the tendency o f deep ecologists (Dave Foreman, in
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particular) to view human tragedies, such as famines and AIDS, as convenient culling 
devices and we should let nature take its course.
Another pointed critique of deep ecology comes from Ramachandra Guha (1989) 
who notes that it is a distinctly American idea and would be harmful if exported, 
particularly to Third World countries. Four points help to flesh out Guha’s critique:
1. The shift from anthropocentrism to biocentrism is unhelpful and irrelevant 
because it doesn’t consider militarization and overconsumption (both uniquely 
associated with developed countries).
2. Deep Ecology is excessively concerned with the preservation of wilderness. 
This can be especially harmful to people who live in countries where there is 
not a lot o f potential for wilderness. (India’s Project Tiger has benefited the 
elite and the tourists at the expense of the locals).
3. Invoking Eastern belief systems is irrational and divisive. Eastern peoples have 
just as poor an environmental track record as the west. Also, holding up the 
“Eastern” view as the other unnecessarily sets up an Us/Them dualism.
4. Finally, there is a question whether or not deep ecology is truly radical. They 
seem to just want to preserve land (wilderness) and there’s nothing new about 
that.
Both Bookchin’s and Guha’s criticisms are social in nature. Ecofeminists, too, 
have their own criticism o f deep ecology.
2.3.1.4 Ecofeminism
In 1974, Francoise d ’Eaubonne coined the term ecofeminism to describe a growing 
feminist interest in the environment. Where deep ecology focused on anthropocentrism as 
a fundamental problem, ecofeminism focuses on androcentrism, or male-centeredness. 
However, ecofeminism is not nearly as codified as deep ecology with its eight point 
platform. Further, according to Karen Warren, (1998a) there is no single type of 
ecofeminism just as there is no single type of feminist. Yet, there is one issue where all 
ecofeminists agree: “that there are important connections between the domination of
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women and the domination of nature” {ibid. p. 264). For a general frame o f reference, 
though, we can identify three types o f ecofeminists. The first type might be referred to as 
Liberal Ecofeminists. Their position is simply to give women and nature equal treatment 
as men and culture. The second type are Cultural Ecofeminists who suggest that we 
consider other values such as care and love and elevate nurturing and trust. In their view, 
no substantial overhaul is needed, tweaking the current system should suffice. Most o f the 
ecofeminists discussed in this section would fell into this category (Le., Karen Warren, Val 
Plumwood and Jim Cheney). The third type are the Social Ecofeminists who believe that 
those people who would dominate nature are the same people who dominate other people, 
in particular women. Murray Bookchin, while technically a social ecologist, recognizes 
that domination o f women is a subtly nuanced deviation o f hierarchy.
Warren suggests that the “philosophical significance of ecofeminism is that it 
challenges feminism to take environmental issues more seriously, environmental 
philosophy to take feminism seriously, and philosophy to take both seriously” (Warren 
1998b p. 264). This evaluation of the place o f ecofeminism in the realms of 
environmentalism and philosophy indicates that there remain ontological questions to be 
answered. What is an individual? What is the difference between two individuals? And 
what is the relationship between a species (such as humans) and its environment? Val 
Plumwood (1998) believes that these questions must be considered in addition to 
questions of ethics.
As ecofeminism is so closely tied to feminism, a review o f their similarities is in 
order. Karen Warren (1998a) outlines eight boundary conditions ofboth ecofeminism and 
feminism.
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1. Ironically, nothing that promotes an “ism” can be a part o f either ethic.
2. The ethic must be contextualist.
3. There is a denial o f “one voice”, the ethic must be structurally pluralistic 
(pragmatic).
4. The ethic can change over time, it is emergent and evolutionary.
5. Because the ethic is contextual, pluralistic, and emergent, it is inclusive.
6. There is no privileging o f an “objective” point o f view.
7. The ethic centralizes values like love, care, trust, and friendship.
8. We should reconceive o f humans as beings in relationships.
These eight points do not necessarily precisely describe ecofeminism, however, they do 
illustrate the conceptual similarities to feminist ethics, such as an ethic o f care. And as 
Plumwood (1998) suggests, environmental philosophies that have not learned to 
incorporate feminist concerns are doomed to be incomplete.
There are two major features o f Warren’s (Warren 1998a; Warren 1998b) 
conception o f ecofeminism—it should involve both the ethic o f care and a narrative voice. 
The care ethic perspective allows a person to approach a moral situation with a loving eye 
rather than an arrogant eye. The difference being that a loving eye is open to the dignity 
o f the other, knows the scope and boundary of the self and wants to embrace the power 
o f that which is between the self and the other. Conversely, the arrogant eye is not open 
to the other in any real sense.
The emphasis in the narrative approach does four things. First, narratives give 
((voice to a felt sensitivity often lacking in traditional analytical ethical discourse” (Warren 
1998b p. 332). Secondly, narratives allow for the expression o f often under-represented 
perspectives in mainstream ethics, such as care. Next, the true nature o f ethics as 
emergent out o f particular situations and contexts is most clearly revealed through 
narratives. And finally, “to contextualize ethical deliberation is, in some sense, to provide
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a narrative or story, from which the solution to the ethical dilemma emerges as the fitting 
conclusion” (Cheney 1987 p. 144). This refers to the dialogical nature of narratives where 
appropriate ends are worked out through discourse. This narrative approach is also 
fundamentally one that identifies epistemological components o f a given dilemma in that 
we question one another how we come to know certain things.
Returning once again to the distinction between the arrogant eye and the loving 
eye—Val Plumwood clearly has this contrast in mind when she critiques other 
environmental ethical views. Specifically Plumwood criticizes the positions of Regan, 
Taylor and Deep Ecology. Her mam critique is the emphasis on rationality and on 
dualisms, such as reason/emotion, mind/body, and culture/nature (Plumwood 1998), 
although she seems to criticize Regan more for his inconsistencies. Regan’s emphasis on 
rights implies a strong individual separation of rights-hoklers. Further, it is ambiguous 
how we, humans, as rights-holders are obligated to behave when we see one wild animal 
in the process o f killing another. Recall that Taylor’s account is rooted in the Kantian 
tradition of reason, as such, Taylor treats “care viewed as ‘inclination’ or ‘desire’ as 
irrelevant to morality” {ibid. p. 293).
Plumwood’s critique o f Deep Ecology is a bit more comprehensive. She 
repudiates three important aspects o f deep ecology: indistinguishability, the expanded self 
and the transcended self. Plumwood suggests that ecofeminists should disagree with the 
indistinguishability aspect o f deep ecology because it erases differences and doesn’t 
recognize the natural boundaries between the self and other, or self and nature. In 
reference to the expanded self Plumwood notes that it did not arise as a “result o f a 
critique of egoism; rather it is an enlargement and an extension o f egoism. It does not
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question the structures o f possessive egoism and self-interest; rather it tries to allow for a 
wider set of interests by an expansion of se lf {ibid. p. 302). Finally, the transcended self 
serves nothing more than a means to distance us from the particulars o f place and the 
context in which real environmental dilemmas arise.
Plumwood does offer two suggestions for dealing with the shortcomings o f other 
views. First we should reconceive of the human being not simply as a rational agent but 
also as an emotional and sensuous being. This should help in overcoming dualisms. 
Secondly, the problem of discontinuity can be addressed by thinking of ourselves as Self- 
in-Relation. This is clearly a suggestion in reference to the self-in-Self concept advanced 
by deep ecologists. A Self-in-Relation does not attempt to erase boundaries between 
humans and non-humans, rather this person thinks o f nature as that with which I have a 
relationship.
Despite these well-thought critiques, ecofeminism is not beyond questions. As 
mentioned at the outset of this subsection, the one thing that all ecofeminists agree on is 
the connection between a domination of women and a domination o f nature. This is not 
accepted as a complete enough explanation by some. Here, we return again to the social 
ecologists, namely Bookchin, who would argue that focusing on gender inequality is but 
one aspect o f a much large system that encourages social inequality (Bookchin, 1988). 
Additionally, it has been noted that ecofemisim fails on many of the same fronts which 
have plagued deep ecology: setting up needless dichotomies, lack of context, and 
ambiguity (Levin & Levin, 2001).
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23.2 Two “Substandard” Views
Substandard in this sense should not imply a lesser view in terms o f worth or 
validity. Rather, here substandard means simply that these two views have yet to find the 
strength and force o f the four standard views. Both o f these views are newer in terms of 
thought and literature, yet they both appear to count growing numbers o f devotees. The 
essence of the thought in each of these views in not at all new; pragmatism traces its roots 
back at least to the early part o f the 20th Century and of course virtue ethics first gained 
prominence with the works of Aristotle in the fourth century BC. What is new with both 
o f these positions is in their application to environmental issues and concerns.
233 .1  Environmental Pragmatism
Environmental pragmatism is a fairly recent addition to the field o f environmental 
philosophy, although it relies on John Dewey’s criticisms of philosophy back in the early 
part of the 20th Century. In the 1920’s Dewey argued that philosophic reasoning is often 
too abstractly removed from the real problems people face in their everyday lives (Dewey 
1985). Further, this non-contextual approach tends to stymie policy decision-making. 
More recently environmental philosophers and writers have updated Dewey’s challenges 
to apply to issues o f environmental concern. Most notable among these new, 
environmental pragmatists are Bryan Norton, Andrew Light and Eric Katz. The latter two 
edited a book published in 1996 titled Environmental Pragmatism.
Norton (1991) describes a humbling situation when one day be confronted a young 
girl and her mother gathering heaps upon heaps o f sand dollars from the ocean. He felt it 
was wrong for them to be taking these living creatures from their home and so many of
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them at that. However, his attempt at a persuasive animal rights-based argument was 
answered by the young girl who responded, “We can get a nickel apiece for the extras at 
the craft store.” This exchange emphasized to Norton that arguments based exclusively 
on foundational ethical positions often fail in the face o f real world considerations—in this 
case money. What Norton hopes for is a more practical discourse where genuine 
solutions can be found for real environmental problems.
On the opposing side to the pragmatists are those philosophers who search for 
fundamental ethical theories to guide our interactions with the natural world. These 
philosophers seem chiefly concerned with intrinsic or inherent value, specifically Rolston 
and Callicott. Pragmatists contend that the fuzziness or spookiness o f intrinsic value is 
simply too far removed from that which the overwhelming majority of people find 
themselves able to relate. Minteer (1998) suggests that there are three additional flaws to 
a foundational approach. First, foundationalists or monists (as opposed to pluralists) tend 
to ease off or backpedal when push comes to shove in matters of specific environmental 
policy; Minteer contends that Callicott is guilty o f this. Monists subscribe to a single 
foundation upon which they build their environmental ethic. In most cases, this single 
foundation is intrinsic value. Secondly, there is no opportunity to account for social and 
biological variability across different geographic regions. Specifically Minteer offers the 
opinion that “Yellowstone is not Central Park, and this speaks to specific ecological, 
social and ethical circumstances; factors o f central importance to the justification o f our 
commitments to the natural world” (p. 342). This type o f contrast was fundamental to 
this study as well—particularly when those interviewed attempted to wrestle with differing 
feelings for and levels o f knowledge of Cumberland Falls and Yellowstone. It is this
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recognition that nature here and nature there may not be so easily transposed. Lastly, 
there is the sense that a monistic perspective undermines the democratic approach to 
problem solving.
Callicott (1999) responds to these criticisms mainly by suggesting that his words 
have been misinterpreted. However, he does not back away from encouraging a monastic 
approach to environmental theorizing. Where Callicott best clarifies his position is in 
reference to the differences between a moral philosophy, an ethical theory, and moral 
principles. Callicott advocates monism at the levels o f moral philosophy and ethical 
theory, but supports pluralism at the level o f moral principles. This distinction is 
noteworthy, because in one sense it tends to support Norton’s convergence hypothesis. 
The convergence hypothesis suggests that over the very long term, considering all relevant 
variables, it matters not if someone is an anthropocentrist or an ecocentrist, the result will 
be the same management policy. In other words, Norton believes that quibbling about 
different moral philosophies is a waste o f time, because in the end both types o f people 
want the same things—preservation o f the natural resource.
What most monists find so troubling about pluralists is that “without some kind of 
epistemologically basic justification for our moral stances toward the natural world, we 
will slip into the morass o f relativism and its accompanying seductions” (Minteer, 1998, p. 
336). However, there is hope against this fear. In Charles Taylor’s book The Ethics o f 
Authenticity, he argues for what he calls ‘horizons o f significance’. These horizons allow 
individuals to be “embedded in matrices o f meaning that owe their character to our 
membership in families, social institutions, and the traditions of the larger community”
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(Minteer, 1998 p. 341). This grounding presumably prevents a slide into absolute 
relativism.
The other concern with a pragmatic approach is that pragmatism essentially returns 
to arguments based on utility which so many environmental ethicists find distasteful. So 
we seem to have come full circle debating the appropriateness o f arguments based on 
human utility versus arguments based on more bio centric or ecocentric approaches.
The importance of this discussion is the emphasis on pragmatists to consider 
context. In this respect they are quite similar to the ecofeminists and those who advocate 
care ethics. While, pragmatists do not necessarily hold any great attachments to concepts 
such as care, the loving eye, and relationship, the point that they embrace context and the 
particular is worthy o f consideration.
23.2.2 Ecological Virtue Ethics
Perhaps the oldest ethical tradition in western thought is that o f virtues. Aristotle 
in his Niehomachean Ethics outlined his version o f the “Good Life” as that which centers 
on virtuous behavior. Virtue ethics primarily derive from those things that Aristotle felt 
we (or in his case, white, free men) should strive for. It may seem, then, an odd 
connection to relate Aristotle’s notion o f a good life with environmental ethics. However, 
there is much to be gained by allowing these two to blend.
Recall Sylvan’s three suggestions: 1) extend a prevailing ethic to include non­
human entities; 2) incorporate environmental values into the dominant tradition; and 3) 
create a new ethic. Bringing environmental concerns into the language o f virtue ethics 
represents an example of number 2—incorporating environmental values into the
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dominant tradition. In this discussion none of the other views have attempted this 
approach.
To begin with, let’s consider virtue ethics in general Aristotle’s concept o f the 
Golden Mean between two vices yields a virtue. For example, bravery is the mean 
between the vices of cowardice and recklessness; generosity is the mean between the vices 
o f stinginess and wastefulness (Aristotle 1985). The process o f negotiating the virtuous 
life is the pathway which leads us to a fulfilled life. In other words, for Aristotle, “moral 
goodness and enjoyment o f life are pretty much the same thing” (Stevenson, 1998 p. 62). 
The pursuit of these virtues and others mentioned by Aristotle give few clues to an 
ecological virtue ethic. However, this is because Aristotle was only concerned with those 
virtues that would be conducive to allow men to achieve their full potential in the city 
state. Therefore, one only had virtues that were other people directed. In order to realize 
an ecological virtue, we must consider our actions towards non-human and in some cases 
non-living things.
Hill (1983) suggests a few other virtues that we might consider in reference to our 
treatment of nature: humility, self-acceptance, gratitude, and seeing the good in others. 
These ‘new’ virtues can still advance the cause of human excellence, they just broaden our 
responsibilities. Hill notes that some type of appreciation toward nature is not the same 
thing as valuing nature instrumental^; he suggests that “learning humility requires learning 
to feel that something matters besides what will affect oneself and one’s circle o f 
associates” (ibid. p. 220). This point is echoed in reference to another writer’s application 
o f virtue ethics to Leopold’s land ethic (Shaw 1997). Shaw suggests three ecological 
virtues of respect (or ecological sensitivity), of prudence, and o f practical judgment as
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means towards achieving/maintaining the integrity, stability, and beauty o f the biotic 
community. Shaw further reinterprets the concept of the “good” in reference to the land 
ethic, “Leopold envisions ‘the ultimate good’ not as happiness but as harmony within the 
biotic, or living, community” (ibid. p. 55). As with Aristotle, these virtues are still other- 
directed. However, the other in this case is not another human being, but the natural 
environment.
With these two brief examples one wonders if there are other ecological virtues we 
might turn to for guidance. Louke van Wensveen (2000) has done just this. She 
catalogued nearly 200 ecological virtues including awe, care, curiosity, sense of place, 
warmth and wisdom. Clearly her conception o f ecological virtues is much broader than 
anything we have encountered before. At this point it may be worthwhile to examine just 
what criteria are used to make something an ecological virtue. Van Wensveen calls on 
four Aristotelian boundary conditions for this purpose.
1. The Repression Test
2. The Alienation Test
3. The Guilt Test
4. The Fetishism Test
The repression test refers to “the judgment o f a repressed psyche is not a good 
standard for determining what is virtuous” (van Wensveen 2000 p. 90). This refers to the 
tendency of many early virtue ethics advocates to repress the value o f some things. The 
example cited by van Wensveen is sensuousness. For a long time these sensory-based 
inclinations were to be suppressed lest they turn into base animal desires. This should not 
suggest that any inclination that was at one time suppressed should now become a virtue.
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Van Wensveen turns to a suggestion by Bookchin (1982) who acknowledged the value o f 
prudence. “Since prudence is corrupted by inappropriate levels o f  fear or desire, we could 
say that these levels function as negative boundary conditions for the life o f virtue in 
Aristotle’s ethic” (van Wensveen 2000 p. 90).
The alienation test refers to “the judgment of an alienated consciousness is not a 
good standard for determining what is virtuous” {ibid. p. 92). This test is designed to give 
priority to context and connection to a particular situation. More so than just the hope to 
reintroduce context, the alienation test also cautions against using terms that are empty o f 
real meaning. The example given by van Wensveen is “love o f nature”. She cautions that 
this expression far too often is simply a wish for such a state rather than any true 
connection with nature. Alienation implies lack o f connection with one’s situation, which 
leads to various mistakes in judgment.
The guilt test is largely self-explanatory. It is designed to illustrate that “the 
judgment o f a guilty conscious is not a good standard for determining what is virtuous” 
(van Wensveen 2000 p. 93). Van Wensveen suggests that we are all at one time or 
another saddled with a guilty conscience in terms of environmental problems. However, 
she cautions against creating a virtue in the presence of this guilty conscience because the 
guilty conscience overcompensates and skews the mean to some unreasonable alternative.
Finally, the fetishism test refers to the tendency to allow thin and shallow 
definitions to replace historic meanings. She cites Bookchin again who offered the 
evolution o f honor as a term that is now more “important as a credit rating than a sense of 
moral probity” (Bookchin 1982 p. 71). In short, an ethical term becomes replaced by an 
unethical one which cannot then be considered a virtue.
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These four criteria (repression, alienation, guilt and fetishism) combine to guide us 
towards those things we can consider virtuous with reference to the natural world. One o f 
the most important aspects o f these criteria is that the lengthy list of virtues complied by 
van Wensveen was not thrown together willy-nilly. She was prudential (to borrow a 
virtue from Aristotle) in her selections. The concern with her virtues, and indeed all 
virtues, is that it is not clear how one goes about practicing than. In essence, it is not 
clear exactly what one must do to be brave, generous, humble, or thoughtful. This then 
leads to uncertainty in commitment since there does not exist clear prescriptions for 
behavior.
All six of these views (four standard and two substandard) represent nearly all o f 
the perspectives in environmental ethics today. A few views were specifically excluded for 
assorted reasons, however, the treatment given to these six views now provides the 
background with which a discussion can be advanced on the more specific features o f this 
research: ethics o f justice and care, and obligatory and supererogatory ethics. It is to 
these more specific topics that I now turn.
2.4 A Consideration of Ethics
Following the Theory o f Reasoned Action (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980), Gorsuch 
and Ortberg (1983) found that ethical bases proved to be an important predictor o f 
intentions in situations where the topic was considered one o f morality. Further they 
concluded that in ethical decision-making scenarios, ethics may be the strongest predictor 
o f intentions. In this way, the commitments expressed with regards to natural areas may 
assume an ethical component in addition to any existing attitudinal or normative pressures.
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This seems to be in important point particularly in the context of environmental ethics, 
where some disagreement likely exists between cases in which there is an unequivocally 
clear moral obligation and cases in which there is a vague moral ‘ought’ but it is less clear 
how to fulfill that ‘ought’, and perhaps less required o f us that we do fulfill this ‘ought’.
In a nutshell this is the distinction between the ethical orientations o f obligatory and 
supererogatory. The distinction between the ethical theories of justice and care is not 
concomitant with the distinction between obligatory and supererogatory though. Both of 
these theories can be said to rest within the arena o f obligatory ethics; where they differ is 
in reference to the nature o f  the obligation.
2.4.1 Ethical Orientations: Obligatory or Supererogatory
Ethics can be defined and described in any number o f ways. To begin with, let’s 
consider that ethics can be both a practice and a theory. As a theory, ethics is that which 
is the overriding theory o f human behavior, overriding because any action or behavior can 
produce the question, “But is it right to do that?”. However, ethics as a theory is not 
appropriate for this study which requires ethics as that which can be empirically measured; 
ethics as practice does just this. As a practice, we consider ethics as appropriate behavior. 
People can be identified as acting ethical or unethical based on their behavior. From an 
empirical perspective, there are clear implications in developing appropriate measures to 
study ethical behavior. This follows the line o f thinking proposed by Babbie (1995), when 
he suggested that anything can be measured. However, Babbie’s approach in measuring 
concepts such as ethics is limited in some important respects, namely developing an 
adequate understanding o f the complexity and inter-relationships o f this phenomenon.
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In addition to being defined as a theory and a practice, ethics can further be 
described in orientation as either obligatory or supererogatory. This distinction will be 
useful in considering the relative priority that environmental ethics have to some people. 
Obligatory ethics, also referred to as ethics o f perfect duty are those duties that each o f us 
are bound to follow under all circumstances. That is, we are obligated to follow our duty. 
These are typically framed as negative duties: Don’t steal, don’t violate someone’s rights, 
don’t physically harm someone, etc. In general these are the proscriptive ‘judgments that 
are also universalized, not contingent on rules, laws, and conventions, and justified based 
on moral considerations of justice and human welfare” (Kahn 1999 p. 70). Gewirth 
(1978) defines morality as a “set o f categorically obligatory requirements for action...” (p. 
1). Nearly all of the empirical work devoted to ethics or moral development has assumed 
this obligatory view of ethics.
Supererogatory ethics, also referred to as discretionary ethics (Kahn 1999), or 
ethics o f imperfect duties, are those ethics that we practice above and beyond the call of 
perfect duties. Generally this perspective has followed from the work o f Aristotle in his 
Nichomachean Ethics. Aristotle was less concerned with actions such as stealing, lying 
and doing harm to others. His focus was on those traits that define humans as being 
exemplary people: courage, generosity, mildness, etc. Aristotle’s “golden mean” signified 
the perfect balance between two vices that produces a virtue. Collectively, all o f 
Aristotle’s virtues lead us to more fulfilled existence.
We might now consider if environmental ethics, for most people, are either 
obligatory ethics or supererogatory ethics. I would submit that treating environmental 
ethics simply as a “new” set o f obligatory ethics is poorly conceived. Moral obligation is
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thinly veiled as social coercion buttressed by fear o f recrimination. In other words, 
demanding compliance in terms o f a new set of obligatory ethics fails to consider the 
foundation of the new set. I would further offer that many, if not most, people perceive of 
environmental ethics as supererogatory ethics, or those behaviors we perform beyond the 
minimal behaviors required o f us. It is the sense that any actions we take to help or 
improve the environment may well be considered praiseworthy. Yet at the same time, 
many o f those actions we take which in some sense cause harm to the environment are 
often not considered blameworthy. This contrast is exactly what is meant when we talk 
about doing what is ‘right’ versus doing what is ‘good’. A diagram may illustrate more 
clearly the relationship between the obligatory and supererogatory.
Neutral
Optional
Supererogatory
Obligatory
Right
(Permissible)
Wrong 
(Not permissible)
Domains of Ethical Assessment
Figure 3: Distinguishing right from wrong and obligatory and supererogatory ethics 
(Adapted from (Pojman, 2001).
If we accept the view that, presently, a good deal o f environmental ethics might be
better conceived of supererogatory ethics, this means that they are not necessarily
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universally prescribed, and are open to interpretation. Aristotle first listed courage as one 
of his virtues to be practiced. However, there is no guidance on specific behaviors one 
should practice in order to be courageous. Different situations would encourage different 
examples of courage (e.g., going into battle, standing up to one’s unethical superior, 
discarding immoral traditions, etc.). Similarly in environmental ethics, a virtue might be 
humility (van Wensveen, 2000). Yet, it’s not exactly clear how one should operationalize 
humility across all situations. I may choose to walk rather than drive my car as an 
example o f humility, or I may sit quietly and contemplate my small presence in the vastly 
complex natural world. Thus, walking and thinking would both be considered examples o f 
humility, but I am left without clear direction on which I should do.
Certainty one can identify at least one example of an environmental obligation that 
counters this claim: the universal obligation not to litter. However, for most other 
environmental examples, there are nearly always contingencies. Consider the following 
statements: preserve biodiversity, protect endangered species, act only to fulfill vital 
human needs (re: Item number three from Deep Ecology’s Eight Point Platform). Clearly 
there are ample instances in which each o f these examples can be contested based on some 
contingency. At what scale should biodiversity be preserved? Are we to protect 
endangered species at the cost of all human welfare? Are all vital human needs universally 
agreed upon? With these ambiguities comes the notion that these are ethics which cannot, 
and perhaps should not, be practiced by everyone all o f the time in the same way that not 
stealing or not violating someone else’s rights should be. Thus, an obligatory ethics seems 
ill-fitting. O f course on the other hand, when it comes down to practicing supererogatory 
ethics, at some point I will likely say, “’Enough is enough, I have my own needs to take
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care o f an my own personal interests to pursue.’ That is, there are personal costs involved 
in helping others, and these costs presumably affect conceptions o f whether one is morally 
obligated to help” (Kahn 1999 p. 72). This statement is at the crux of the distinction 
between obligatory and supererogatory ethics, or stated another way: doing what is ‘right’ 
and doing what is ‘good’.
In thinking about the contrast between doing what is right and doing what is good, 
it seems that there is important variable at work that fundamentally changes the nature of 
being ethical. The variable of concern is opportunity. Once again, doing what is right, in 
my conception, refers to following universal proscriptions on behavior. For example, I 
should never steal I should never kill an innocent. I should never violate someone else’s 
rights. Doing what is good, I attest, is more like practicing contextual prescriptions such 
as courage, charity, or humility.
The difference between the right and the good is not just a shift from the universal 
to the contextual. Nor is it just a change from negatively worded proscriptions to 
positively worded prescriptions. There is a difference in the opportunities to do what is 
right and opportunities to do what is good. An extreme statement of doing what is right 
might be considered as consistent vigilance against unethical behavior. That is, there are 
constantly opportunities to not do what is right. It is constant because in normal life I am 
always surrounded by opportunities to steal something, or to kill someone, or to violate 
another’s rights. As Hobbesian as this sounds, with echoes o f lives that are “solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish and short” ringing in our ears, the previous sentence appears accurate. 
So long as I exist in some social system I will always have the opportunity to steal to kill
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or to do wrong. These opportunities simply exist in the same way that property, life or 
(arguably) rights exist. Opportunities for me to be blameworthy always abound.
In contrast, there are not consistent opportunities for me to do what is good. 
Opportunities to practice courage do not surround me in the same way that opportunities 
to steal do. In order to practice courage, I must first be presented with an opportunity in 
which courage may be required. In theory I may never experience an opportunity to 
practice courage. Granted, this may be indicative o f a very dull life, but it is at least 
possible. Similarly, Aristotle’s virtue of mildness requires that I be confronted with an 
opportunity to overreact in anger or to be less angry than I should. Presumably, these 
opportunities do not surround me all the time either. Other examples of doing what is 
good seem less obvious as to the specific opportunities required for them. I suppose I 
could always find some opportunity to practice charity, but it will likely become 
cumbersome or burdensome as stated earlier. Yet not stealing doesn’t become 
cumbersome or burdensome. With these examples, opportunities for praiseworthy 
behavior must be encountered if not specifically sought out. Thus a fundamental 
difference between obligatory and supererogatory ethics reflects opportunity.
This distinction between obligatory and supererogatory ethics has much to offer to 
a consideration of environmental ethics. Consider that the very limited but predominant 
approach to an empirical examination o f environmental ethics follows Kohlberg. Further 
consider that Kohlberg’s focus was on obligatory ethics (more specifically, Kohlberg was 
a Kantian and developed his theory o f moral development as essentially one o f justice).
As such, the empirical approach to most environmental ethics studies favors a view o f 
environmental ethics as obligatory ethics. This bias towards obligatory ethics is also both
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explicit in terms o f Swearingen’s (1989) and Kahn’s (1999) work and implicit in terms o f 
any number of studies related to environmental concerns (Dunlap and van Liere 1978; 
Borden and Schettino 1979; Szagun and Mesenholl 1993; Comunian and Gielen 199S; 
Gebhardt and Lindsey 1995; Howe et al. 1996; Manning and Valliere 1996; Zimmermann 
1996; Manning et aL 1997; Seguin et al. 1998; Widegren 1998; Schindler 1999). So, 
since Kohlberg’s system is decidedly slanted towards obligatory ethics and if, in feet, 
environmental ethics may be more properly conceived o£ at best, a balance between 
obligatory and supererogatory ethics for many people, then a Kohlbergian-based 
methodology may be flawed from the outset, like trying to fit a round peg into a square 
hole. This analogy is suggested because I can likely get a round peg to fit into a square 
hole, but the corners o f the hole would not be filled—these empty comers then represent 
the supererogatory orientation which is left out o f most considerations o f environmental 
ethics. As a result, it is important to consider the limitations of conceiving of 
environmental ethics only as obligatory ethics.
2.4.2 Ethical Theories: Care or Justice
The contrast between ethics of care and ethics o f justice is another guiding 
framework for this research, where care represents a certain class o f environmentally 
friendly obligations and justice represents another class. The care-based class of 
obligations are built upon lived relations and sympathetic feelings. The justice-based class 
o f obligations are built upon a prior established principles o f right and wrong. What is 
worth noting at this point, is that care should not be aligned with supererogatory ethics, or 
simply those ethics we practice above and beyond the moral minimum. Care ethics, in
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Gilligan’s conception, do cany with them universal obligations to care. However, the 
direction that care takes is shuationally-dependent, and therefore it may be thought o f as 
an ethic with less clear prescriptions. In this respect, care does share a certain openness 
with supererogatory ethics, but again, where supererogatory ethics represent an ethical 
ideal and obligatory ethics represent an ethical minimum—care ethics and justice ethics 
both illustrate a moral minimum.
Thus, the care ethic as described by Gilligan (1982) illustrates another aspect o f 
obligatory ethics that has similarly received little empirical attention in environmental 
ethics. Care ethics are no less binding (read: no less obligatory) than justice ethics. 
Noddings (1995) wrestles with the idea o f an obligatory caring. Where obligation has 
typically been conceived of as the result o f some cognitively-reasoned approach to a moral 
dilemma (a la Kant), Nel Noddings suggests that, with the exception of the pathological 
person, we all experience a powerful feeling expressed as “an inner voice saying, ‘I must 
do something”’ (p. 11). It is this “I must” that aligns ethics o f care with an obligatory 
ethical orientation.
It has been argued that “the scope o f environmental philosophy reaches beyond 
ethical issues and includes diverse metaphysical, epistemological, cultural, and political 
issues as well” (Zimmerman, et a l 1998 p. 3). Thus, we can care about any number o f 
people and things and to varying degrees (Gilligan 1982; Gilligan 1995). To clarify care, a 
number o f authors have attempted to parse out the intricacies o f this term. Blustein 
(1991) identifies at least four different interpretations o f the concept of care: 1) to care 
for, 2) to have care o f 3) to care about, and 4) to care that. Blustein is also quick to note 
that in varying situations people can experience any and all four o f these types of caring.
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O’Neil (2000) refers to a  framework of Deane Curtain to distinguish between caring for 
and caring about and this further extends the realm o f caring. In their conception, caring 
for occurs when someone is in “direct relatedness to others” (p. 187). On the other hand, 
caring about results when one is not in any direct relation to the object o f care. For the 
purposes o f this study the former parallels the idea o f familiarity to some natural area and 
the latter to those areas with which one is not familiar. These theoretical groundings of 
care are intended to represent the necessary and sufficient conditions to analyze the 
narratives provided by the interview subjects in this study.
Ethics of justice are often considered to be an amalgam of different western ethical 
theories in which people (and in some cases things) possess rights and as holders o f rights 
other moral agents are obligated to respect those rights. The philosophic traditions of 
Immanuel Kant (1785/1964) and, more recently, John Rawls (1999) provide the bases for 
ethics of justice. In contrast to ethics of care that are derived from the uniqueness of some 
dilemma, ethics o f justice are established prior to and independent of any ethical dilemma. 
The following table distinguishes various characteristics o f each ethic.
Ethic of Care Ethic of Justice
Particular Universal
Contingency Necessity
Situatedness Abstraction
Relationship Individual
Private Public
Table 4 : Contrasts between ethics of care and justice.
Mary Raugust (1996) outlines seven characteristics that describe an ethic
of care.
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1. The central priority of ethics is not the concept of individual rights but o f 
relationships with other human beings.
2. The principle goal of ethics is not autonomy and liberty o f individual humans, 
rather it is “the giving and receiving of care appropriate to specific persons and 
their situations.”
3. Interdependence over individualism.
4. The “other” with whom one deals morally must be distinctly personified and 
not an impersonal faceless abstraction.
5. Moral judgments emerge from actual situations and are not derived by applying 
logical formulae to general principles.
6. Feminists ethics are “accepting rather than transformative.”
7. Feminist ethics will be a morality o f virtues rather than primarily one of justice.
Raugust clearly has in mind relationships between two or more human beings and it is not 
apparent from her list how natural areas can step in an assume the position o f the “other” 
in the relationship. At the same time, it could be argued that the human-human 
perspective needlessly narrows the moral community. The majority o f Raugust’s points 
are consistent with many o f the criticisms directed towards ethics o f justice: they are 
separatist, isolationist and abstract, that they ignore the particular and the context o f the 
dilemma.
In discussing how a care perspective is more fundamental to our notions of right 
and wrong, Noddings (1984) suggested that relationship is ontologically basic, meaning 
that we have to recognize that our existence is prima facie defined as one in relationship 
with others. Conversely, an ethic o f just ice deliberately seeks to eliminate any relationship 
which might encourage some bias.
Care ethics need not assume, as ecofeminism does, that male domination o f nature 
and women are the primary factors o f concern. One characteristic o f the care ethic that is
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frequently misrepresented is its exclusivity to females. While it is true that Gilligan (1982) 
set out to respond to a methodologically flawed study o f moral development (Kohlberg 
1971), it was not her intent to create an ethic, o f by, and for only women. Similarly, the 
care ethic is often referred to as a feminist ethic, this terminology reflects is origins rather 
than its application. In feet, it was found that in the five years following college, women 
and men both used the care ethic in attempting to resolve moral dilemmas (Gilligan and 
Murphy 1979). Additionally, Gilligan (1993) emphasized that “the care perspective in my 
rendition is neither biologically determined nor unique to women” (p. 209). Therefore, 
any conception o f the ethics o f care by ecofeminists as being essentially female is denied 
here.
The one criticism that remains with care ethics might be referred to as a critique o f 
insularism (Hoagland 1991). This criticism illustrates the potential o f care-based ethics to 
collapse upon itself in a narrowly defined moral community. At the root of this criticism is 
an ambiguity on how to deal with those with whom we are not in direct relationships. The 
example most often encountered is how should we deal with starving people in a distant 
land, particularly in those cases where we (our culture) might be said to have been 
partially responsible for their dire conditions. Hoagland (1991) suggests that the care 
ethic, as generally conceived o f is inadequate in this respect. That is, care may work well 
in situations when we are somehow tied to the other people in the dilemma; however, it 
works less well, or not at all, in cases where those in the dilemma are distant and not in 
any genuine relationship with us.
Consider this criticism from the perspective o f caring for nearby and distant natural 
areas. The logical connection would suggest that we are unable to care for that which is
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distant. Under these circumstances, the care ethic does not give us adequate guidance. 
However, perhaps this is where a justice ethic is more conveniently articulated. Although 
Hoagland entreats us to develop a more comprehensive care ethic to replace an ethics 
located in principles and duty, others do not share the view that a single ethical theory 
based on care is necessarily preferable to a pluralistic approach to ethics where the ethic of 
care is neither superior nor inferior to any other ethics and multiple ethical theories can be 
used. Recalling Noddings (1984), it is true that we are bom into and exist with respect to 
a variety o f relationships. However, we are not bora into nor do we exist in relationships 
with everything. And it is from this point that one can contend care ethics may be 
insufficient to resolve all moral dilemmas in the same way that ethics o f justice are 
similarly limiting.
Neither justice nor care can be expected to work perfectly in all situations. Just as 
ethics of justice seem awkward or cumbersome when applied to instances involving people 
in close relationships, ethics o f care seem misplaced or hollow when applied to dilemmas 
involving distant strangers. Thus, neither ethic is presumed to be better than the other. 
Rather, they both have value albeit in different situations. In the context o f this research 
distance o f natural areas serves as a mildly imprecise proxy for familiarity. From this 
discussion on care/justice, it is suggested that care ethics may be more appropriate for 
those natural areas where one is more familiar and ethics o f justice may be more 
appropriate when directed towards those areas we know less well
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2.43 Ethics or Convention or Etiquette?
The previous discussions on obligatoiy/supererogatoiy and justice/care have 
helped to shape some o f the interior of this thing called ethics. Yet, the contours 
identifying the boundaries o f ethics still requires some defining. The general question, just 
what is ethics will guide this subsection. In Chapter 1 ,1 offered a few definitions of 
ethics—mainly involving language associated with obligation. What may be needed is 
some further explanation to distinguish ethics from other aspects of social life, such as 
convention or etiquette. Where this distinction becomes clouded is when some action or 
behavior is indeed moral, or if in feet, it is simply convention, personal preference or a 
matter of etiquette. Stated another way, what is it about a given dilemma that makes it 
moral rather than something else?
While, some have outlined those features that distinguish ethics from other things, 
this is not as simple a distinction as it may seem. In feet, Turiel (1983) suggests that 
Kohlberg himself confounded conventions with morality. Callahan (1988) offers a nice 
summary of those differences between ethics, convention, and mere opinions and taste. 
Her conception required that ethics be reflective o f the underlying principles and values as 
they might affect the interests and/or welfare of others, while conventions, opinions and 
taste do not cut so deeply into the social fabric. This gives us some guidance toward 
identifying what is ethics from what is social convention from what is personal preference, 
but it remains less than satisfying as an evaluative criterion. Further, how should we 
conceive of etiquette as it relates to ethics?
Etiquette is a curious phenomenon in light o f a discussion o f ethics. It would seem 
that behaviors associated with etiquette can be both moral and non-moral (not immoral).
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Consider the act o f giving up one’s seat on the bus to an elderly rider. This act may take 
on moral qualities because the welfare o f another may be at issue. However, consider the 
example of poor table manners at a dinner party; poor table manners may be considered 
impolite, but likely of little moral consequence. A general rule for etiquette as it relates to 
ethics might be the degree o f importance to another’s welfare. Burtness (1999) takes up 
this argument in great detail with his term “degrees o f moral density. ” And Pojman (2001) 
suggests that “morality distinguishes itself from law and etiquette by going deeper into the 
essence of rational existence” (p. S). To explore an example o f etiquette in environmental 
ethics, consider the act of littering. Is littering really unethical? What is the harm and to 
whom does it apply? Let’s assume we are just talking about a discarded bag and drink 
cup from McDonalds. If the environment, or at least part of it, is o f moral consideration, 
then I might talk in terms of harm to the environment. But have I really “harmed” the 
environment by my act of littering. (I am purposely avoiding Kant’s Categorical 
Imperative here to focus on a singular act). Considering the fact that McDonalds has 
switched to using more “eco-friendly” materials in their packaging, I feel confident saying 
that discarding that bag and drink cup did not harm the environment in any real sense, in 
feet a number o f little creatures may benefit in some way from some of the littered items. 
However, what about my action in reference to other people? Here I can envision littering 
as an unethical act because the psychological, and perhaps, emotional welfare of other 
people may be negatively affected by witnessing my litter and thus returns to being a moral 
issue. This, then, represents littering as a non-moral issue o f etiquette as well as an issue 
o f moral import.
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Hart (1961) discussed cardinal features that distinguish moral situations from non- 
moral ones. The first relevant feature is “importance”. The person considering the 
dilemma must feel that his or her choice and its consequences are significant and not 
trivial. This first feature deserves further comment. A decision or behavior can be said to 
be important if it has far reaching or extended implications. Anything that is far reaching 
has the potential to affect other people’s welfare. However, this is a necessary, but not 
sufficient condition of the ethical realm. The second feature described by Hart is 
“immunity  from deliberate change”. Unlike rules for a game, moral rules cannot be made 
up or altered. In Hart’s view, moral rules transcend situations and time, they should not 
waver depending on context. Third, a “form of moral pressure” exists—obeying moral 
rules is not done solely for utilitarian or authoritarian factors but rather because we should 
have respect for these rules in and o f themselves. It is with this feature that ethics is often 
distinguished from religious codes, since the latter are frequently grounded in the authority 
o f the supernatural while the former are grounded in reason (Pojman, 2001). Hart clearly 
conceives of ethics as obligatory and most likely justice-based, thus leaving open an 
opportunity to define ethics as that which also encompasses supererogatory orientations 
and care perspectives.
Another novel suggestion in distinguishing moral from non-moral is to turn to the 
emotional reactions that some behaviors invoke. This is the approach o f some 
psychologists who contend that violating moral codes differs from violating social 
conventions in the resulting emotions. The three emotions o f shame, embarrassment and 
guilt are believed to follow from when one’s own behavior is against the moral code 
(Rozin et al. 1999). The three emotions of contempt, anger and disgust result when one
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observes another moral agent violating the moral code {ibid). This may be a helpful tool, 
but it is backward looking in that the emotions follow from some behavior. Further, it too 
is slanted towards obligatory ethics. It is easy to see how stealing might elicit shame, 
embarrassment, and guilt. However, if we also are concerned with environmental ethics as 
supererogatory ethics, it does not follow that not practicing charity should elicit those 
three emotions as well. A preferable course would be to determine if some behaviors are 
ethical in and of themselves, irrespective of the subsequent emotions felt by the moral 
agent. AO of the preceding descriptions of ethics are enlightening, but what is needed at 
this point is a more precise tool that will differentiate ethics from these other things.
To do this, we should conceive o f some criterion or criteria that will at once define 
ethics and distinguish if  from things like convention, preference, and etiquette. To this 
end, I return to Hart (1961), Williams (1985) and Aristotle to propose the following 
guidelines. Ethics (as practice) encompasses those important behaviors that, following 
supererogatory ethics results in the agent being perceived by others as praiseworthy and 
violating obligatory ethics results in the agent being perceived by others as blameworthy. 
Neither behaviors associated with social conventions, etiquette, nor personal preferences 
would result in either praiseworthy or blameworthy evaluations. While this definition is 
satisfying in many respects, it too lacks rigor, particularly when one considers that blame 
and praise only work when others agree on applying those evaluations in specific 
situations. As will be discussed in the final two chapters o f this document, environmental 
ethics suffers from a lack o f unifying principles or starting points and this, in turn, results 
in uncertain beliefs if some action should engender blame, praise, or neither o f the two.
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A final note about this last subsection, the distinctiveness or obviousness o f 
environmental ethics came up in the course o f the interviews. I am content with the 
preceding descriptions o f ethics, convention, etiquette, etc. as they stand. However, I will 
return to some o f these ideas in Chapter 5 of this document. A more detailed discussion 
will follow there in which the question about what differentiates the moral from the non- 
moral is considered. It seems that environmental ethics in particular took on a very 
different meaning for some people interviewed for this study perhaps reflecting the 
ambiguous nature o f the concept as well as environmental ethics existing as anything 
anchored in real life dilemmas.
2.5 Concluding Ethics
The inclusion o f the various sections in this chapter are meant to illustrate the 
tremendous variety o f this thing called environmental ethics. Animal rights is no more a 
comprehensive view o f environmental ethics than is deep ecology. And from this comes 
the suspicion that querying people about their environmental ethics with regard to specific 
parks will yield a wide range o f prescriptions. Additionally, with the first two sections of 
this chapter, I intended to show how environmental ethics has not sprung up fully formed 
in our collective consciousness. Rather, a number o f social and political factors 
contributed to and continue to contribute to our view o f environmental ethics. Through 
engaging people in narrative interviews about environmental dilemmas, it was hoped that 
some of the multiplicity concerning environmental philosophies, commitments, and 
perspective would emerge. It is from this standpoint that I turn now to a discussion of 
methods.
94
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 3: Methodology
To date, environmental ethics has largely been relegated to the domain of 
philosophers with little attention given to it by researchers. An empirical treatment of any 
object presupposes a few general criteria: that the phenomenon is sufficiently tangible or 
real that it can be observed at least indirectly, that observations can be collected in 
accordance with some testing logic, and that interpretable results will follow from an 
analysis. Ethics by their very nature represent a complex amalgamation o f influences 
ranging from one's religious background to one’s cultural norms to one’s first-hand 
experiences in addressing moral dilemmas. It is due in large part to this complexity that I 
followed a qualitative approach in order to better understand the relationship between 
ethics and the way(s) that people relate to natural areas.
In this chapter, I will discuss all aspects of the empirical research process from 
formation and subsequent modification o f the interview guide to data analysis and the 
steps in between. Additionally, I will briefly address the nature of my qualitative research 
approach. It is here that I begin this chapter.
3.1 Research Approach
Despite the feet that most studies o f environmental ethics have relied on survey 
methods, ethics are not algorithmic, in that they do not readily lend themselves to a 
reductionist or even multivariate analysis. Ethics, while often fundamental to a person’s 
worldview, exist mainly in the background. Yet, this background residence should imply 
neither secondary status nor a lack of importance. Rather, our ethics diffuse through
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everyday life, often without much conscious thought. This is even more true when the 
object is environmental ethics—a topic which is still beginning to percolate through the 
public consciousness. A more holistic understanding is needed particularly in the realm of 
environmental ethics, where practically no empirical research has been conducted. 
Additionally, it has been noted that environmental ethics is often expressed inconsistently 
(Borden & Schettino, 1979; Dunlap & Heffeman, 1975) or awkwardly (Howe, Kahn, & 
Friedman, 1996; Schindler, 1999). Thus, the ambiguity o f people’s environmental ethics 
requires a negotiation between subject and researcher in order for questions and responses 
to be better understood. When survey methods have been used to corral the range o f 
responses, narrow, a priori assumptions about the extent o f environmental ethics have 
already been made by the researchers, which inevitably neglected other rightful aspects of 
environmental ethics (Manning, VaOiere, & Minteer, 1997; Minteer & Manning, 1999; 
Szagun & MesenholL, 1993). In an effort to understand an elusive and fundamentally 
broad topic, environmental ethics, I proposed the use o f a qualitative methodology.
Previous research purporting to study environmental ethics relied on some form of 
survey methodology (Dunlap & Heffeman, 1975; Dunlap & van Liere, 1978; Gebhardt & 
Lindsey, 1995; Manning & Valliere, 1996; Minteer & Manning, 1999; Schindler, 1999; 
Swearingen, 1989; Szagun & MesenholL, 1993). In those rare instances when a qualitative 
approach was used, the researchers restricted their conception o f environmental ethics to a 
narrow and monist definition—that o f a class o f obligatory and largely justice-based 
theories (Howe et a l, 1996; Kahn, 1999; Shanahan, Pelstring, & McComas, 1999). As a 
result, there exists a gap in how we define environmental ethics and more how we have 
chosen to study it. In an attempt to address this gap in the empirical study of
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environmental ethics, I chose a qualitative methodology which allows for a pluralistic 
definition of environmental ethics: obligatory and supererogatory as well as theories o f 
justice and care.
In an effort to negotiate unfamiliar (due to lack o f empirical study) terrain and at the 
same time achieve a more complete understanding o f a meagerly researched topic o f 
inquiry, a hermeneutic methodology was selected. In addition to the rational for 
qualitative research presented above, several additional factors suggested a hermeneutic 
approach to this study would be most appropriate. First, Patterson and Williams (2002) 
identify hermeneutics as a technique that draws its strength from knowledge gleaned 
through traditional literature reviews as well as leaving open the possibility for new and 
previously unexplored themes to emerge. Second, my goals and objectives can be 
condensed to developing a more thorough and complete understanding o f the nature of 
environmental ethics with regards to specific places. This can be achieved through the 
production of narratives in which the respondent and I negotiate a shared understanding of 
this phenomenon. Rather than starting each interview from a blank slate, I relied on my 
familiarity with previously attempted studies in ethics and environmental ethics. These 
previous empirical studies provided the door to  access a portion of the relevant 
information. However, more is needed than just access through this door. Here, the 
nature of a dialogue between two or more people will serve as the vehicle to come to 
some understanding of environmental ethics.
A third reason for selecting an hermeneutic approach is that the nature o f this research 
does not lend itself well to hypothesis testing or working propositions or some other such 
testing logic, due to the fact that this research involves at least three fundamentally
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complex variables: ethical theories (justice and care), ethical orientations (right and good), 
and place familiarity. None of these variables lend themselves well to hypothesis 
statements which imply bounded, concrete dimensions. Indeed, in instances where beliefs, 
values, meanings, and traditions all converge, as they do in a discussion o f ethics, an in- 
depth understanding o f the phenomenon as gleaned through interviews is the most 
appropriate research protocol (Patterson, Watson, & Williams, 2001).
In selecting an hermeneutic testing logic, traditional criteria for evaluating the 
adequacy of the test are not applicable. The research approach is not driven by a desire to 
identify p-values, or statistically valid correlations, or some regression-based model of 
environmental ethics. Rather, the research approach is driven by the motivation to reveal 
meanings and relationships between different aspects within the general field of 
environmental ethics.
Clifford Geertz (1976) uses the term “thick description” as a means to achieve a 
rich understanding o f some phenomena or experience. A qualitative research approach is 
the means by which the end of rich understanding was reached. In discussing the nature of 
interview methodology in general, Steinar Kvale (1996) draws the analogy of the 
interviewer as a miner where the “nuggets of essential meaning” are discovered through 
the interview and the whole research process. Elsewhere, Kvale suggests that “the aim of 
the qualitative research- interview is not to end up with unequivocal and quantifiable 
meanings on the themes focused. What matters is rather to describe precisely the 
inherently contradictory meanings the interviewee expresses” (Kvale, 1983 p. 177). And 
as others have noted, our ethics may often be internally inconsistent or contradictory 
(MacIntyre, 1984; Rawls, 1999).
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3.2 Goals and Objectives
Any research approach should be driven in large part by the goals and objectives o f 
a study. This was amply true in the case o f this study. Consider the nested qualities o f 
purposes, goals and objectives. Purposes can be viewed as encompassing general goals 
which in turn can be viewed as containing more specific objectives. The singular purpose 
o f this study was to engage people in discussions about environmental ethics with respect 
to certain places. As stated earlier, there were two primary goals o f this study that 
reflected its exploratory nature:
1. To understand justice and care in reference to parks o f varying familiarity; and
2. To understand the roles o f obligatory and supererogatory environmental ethical 
orientations as they relate to parks of varying fam iliarity.
These two statements represent the most general articulation o f what this research study 
was about. Yet, in order to meet these goals (and ultimately the broader purpose), a few 
specific objectives were used to chart the path.
As a result the three objectives listed below might be conceived o f as guiding 
statements which emerged following a review of the literature. These three objective- 
statements more precisely gird the scope o f the research and the questions in the interview 
guide. Following each statement is a brief explanation and in some cases a justification for 
it.
99
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3.2.1 Objective 1: Engage people In environmental ethics discussions where 
principles of justice and care can emerge.
•  Ethics o f justice and care both make assumptions about the fundamental nature 
of relationships between people. These ethical theories may similarly illuminate 
the fundamental nature o f relationships that people have with natural areas.
Care for a natural area must be consistent with language used to express 
relationships o f one person caring for another person. Ecofeminists believe 
that such human-native relationships are a natural extension of our community 
(Zimmerman 1987). Following the logic o f Rick O’Neil (2000), caring for 
something and caring about something represent two very different aspects of 
caring with the former more consistent with care ethics and the latter more 
aligned with an abstraction such as what might be considered in an ethic of 
justice. King (1991) questions whether caring for nature can be concisely 
expressed in meaningful ways consistent with care ethics. Primarily his 
concern is in reference to reciprocity and what benefits accrue to nature 
through caring for it. This concern will be answered, I believe, in a line of 
questioning that encourages people to talk about how their actions (or lack 
thereof) have helped (or harmed) some natural area. Field (1995) and Warren 
(1998) both suggest that real benefits can be realized by non-human others. 
Warren goes on to clarify that moral relationships can and do exist when only 
one o f the parties is a  moral agent. As such, it takes just one moral agent to 
create a moral relationship. Most certainly moral relationships exist with two
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or more moral agents, but Warren’s point is noteworthy in that it allows a 
moral relationship to exist between a person and a place.
• In contrast to the language typical o f ethics of care (reflecting relationship and 
responsibility and concern for the wellbeing of the other), language expressing 
justice principles will refer to concepts outside o f the particular circumstances 
behind the moral dilemma. Arguments based on rights are, perhaps the most 
typical o f the these. Concepts such as fairness and equality typify much o f the 
focus on rights. John Rawls’ (1999) thorough treatment o f justice as a moral 
theory, however, provides little guidance on how humans should behave justly 
in reference to nature. In feet, others have concluded that a Rawlsian approach 
may not be a suitable foundation for a long-term environmental ethics based on 
anything other than a prudential use o f resources for future human generations 
(Manning 1981; Thero 1995)—which is essentially the argument o f the 
environmental pragmatist. In this respect our ethics is, once again, other- 
person directed rather than nature directed. However, Rawls does not stand 
alone in the justice camp. Thus, I will refer to the work o f other justice- 
oriented researchers and theorists to anchor some of the questions in this 
study. The framework developed by Kohlberg (1971; 1983) will provide this 
foundation. Additional insight can be gleaned from others who have followed 
the Kohlberg tradition in studying environmental ethics (Howe et al. 1996; 
Kahn 1999). Finally, the arguments offered by rights-based theorists such as 
Regan (1985; 1996; 1998) and Taylor (1998) can provide further guidance on 
rights-based language.
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• In focusing the study this way, I propose the use of the competing perspectives 
o f justice and care. Justice and care are not just two among many different 
ethics; they are more fundamental in that they illustrate two different aspects of 
relationships; equality/inequality and attachment/detachment (Clement 1998).
In this respect, I will study care and justice as opposed to all other ethical 
theories.
3.2.2 Objective 2: Engage people in environmental ethics discussions where 
obligatory and supererogatory ethical orientations can emerge.
• Ethical orientations might be either obligatory or supererogatory; that someone 
subscribes to one orientation more than the other in reference to environmental 
concerns suggests the force and clarity of pro-environmental behaviors or 
commitments. An ethical relationship to natural areas will therefore inform the 
values we assign to nature and those responsibilities which we have to the 
same. If someone describes their environmental ethic as one o f obligation, then 
are they advocating a strong deontological ethic (read: justice) where what is 
right or wrong never changes across time and place? Or, are they advocating a 
somewhat softer or more fluid type o f obligatory ethic (read: care) where a 
general, universal obligation exists, but each person is free to determine the 
best course o f action based on the particularities of each unique situation? On 
the other hand, if someone describes their environmental ethic as 
supererogatory, then they might be said to promote environmental ethics as 
those actions we perform above and beyond the call o f duty. Supererogatory
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ethics are ethics o f an ideal morality, contrasted to ethics o f a moral 
minimalism.
•  Within the scope o f supererogatory ethics, we might want to consider if people 
feel pro-environmental behaviors are at all behaviors o f moral consequence or 
simply behaviors dictated by other conventions, such as norms, personal 
preferences, or etiquette. Additionally, people might suggest support for 
natural areas based on reasons o f human utility (e.g., medical benefits, clean air 
or water, or simply as places to recreate, etc.) In these instances the object o f 
moral consideration is other people, not the place itself. Therefore, I gave 
people opportunities to discuss nature in whatever terms they felt appropriate 
(e.g., as an object o f moral concern itself, or perhaps only as a resource for 
human use).
3.23  Objective 3: Provide people with opportunities to distinguish familiar natural 
areas from less familiar natural areas.
• The familiarity a person has with a particular natural area likely influences the 
way that this area is viewed in terms of ethical obligation. “Through 
interpretation, understanding; through understanding, appreciation; through 
appreciation, protection,” Tilden (1977, p. 38) offers this concise phrase to 
describe the gentle, but powerfully positive effects o f environmental 
interpretation. The idea o f familiarity is the firmament upon which Tiklen's 
phrase rests; for understanding, appreciation, and protection combine to reveal 
a progression in familiarity. The suggestion is that the more familiar someone 
is with something, the more they will act towards protecting that thing. In
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reference to the discussion of environmental ethics, if someone is more familiar 
with a specific area, then they may rely on a different arsenal of ethical theories 
and orientations than if they were less familiar with an area. A hallmark of 
care-based ethics is the emphasis on the familiar—that care is, in some sense, 
required for those with whom we are familiar. Conversely, the less familiar 
someone is with a particular area, the more they may rely on ethics o f justice. 
As obligatory and supererogatory orientations relate to familiarity, I might 
suggest that supererogatory ethics may be more appropriate when directed 
toward areas o f lesser familiarity because the individual may feel a less pressing 
need to act in a pro-environmental way and his/her options may be less clear 
towards areas he/she knows little about.
3.2.4 The ‘Unexpected* Objective
Any qualitative approach leaves open the door for unexpected information and/or 
connections to occur. With regards to this research it is not surprising that unexpected 
information and connections did emerge. In feet, it may be fair to say that there was even 
an unexpected objective to the extent that I was at least aware that the justice/care and 
obligatory/supererogatory parameters might not neatly confine the ethical narratives. The 
four themes to be discussed in Chapter 4 (Results) can all be said to exist beyond the 
scope of the original questions. This is not to suggest that the original questions were 
without value; far from it, in fact. The responses to the original questions simply revealed 
broader categories in which more revealing meanings could be found. The interpretivist 
testing logic I used allowed this nature of discovery and exploration. A fine example of
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the unexpected came up in respect to the notion o f beauty in nature. This theme emerged 
fairly early in the interviews and as a result I began asking questions in latter interviews 
that were designed to explore the concept of beauty more completely. I’ll expand on this 
in the section titled, Interview Guide(s).
In reviewing the shift from the three objective statements listed above to the 
ultimate discovery o f the four themes, it is worth noting that the primary domain of 
interest in this research remained the same—exploring the notion of environmental ethics 
with respect to different places.
33  Study Sites
Interviews were conducted at three different sites: Cumberland Falls State Resort 
Park, Dr. Thomas Walker State Park, and the Union College campus. These three locales 
present themselves not as unique places receiving special sorts of visitors, rather these 
three places present themselves as convenient opportunities to explore the phenomenon o f 
interests. That is, these study sites provided me access to people who couki discuss 
environmental ethics with regards to the southeastern Kentucky area as well as distant, 
and lesser known natural areas.
As a state resort park in the Kentucky State Park system, Cumberland Falls boasts 
a number of amenities that compare somewhat to National Parks such as Yellowstone, 
although they ultimately differ greatly in scale. Cumberland Falls has an historic hemlock­
framed lodge overlooking the Cumberland River. Within the lodge are guest rooms, a 
large dining area, visitor’s center and museum as well as common areas with large stone 
fireplaces. Walking through the lodge it compares quite nicely to the lodges at
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Yellowstone or Glacier National Park. Overnight guests at Cumberland Falls can also 
choose their accommodations from traditional campgrounds to furnished cottages with 
their own full bathrooms, dining rooms, and kitchens.
The Kentucky State Park system distinguishes among the units within the system 
largely by the amount and type of amenities found at each park. The Kentucky State Park 
system has four classifications of paries: Resort Paries, Recreational Parks, Historic Parks, 
and one Interstate Park (jointly administered with the Commonwealth of Virginia). 
Cumberland Falls and other State Resort Parks are designed to be the most amenity rich. 
Some o f these parks have golf courses, tennis courts, and water slides. Cumberland Falls 
has tennis courts and a pool near one o f the cottage clusters. The centerpiece to the park 
is the 125-foot wide, 60-foot high waterfall, known locally as the “Niagara of the South.” 
The foils also contributes to another visitor attraction—the moonbow. The moonbow is 
found nowhere else in the Western Hemisphere and occurs only on clear nights when the 
moon is full. In addition to this central, eponymous feature o f the park, there are more 
than 20 miles o f hiking trails with additional miles available for equestrians.
In many respects, Cumberland Falls and Yellowstone are comparable. Both parks 
are identified by some central feature, both cater to a range o f visitor types from those 
preferring four walls and a bed to those who’d rather pitch their tent on the ground. And 
both parks are surrounded by National Forest lands. However, clearly Cumberland Falls 
and Yellowstone are not the same in some other respects, the most obvious o f which is 
size. At over 2 million acres, Yellowstone is one o f our nation's largest parks, while 
Cumberland Falls is less than a thousandth o f this size at 1,776 acres. Further, 
Yellowstone claims world-wide feme as a World Heritage Site. And while Cumberland
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Falls is one o f the jewels in the Kentucky State Park system, its renown spreads little 
beyond the state’s borders.
The interviews conducted at Cumberland Falls were all done in the area adjacent to 
the Falls. This is the most popular place (in terms o f visitor density) in the park and it 
provided the easiest access to many people. Moreover, upon entering the park via state 
route KY 90, the Falls is one o f the first features one comes to. In this respect I felt that 
my pool o f potential interviewees would be greatest at this area near the Falls.
In addition to Cumberland Falls State Resort Park, I also conducted interviews at 
Dr. Thomas Walker State Historic Park. Dr. Thomas Walker State Historic Park is 
approximately 30 miles due east from Cumberland Falls and is a day-use only area. 
Although the focus of Walker Park is different from Cumberland Falls, this second, study 
she was selected for a combination of hs proximity to Cumberland Falls and the types of 
visitors it draws. As a day-use park, many o f the visitors came from the surrounding area 
and were, therefore, relatively familiar with Cumberland Falls. The need to go to a second 
and then a third “study she” will be taken up in greater detail in the next section, Sampling 
Principle. Suffice to say, at this juncture, my first study she was proving to be less 
efficient in terms o f time spent there.
The third and final place where I collected data was on the Union College campus 
where three long-time residents o f southeastern Kentucky were interviewed. To borrow a 
term from traditional hypothesis testing, the independent variable across all the interviews 
was familiarity with Cumberland Fails. All three “study sites” provided me with a pool of 
people from which I was able to select those with some familiarity with Cumberland Falls 
State Resort Park.
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3.4 Sampling Logic
Patterson and Williams (2002) employ the terms “richly, deeply, and thoroughly” 
as a means to understanding some phenomenon. Ultimately the goal is to capture “the 
range of experiences (or as diverse a range as possible).” When this range of experiences 
is achieved, the sampling process is concluded. At the same time, a trade-off must be 
made between the representativeness and analyzability of the data. Analyzabilhy 
specifically refers to being able to understand and work with a qualitative data set that is 
not beyond the scope o f anyone’s mental abilities. As such, a specific sample size cannot 
be identified precisely. That said, any qualitative sample should be sufficiently large to 
provide real insight into some phenomenon and at the same time be limited to a small 
enough number so as to be manageable to the researcher before he/she becomes 
cognitively overwhelmed. This balance occurred over the course o f 22 interviews 
conducted with 28 people. Six interviews were conducted where there were two people 
present and contributing to the construction o f the narrative.
Clifford Geertz (1976) uses the term “thick description” to refer to the function o f 
narratives to provide depth and meaning rather than a simple, thin or cursory treatment 
without much substance. Thickness, in this sense, infers some measure o f validity in that 
themes are built around shared ideas and concepts. Over 20 years ago, Kelly (1980) made 
the observation that due to the complexity o f the phenomenon o f leisure, no single 
methodology can do it justice. 1 would echo this statement for ethics in general and 
environmental ethics in particular. Prior to any data being collected in a qualitative study, 
there exists in the future a foggy sample size. How many will ultimately end up in this
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sample is unknown. Arguments can even be made for as few as one person in the sample 
(McCormick, 1996). However, to  focus on the number o f people in the sample misses the 
objective o f qualitative research which is to understand some phenomenon.
Understanding a phenomenon is not coincident with a large sample, but rather is more 
reflective o f the comprehensiveness o f meaning. Of course this raises questions of 
reliability and validity. Yet, reliability and validity are not solely determined by sample 
size, independence, and randomness. Other criteria may be employed to illustrate the 
merits o f the results. Some o f these criteria will be discussed in Section 3.7.3: Evaluation 
o f Analysis.
Books and articles on qualitative research often contain phrases such as “thick 
description,” “lived experience,” “emergent themes,” and “detail rich.” Generally, these 
terms are meant to convey, in some sense, the complexity and depth o f some phenomenon. 
In this study, ethics and the environment both proved to be complicated concepts, 
frequently embedded into other aspects o f the interviewee’s life. As such, my attempt to 
study somewhat narrowly conceived o f environmental ethics topics resulted in emergent 
themes that arose through sometimes, tangential thick descriptions.
3.5 Sampling Criteria—Familiarity
From late April to early June 2001,1 traveled to Cumberland Falls State Resort 
Park to contact visitors. The first several people I contacted were first screened for their 
familiarity with the area they were visiting. Upon approaching a prospective interviewee, 1 
would introduce myself as a faculty member of Union College and that I was conducting a 
study on how people talk about different parks. I would then ask them if the had been to
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Cumberland Falls before and if they considered themselves familiar with it. If they 
acknowledged some degree o f familiarity, I would then ask them if they were more 
familiar with Cumberland Falls than with Yellowstone National Park.
O f the 22 different interviews conducted, the first 12 were conducted at 
Cumberland Falls. The remaining 10 interviews were conducted at two other sites in 
Knox County, Kentucky. As the summer vacation season progressed, local residents 
seemed to make up a smaller and smaller percentage o f the overall visitation to 
Cumberland Falls. As a result, I was having a harder and harder time finding visitors who 
were decidedly familiar with Cumberland Falls. I then made the decision to expand my 
sampling resources to areas outside the boundaries o f the park itself. Interviews were 
conducted at another state park that is more o f a picnic/playground/day-use site (as a 
result its visitors are overwhelmingly local) and at Union College. Appendix A gives a 
more detailed description o f the other two interview sites and which people were 
interviewed at each she. Despite traveling to different sites, the questions I asked 
remained consistent. In other words, I continued to query people on Cumberland Falls 
and less familiar lands out west.
So, what criteria would differentiate a familiar from a non-familiar resource? Short 
o f asking someone directly about their familiarity with ‘A’ versus ‘B \ h is difficult to 
sketch a boundary o f those things that would contribute to one’s knowledge of something 
or some place. Even a direct question such as this has its own problems as well because 
who is to say what familiarity means. Consider the person who has never been to 
Yellowstone, but has heard about h through news stories over the course o f IS years.
And perhaps this same person moved to the area near Cumberland Falls State Resort Park
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a mere three years ago, but has visited this park a few times in those three years. Can we 
definitively say that this person is more familiar with Cumberland Falls than with 
Yellowstone? I don’t think so. Nonetheless, geographic proximity was one criterion that 
served as a convenient, if imperfect, proxy for familiarity and there is some evidence to 
suggest that geographic distance may relate to one’s moral perspective. This, after all, is 
one o f the bases for ethics o f care, particularly those nature-directed ethics o f care.
Because I had no prior empirical evidence to suggest that different people 
interviewed in different locations would differ from one another in their ethical 
perspectives, the primary screening variable I used when deciding if I would interview 
people was their familiarity with Cumberland Falls. So long as they were familiar with this 
park, I decided that it didn’t matter as much if I was on site at Cumberland Falls to do the 
interview. The ’variable’ o f interest was not presence at Cumberland Falls, rather it was 
familiarity with Cumberland Falls. Also, there is no observable characteristic that ensures 
a distribution of obligatory/supererogatory and justice/care. Thus, the degree of 
familiarity with different natural areas was intended to capture the diversity o f ethical 
perspectives. While this is somewhat purposive, the representativeness o f this sampling 
method should not be confused with the concept o f proportionality or an unbiased 
estimator for some population. Here, I am referring to the representative nature of ethical 
perspectives as they relate to people’s relationships to place. In brief using familiarity as a 
screening criterion, I hoped to canvass a representative range of ethical perspectives which 
included care/justice and obligatory/supererogatory.
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3.5.1 Selecting the Sample
Everyone in the sample had some level of familiarity with Cumberland Falls State 
Resort Park. This was really the first and only filter I used when determining if 1 would 
interview someone for this study. Obviously there were varying degrees of familiarity and 
the term familiarity can mean different things to different people. For instance, one person 
who I interviewed, Sharon, had been to Cumberland Falls more times than she could count 
from her early childhood continuing through her adult years. In another interview, I spoke 
with a young married couple who grew up in the area just a few miles away from 
Cumberland Falls, however, Jon had only been to Cumberland Falls 3-4 times and Amy, 
his wife, had never been to the park before. Yet, all three of these people agreed that they 
had some familiarity with the park. Thus familiarity was acknowledged even in absence of 
an actual visit, but rather due to a life-long presence in the immediate area surrounding 
Cumberland Falls. In essence this variation of experiences that contributes to some level 
o f familiarity provided the richness and depth needed to explore the nature of people’s 
relationships with Cumberland Falls and other natural areas. Ultimately the variable o f 
familiarity with Cumberland Falls was a self-assessment and likely varied across people. 
However, that Sharon may have been more familiar than Amy (in some objective sense) is 
not as important as the idea that both Sharon and Amy considered themselves more 
familiar with Cumberland Falls than with Yellowstone.
Using this approach, 45 people were identified as potential interviewees.
However, 17 people who were identified as potential interviewees were not, in the end, 
interviewed as part o f this study. The reasons these 17 people did not make it into the 
sample were varied. First, 8 people (three couples and two individuals) did not feel
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comfortable being tape recorded and were also concerned that they would not be able to 
give me the type o f information I was looking for. When I attempted to explain that their 
opinions were as valid as anyone’s and that I was genuinely interested in what they had to 
say and their words would not be connected to their real names, they still declined. Two 
other people (both individuals) declined to participate in an interview because o f an 
unwillingness to commit the necessary time. Seven people (all individuals) were not 
interviewed due to their admitted unfamiliarity with Cumberland Falls State Resort Park. 
Following my contact with a number of people who confessed that they were not familiar 
with Cumberland Falls, I walked through the parking lot and noticed the obvious absence 
o f any vehicles indicating a local residence. Kentucky license plates carry on them the 
name of the county where the car is registered. Knox, Laurel, and Whitley Counties are 
the three most adjacent counties to Cumberland Falls State Resort Park. While I did not 
make a detailed accounting o f cars’ license plates, I would guess that at least two-thirds 
were non-Kentucky plates and many of the remaining third were from outside the Tri- 
County area.
Over the course o f approximately six weeks, I conducted interviews at three 
different sites: Cumberland Falls State Resort Park, Dr. Thomas Walker State Historic 
Park, and Union College. The days for these interviews included both weekends and 
weekdays and were conducted as early as 9:00 a.m. and as late in the day as 7:00 p.m. No 
interviews were conducted on the Memorial Day weekend. During those six weeks, 22 
interviews were conducted with 28 people. Yet it is not accurate to consider these 28 
people the sample in this study. Rather, the sample is more rightly conceived o f  as the 22 
narratives as produced through interviews. The 28 people interviewed were a necessary
113
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
condition for achieving a representative sample; however, ultimately the sample resides in 
the words spoken and not the people speaking them. To clarify, the data produced 
through this research was a function o f the respondents’ ability, or more rightly inability, 
to articulate an environmental ethics. Thus, the words used to construct each narrative are 
more indicative o f the nature of environmental ethics discourse than they are indicative of 
a rigorous and personal environmental ethics.
3.5.2 Justification of Sample
“The purpose of a sample is to represent the larger phenomenon being studied in
some manner because it is too large to be characterized in its entirety’' (Patterson et al.,
2001 p. 6). Indeed, this is the case with the phenomenon of environmental ethics. The 22
narratives that make up the sample may be considered small by standard positivist
approaches to science. However, this study did not follow the traditions o f positivist
inquiry. Patterson and Williams (2002) discuss in some depth the notion of
representativeness with regard to justifying one’s sample:
The purpose of sampling is to represent the phenomenon being studied using some 
subset o f its elements because it is too large to be characterized in its entirety. 
Therefore, the central concern in any approach to sampling is representativeness; a 
sample is intended to represent the larger phenomenon being studied in some 
manner. The concept of representation can be conceived in different ways and at 
different scales. For example, representativeness may be conceived as being a 
question o f whether the results are "statistically generalizable to" the population.
A closely related perspective conceptualizes representativeness in terms o f 
obtaining an "unbiased estimator" o f a population parameter. But 
representativeness can also be conceived as a question of how well (richly, deeply, 
thoroughly) the findings represent the actual subject or individual being studied (p.
4).
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With regards to this study, representativeness is best understood as a measure of richness, 
depth, and thoroughness of the subject being studied, in this case environmental ethics 
with respect to specific places. Determinations o f these three factors (richness, depth, and 
thoroughness) are based on the ability o f the researcher to analyze the narratives for 
meanings and condense those meanings into themes and subthemes. The three objectives 
listed in section 3.2 represent the means by which the important information in this study 
was accessed.
The 22 narratives represent a representative sample o f the richness, depth, and 
thoroughness of environmental ethics. Those words uttered and ideas expressed through 
the 22 interviews document the way(s) that environmental ethics is expressed by some 
people. Insofar as environmental ethics is a valid topic of inquiry which can be accessed 
through interviews, the 22 narratives did produce data insightful into the nature of the 
topic.
3.6 Data Collection
The production of a narrative between two or more people marks the first appearance 
o f data. In total, 22 narratives were produced. The process of producing narratives was 
governed by both an interviewing logic and a series of interview guides. The interviewing 
logic informed both the choice of data collection as well as the ultimate interview guides.
3.6.1 Interviewing Logic
Some interview approaches view the questions asked as a stimulus-response model 
(Mishler, 1986) in which each individual receives the same input stimulus and the output is
1 IS
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thought to vary only as a consequence o f the differences among individuals. This 
approach may be well-suited to studying phenomenon where individuals are responding to 
questions with clear and, perhaps, unambiguous answers. However, ethics does not lend 
itself well to this sort of approach due to the fuzziness o f its boundaries and the lack o f 
clarity in its commitments. In fact, Des Jardins (2001) cautions against expecting too 
much precision in determining the one right path in environmental ethics.
The concern with the precise boundaries of environmental ethics (anthropocentric 
vs. biocentric vs. ecocentric, individual vs. collections, etc.) gains force when paired with 
another concern—the youthful nature o f the field. Environmental ethics, as an area of 
inquiry which has only begun to penetrate public discourse, suggests that it may not be 
appropriate to consider a single clearly operationalized model prior to any interview. 
Therefore, in this instance, what is needed is an approach that focuses the general topic of 
inquiry—environmental ethics—but allows the individuals to explore their own ideas and 
feelings about this topic. Kvale (1983) describes this type o f interview as a means to enter 
into a dialogue of themes, without the interviewer prescribing the bounded meanings of 
various concepts. “Under this model, the interview structure is variable to accommodate 
the way a respondent understands, structures, and communicates about phenomena” 
(Patterson et a l, 2001 p. 7).
3.6.2 Interview Guidefs)
Data were collected by conducting in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 
visitors to the three study sites. The following list o f questions was designed to guide my 
understanding of the intersection o f different types o f ethics and the relationship that
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people have with different natural areas. Although this can be considered a structured 
interview, the prompts and follow-up questions posed to each person varied. For 
instance, in many cases I asked the respondents to explain why they felt the way they did. 
Specifically, respondents were encouraged to provide more detail and clarification than 
may have been originally presented. In some cases the probing was designed to reveal 
specific ethical commitments, such as principles based on justice or care. In other cases, 
probing was simply used to solicit more information. O f course the challenge with 
probing is to guard against producing answers that may exist only as they relate to the 
questions of the researcher, but have a tenuous attachment to life outside the interview. 
This may be especially true when the researcher is searching for responses to hypothetical 
dilemmas. Another challenge of the probes with this research concerned the tendency to 
persist in questioning until a ‘sufficient’ answer was given—an answer that reflected either 
justice principles or care principles.
The following questions are not necessarily listed in the order they were asked, 
they are presented in the context of the three different objectives listed earlier in the 
chapter. Patterson and Williams (2001) draw the distinction between interview guides and 
interview schedules with the former allowing for a less rigid procedural protocol to the 
questions being asked.
Although the semi-structured interview remained the vehicle through which 
environmental ethics was discussed, new and unexpected information necessitated the 
development o f a second interview guide. The questions in the original interview guide 
were used for the first few interviews. Upon beginning my analysis o f these first few 
interviews, I concluded that these questions were not generating they type o f data I had
117
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
anticipated. As a result, a revised interview guide was constructed. This second interview 
guide was used for the remainder o f the interviews.
3.6J.1 Original Interview Guide
1. Questions related to Objective # 1 (Care/Justice).
• What does the word ethics mean to you?
• Adapted from Gilligan and designed to determine the boundaries o f what 
someone considers ethical.
•  Likely prompts will attempt to discern a distinction between ethics and 
other things, such as conventions, preferences, and/or etiquette.
• What kinds of things do you think about when making ethical decision?
• Adapted from Gilligan and designed to determine the criteria (justice vs. 
care) that someone uses when evaluating ethical situations.
• Overall, do you think this park (Cumberland FaIIs)/Yellowstone/other 
park (of their choice) is a good thing a bad thing or neither good nor 
bad?
• (Assuming they respond affirmatively, proceed to the next question).
• What is it that makes this park (Cumberland FaOs)/Yellowstone/other 
park (of their choice) important?
• This question is designed to encourage people to articulate the values they 
may associate with each park (i.e., recreation, haven for wildlife, scenery, 
etc.).
• The belief is that arguments for intrinsic, or at least non-anthropocentric, 
values may suggest more abstract ethical reasoning.
• Since parks are, by definition, publicly-owned resources, shouldn't all 
people have an equal say in determining how they are managed? Or is it 
more appropriate for those who know the area best to play a bigger role 
than those who don't know the area as well?
•  This question is designed to test the equal treatment argument advocated 
by justice-based ethics and the equal consideration argument advocated by 
care-based ethics.
2. Questions related to Objective # 2 (Obligatory/Supererogatory)
• Do you do anything to protect or preserve this park (Cumberland Falls)?
• Adapted from Kahn and designed to determine the level of obligation one 
has to a more well-known area.
•  Do you do anything to protect or preserve Yellowstone/another park (of 
their choice)?
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• Adapted from Kahn and designed to determine the level o f obligation one 
has to lesser-known areas that might simply represent an abstraction.
• Whose responsibility is it to protect or preserve parks?
• This question is designed to determine the level o f obligation someone feels 
for park protection as a class of ethical behaviors.
•  What kinds of things should be done to protect or preserve this park 
(Cumberland FaOsVYeDowstone N.P^other parks (of their choice)?
• Designed to identify the clarity o f options for pro-environmental behaviors 
and commitments.
• Clear options would suggest a more obligatory orientation, while less clear 
options would suggest a more supererogatory orientation.
•  Do you think your friends and family would be proud of you if yon 
decided to work towards protecting this park (Cumberland 
Falb)/Yellowstone N.PJother paries (of their choice)?
•  Designed to gauge how praiseworthy protecting natural areas o f varying 
familiarity is; and as a result, if protecting a these different areas is a 
supererogatory ethical behavior.
•  Do you think your friends and family believe that it is your duty to 
protect this park (Cumberland Falb)/Yellow8tone N.P Jother parks (of 
their choice)?
• Designed to gauge how blameworthy not protecting natural areas o f 
varying familiarity is; and as a result, if protecting these different areas is an 
obligatory ethical behavior.
Questions related to Objective # 3 (Familiarity)
•  TeH me a little bit about your experiences here at Cumberland Falls State 
Resort Park.
• Designed to gauge further the level o f familiarity someone has with 
Cumberland Falls.
• How familiar are you with this area compared to Yellowstone National 
Park?
• Designed to gauge the relative level o f familiarity someone at Cumberland 
Falls has with Yellowstone N.P.
• The idea behind this question is to set up a contrast in familiarity
between two areas that might be used to illustrate a difference in ethical 
theory and ethical orientation.
•  Do yon have different responsibilities to this park (Cumberland Falls) 
than to Yellowstone?
• Adapted from Kahn and designed to gauge the difference (if any) in ethical 
responsibilities between the familiar and non-familiar.
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Although the previous list of questions was not generating the types o f responses I 
had anticipated, they were contributing to the production o f a number o f interesting paths 
worthy o f further exploration. It was this evolving nature o f the research that necessitated 
a  new set of questions to guide future narratives. As a result, I altered the interview guide 
to allow people to discuss certain topics more freely. This amended interview guide is 
listed below. My initial contact with each person remained largely the same as the first 
several interviews. And although some o f the questions in the second interview guide 
were quite different from earlier questions, the general rubric of studying environmental 
ethics with regards to specific places remained the same.
3.6.2.2. Revised Interview Guide 
1. Questions about Experiences and Thoughts about Cumberland Falls
• These questions were once again designed to gauge familiarity with 
Cumberland Falls. Although there was a screening question used prior to 
this one (“Would you consider yourself familiar with this area/Cumberland 
Falls?”)> this additional familiarity question was designed to reveal degrees 
o f familiarity through stories that people could tell about their experiences 
at Cumberland Falls. As degrees o f familiarity with an object may influence 
ethical obligation towards that object, this line of inquiry was maintained. 
Additionally, questions were asked about the values that people express in 
reference to Cumberland Falls. These expressed values may then lead to 
follow-up questions regarding ethics and obligations to protect or preserve 
those things o f value.
•  Tell me something interesting about your experiences at 
Cumberland Falls.
•  What do you like about this place? Why?
•  What do you dislike about this place? Why?
2. Questions about Other Natural Areas
•  In asking questions about Yellowstone and other natural areas, the intent 
was to set the context for a potential difference in obligations. Further, 
these questions were asked in the hope that respondents would, 
themselves, compare what they know about Cumberland Falls and what 
they know about Yellowstone.
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•  What do you know about Yellowstone National Park?
• How is Cumberland Falls similar to/different from Yellowstone?
3. Questions about Ethics
• In the questions from the original interview guide, ethics proved to be a 
tough nut to crack. In other words, I felt I was unsuccessful in accessing 
information about people’s ethics with the original ‘ethics’ questions asked. 
What seemed to be missing was the nature of right/wrong and good/bad for 
people, both in general and with regards to environmental concerns. These 
questions then were designed to cut more to the essence o f morality.
• What does the word ethics mean to you?
• What kinds o f things do all moral questions have in common?
• Is it ever hard to do what you know is right?
•  What prevents you from doing what’s right?
• How do you know right from wrong?
• Do these things ever change?
• Where do you look for answers in deciding right from wrong?
4. Questions about Environmental Ethics
• These questions were meant to both focus more closely on the topic of 
environmental obligations and to gauge the nature o f the commitment that 
people might feel towards specific places. Additionally, some o f these 
questions were designed to determine the difference, if any, between 
environmental ethics and simple park rules or laws.
•  What do you know about how this area should be treated?
• What kinds of things can and can’t you do here?
• Are there things that are allowed here that maybe you shouldn’t do?
• Is it important to protect places like Cumberland Falls?
•  Why or why not?
• Is it important to protect places like Yellowstone?
•  Why or why not?
• Do you feel personally responsible for making sure that these places
are protected?
•  Why or why not?
• Does it make a difference if we’re talking about public land or
private land?
•  Why or why not?
The intent of this revised interview guide was twofold. In some sense, I took a different 
approach with the questions in order that people might respond better, in terms of 
responding with more meaning and detail. Secondly, the new interview guide was
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constructed with the knowledge that themes different from the original topics o f the study 
were emerging and more richness may be revealed through a modified series o f questions. 
It should be noted that the revised interview guide was not constructed all at once, but 
rather represents an evolution o f my questioning. As such no single person was asked all 
of these ‘revised’ questions, however, several people were asked many o f them. Finally, 
some themes emerged quite stealthily. For instance, through about the first half o f the 
interviews, I asked no specific questions about public versus private resources. However, 
once I began analyzing the responses from the first several people, I noticed that various 
scenarios and contingencies came up which related to the nature of public land ownership. 
Following this discovery I began asking people if what they thought about ethics would 
change depending on who owned the land. I will return to this discussion in the next 
chapter, but it is important to acknowledge here this progression o f understanding as it 
inevitably altered my methods.
With regards to how the interview guide evolved and the data that was produced 
from it, I would note that the overall domain of interest remained throughout the study. 
Specifically, the goal o f engaging people in discussions about environmental ethics 
persisted across interview guides. The second guide simply made accessing this 
information a bit easier and more applied to the language o f the respondents.
3.7 Data Analysis
Interviews ranged in length from a little over 12 minutes to 45 minutes. The 
average time for all 22 interviews was 28 minutes. Each interview was analyzed 
idio graphically and nomothetically. Thus, while each interview was coded and analyzed
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on its own, in the end, each interview was considered as a component o f a larger 
production—the outcome o f which was the four primary themes and their assorted 
subthemes. More specifics on these analyses will be given in the following two 
subsections on Coding (3.7.1) and Theme Identification (3.7.2).
The foundations o f this research followed the work of others who all employed 
both idiographic and nomothetic level analyses on their interview data. Consistent with 
the seminal work of Kohlberg (1971; Kohlberg et al. 1983; Colby et al. 1987) and Gilligan 
(1982; 1993), as well as that of Kahn (Howe et aL 1996; Kahn 1992; 1999), interviews 
were analyzed by developing a qualitative organizing system (Tesch 1990). Stated 
another way, “the process o f developing and organizing system is the analysis, while the 
final organizing system is the product o f analysis” (Patterson and Williams, 2002). This 
organizing system is particularly important in revealing connections and relationships 
between different concepts. The organizing system is constructed o f themes that weave 
throughout each individual interview and across all interviews. For the most part, none of 
these themes can be said to be mutually exclusive or independent o f all others. Indeed the 
relationships among the main themes and among the subthemes are at least as important as 
the themes themselves. Themes are those broad ideas that rein in coded meaning units 
developed during the coding process. In other words, the themes serve as context which 
give meaning and insight into the more specific meaning units. In general terms, the 
analysis o f qualitative data can be broken into two broad categories: coding and 
interpretation, with a number of steps defining each.
Coding is a central term in qualitative data analysis and it refers both to a technique 
o f interpretation and a means towards pattern recognition. Stated another way, coding is
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the process by which interviews are broken down into discrete units (somewhat coincident 
with sentences), questioned and compared and ultimately understood (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). These discrete units are similarly used to discern patterns or commonalities within 
and across interviews. This process o f coding is necessary to condense shared themes, 
perhaps expressed in different language, into meaningful terms. Analyses of qualitative 
data generally follow fairly standardized formats beginning with an interview followed by a 
system of coding and ultimately concluding with a thematic interpretation. I roughly 
followed a seven-step process o f data analysis as outlined by Patterson and Williams 
(2002).
1. All interviews were tape recorded and transcribed. Immediately following 
transcription, all interviews were proofread for accuracy.
2. I coded all o f my transcripts by hand rather than using a software program. As 
a result o f the manual coding, I, instead, printed out each interview at this step. 
I will explain the process o f coding in greater depth in the next subsection.
3. Following the printing o f hard copies o f each interview, I re-read each for 
accuracy. In other words, this was a second proof reading.
4. Meaning units (typically groups o f sentences) were identified and marked. 
Although meaning units cannot stand independent from the rest of the 
interview, they do represent thoughts that are understandable on their own, 
and represent the basic unit o f analysis.
5. As meaning units were interpreted, I identified themes. These themes 
represent my own interpretation of what people are saying in the interviews.
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Themes offer flexibility in that they can be used to group multiple meaning 
units across several individuals who all use different language.
6. As stated previously, the relationships between themes is critically important. 
At this stage these relationships will be identified and explained. This 
explanation leads to the early stages o f a discussion on results. This was done 
idiographically (within interview) and nomothetically (across interviews).
7. The formal write-up of results was the natural conclusion to this analysis. 
Ultimately, this write-up is interpretive rather than a simple listing o f meaning 
units and themes.
3.7.1 Coding
Open coding essentially represents the first o f two efforts in the general realm o f 
data analysis. Strauss and Corbin (1990) describe this type o f coding as the process when 
“data are broken down into discrete parts, closely examined, compared for similarities and 
differences, and questions are asked about the phenomenon as reflected in the data” (p. 
62). My method o f coding was to make notes about specific portions of narratives in the 
margins. From these notations in the margins, I produced a separate list of my own 
comments for each interview. These comment sheets were used to facilitate my own 
organization of the data into more manageable units.
During the coding, sentences, phases and even paragraphs were examined for 
meaning. Often key words were identified as noteworthy and these keywords were then 
used to code the sentence, phrase, etc. For example, one interviewee made this comment 
following my question about the universality o f natural beauty.
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“Well if something is a park, then it is there for a reason and that reason is 
probably to protect something that is beautiful.” (Chris)
I originally coded this response as ‘ Scenery/Beauty. ’ To the extent that this sentence
conveys the notion of natural beauty, the code word chosen seems quite appropriate.
Also, often the original word is derived directly from the text. However, these code
words are not static and immutable. Quite the contrary, the first code word can be slightly
altered to one that is more refined or it may end up being radically changed in light of
further insight gleaned from elsewhere in the interview or even in other interviews. In
other words, once a portion of text is coded opportunities remain to reconsider the
appropriateness or applicability of that code word. Consider the following example of
how a code word can change following new insight gleaned from other interviews.
The first person I interviewed, Michael, spoke o f doing what is right and wrong
with regards to certain natural areas. He said,
“Well... because we should always try to protect things that are beautiful. I mean, 
I would never do anything to take away the beauty of this area, or any area, 
because 1... it would just be wrong.”
I originally coded these two sentences as ‘Obligatory Ethics’ which I then slightly
modified to ‘Always right/wrong.’ However, ultimately this passage was coded first with
the word ‘Beauty’ and secondly with the phrase ‘As a Duty to Be Upheld.’ This first and
second ordering o f terms reflects the nature o f primary themes and subthemes
respectively. Thus, ‘Beauty in Nature’ became a primary theme and ‘As a Duty to be
Upheld’ became a subtheme beneath ‘Beauty in Nature.’
The example just given with Michael’s excerpt is characteristic o f a number of
passages from the first few interviews. My efforts at coding the first few interviews were
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driven largely by the objectives o f the study as described in earlier in this chapter in section 
3.2: Goals and Objectives. In light o f this, I attempted to find instances o f obligatory or 
supererogatory ethics. I was similarly searching for terms indicative of ethics of justice or 
care. It wasn’t until I noticed the frequency o f the occurrence o f the concepts beauty or 
scenery that my coding choices became more solidified. It is through this solidification 
process that themes emerged and were identified. Thus, theme identification is the second 
step in the data analysis.
3.7.2 Theme Identification
Coding and theme identification are not discrete steps in qualitative data analysis. 
While the first efforts at coding occur prior to any identification o f themes, once the data 
has begun to be analyzed, coding and theme identification occur in concert. In addition, 
each informs the other throughout the data analysis. Patterson and others (1998) liken 
coding as the process o f developing an organizing system, while final organizing system 
represents the found themes. It is this process of discovering and identifying the themes, 
as informed by coding, which ultimately yields the results o f the study.
Identifying themes is an iterative process whereby transcripts are read and reread. 
Coded meaning units are re-examined in light of further understanding gained elsewhere. 
Ultimately, the themes which represent the “final organizing system” are the culmination 
o f multiple reviews o f the data and attempts at contextualizing each person’s words within 
the entirety of their whole interview and subsequently across the interviews of others.
This is done, so that in the end, the themes themselves tell a larger story than simply a 
collection o f anecdotes as first identified in the early stages o f coding.
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The theme ‘On Becoming a Moral Agent’ is perhaps the best representation o f this
iterative process and the ultimate revealing o f some bigger picture. It is well-documented
that hermeneutic approaches to research resist partitioning interviewer from
interviewee(s). Each contributes to an overall production of knowledge. In this way,
biases and preconceived ideas are allowed to influence the production o f data. My biases
were evident in the line of questioning whereby I presumed not only the existence of moral
dilemmas, but also of the moral agency o f those whom I was interviewing. (I will revisit
this bias and its implications in the final chapter o f this document.)
My belief in the existence of real environmental, moral dilemmas and in the moral
agency of those interviewed guided nearly all o f my questions. Further, this belief guided
the coding process, such that when keywords were chosen during the coding process they
were selected as referents to moral scenarios. However, it was only through the data
analysis that I was able to discover greater depth to the factors determining when, and
indeed if  people subscribe to an environmental ethics. It is this, my final theme, ‘On
Becoming a Moral Agent’ which reflects the identification some fundamental questions
about environmental ethics which may have been glossed over or even ignored in previous
empirical treatments of environmental ethics.
When Thomas made the following statement my first inclination was to reinterpret
his words in terms more aligned with an supererogatory ethics.
“My ethics don’t realty include anything with the environment, I think you do 
those kinds of things (pro-environmental behaviors) just to be polite or helpful, but 
not because God says you have to.” (Thomas)
Considering a supererogatory environmental ethics, Thomas is simply expressing the idea
that doing good deeds with regards to the environment is not required beyond the call of
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duty. However, I think this interpretation is less accurate. Thomas does not express a 
supererogatory environmental ethic. He considers those things environmental as existing 
beyond the moral realm altogether. Therefore, in identifying this theme, I had to step back 
and question my own preconceived notions o f environmental ethics and the nature of the 
dilemmas I was asking people to respond to.
In the end, theme identification followed from the earliest forays into the coding 
process. Occasionally, themes developed quickly and obviously as in the case o f ‘Beauty 
in Nature.’ In other instances themes developed slowly and begrudgingly (from my 
perspective) as in the case o f ‘On Becoming a Moral Agent.’ Collectively all the themes 
and subthemes represent an organizing system which combine to characterize the nature of 
environmental ethics with regards to specific places. Chapter 4 will explore in some detail 
the essence o f these themes and subthemes.
3.7.3 Evaluation of Analysis
Qualitative data analyses are not comparable to traditional measures o f evaluation 
in quantitative approaches. Therefore, p-values and variance explained are not 
appropriate evaluative tools. I propose that my results be evaluated on the basis of two 
criteria outlined by Patterson and Williams (2002): persuasiveness and insightfulness. The 
first criterion is not coincident with some misrepresentation o f findings to suit the 
purposes of the researcher. In other words, a persuasive theme must be built on strong 
data and a believable representation o f reality. Further, persuasiveness is a criterion 
whereby the excerpts are presented to tell a  story that is at once accurate and meaningful. 
Persuasiveness refers to the strength o f my conclusions based on representative excerpts
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from the interview texts. In short, persuasiveness should allow the reader to conclude that 
the themes and subthemes are accurate representations o f excerpts presented. Two rules 
o f thumb guided my persuasiveness criterion. In some cases the subtheme was best 
illustrated by presenting a range o f responses that gave an indication of the overall 
variation in what people said. In other cases, many people said about the same thing, and 
in those cases I selected those excerpts that seem to articulate most clearly the idea in 
question.
The other criterion—insightfulness—is less easy to objectively evaluate 
particularly in the short time that has passed since the data analysis. Insightfulness, in this 
evaluative context, refers to illuminating the phenomenon o f how people describe their 
relationships and responsibilities to nature to a greater degree than any reader previously 
possessed. Stated another way, insightfulness is a means by which the data further an 
understanding of some topic or phenomenon. We might ask the question, “But what more 
do we know now following this study?” In this respect, I do think this research will hold 
up to the insightfulness test. From my own knowledge o f reading numerous 
environmental ethics articles and books, it seems clear that this research has shed light on 
some shaky foundations. In other words, through this research, a few assumptions 
concerning the study o f environmental ethics may be called into question.
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Chapter 4: Results
Over the course o f 22 interviews with 28 different people, four primary themes 
documenting the ethical relationship that people express towards specific places emerged. 
These themes are 1) Beauty in Nature; 2) Responsibilities to ‘The Other’; 3) Public Lands; 
and 4) On Becoming a Moral Agent. Previous discussions in Chapter 2 have illustrated 
the non-discrete nature o f environmental ethics. That these four primary themes emerged 
indicates further that when people attempt to explore their own environmental ethics they 
occasionally explore curious backroads that are less well-mapped. These curious 
backroads are evidenced in the form of many o f the subthemes. Mapping these subthemes 
within broader primary themes ultimately provides greater clarity to one portion o f the 
general field o f environmental ethics and the more specific focus o f this study: expression 
of ethics for natural places.
In this chapter, I will outline each of the four main themes as well as all o f their 
respective subthemes. My discussion will be interspersed with appropriate excerpts from 
the transcripted interviews. Collectively the quotes do not represent the entirety o f any 
single narrative. The quotes are normally a sample o f the perspectives expressed 
regarding each theme and subtheme. When reading this chapter consider the following 
question as a guide: How does this finding inform the field o f environmental ethics? While 
this chapter will offer a review and a documentation o f the themes and subthemes, a more 
in-depth and thorough interpretation of these themes and subthemes will not be found in 
this chapter, however. This level o f examination will follow in Chapter S: Discussion.
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This additional treatment o f the themes and subthemes is offered in an effort to determine 
if and when existing literature supports these findings.
To begin with, I have outlined the four main themes and their respective subthemes 
in the following table.
Beauty In Nature Public Lands
As an Intrinsic Natural Property Intent o f (Creation)
As a Subjective Evaluation Preservation/Protection
As a Duty to Be Upheld Purpose of (Existence)
Management Responsibility Recreation
Necessary for Outdoor Recreation Ownership
Natural versus Created versus Restored Land Tenure in Appalachia
Discrete versus Continuous Variable Gills
Nostalgic for past beauty Commodities
As a proxy for health Scale
Equals integrity and stability Bigger is better
Health is a normative commitment Bigger is more real/authentic
Big cannot be artificial
Responsibilities To ‘The O ther’ Big-scale mythology
Nature
Obligatory
Supererogatory On Becoming A Moral Agent
Based on Justice Not My Problem to Solve
Based on Care Taxpayer
People Park employees need work
Cultural Heritage Origins of
Other community members Religion
Future generations Parents
Ecology, Evolution, Naturalistic Fallacy Morals versus Ethics
Natural vs. Artificial I was not the cause
Exculpatory evidence (Milgram)
Familiarity
Not enough information to act
Not my place to judge/criticize
This is Not a Question of Morals
Table 5: Themes and subthemes in nested illustration.
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4.1 Theme 1: Beauty in Nature
This theme comprises a number of subthemes all of which speak to the 
appreciation that people express for seeing natural areas. Indeed, beauty in nature is 
overwhelmingly an expression of an appreciation o f the visual aspects o f nature. Scenery 
and experiencing natural beauty are both long-standing and well-documented motivations 
for outdoor recreation (Schreyer, 1986; Williams, 1986). This suggests that seeing the 
wonders of nature is often fundamental to our choice o f outdoor recreation pursuits. It 
was interesting to discover that a number of those people interviewed spoke o f natural 
beauty as a real thing in the world and further as a thing that was worthy o f moral 
consideration. As a real thing, beauty can become an object o f attention, value, and ethics. 
With the axiologieal turn, when beauty is assigned value it becomes an object o f moral 
consideration. Frequently dining the interviews, a number of people opined that beautiful 
parts of nature should be protected. Contained within this simple expression are a number 
o f different justifications, each rich and ripe with meaning.
The following subsections illustrate the subthemes resident in the primary theme 
Beauty in Nature. Further, while this theme is presented first, there is no intended priority 
to the presentation o f themes in this chapter. Rather I am presenting the themes simply in 
the order that I discovered them, yet order o f discovery should neither imply importance 
nor extensiveness/prevalence. The subthemes are presented in an order o f my own 
contrivance. Where one subtheme seems closely related to or contrasted with another 
they are presented one after the other. For instance Beauty as an Intrinsic Natural 
Property and Beauty as a Subjective Evaluation contrast nicely and thus are offered 
consecutively.
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4.1.1 Beauty as an Intrinsic Natural Property
The first indication I had that beauty might develop into a theme o f its own came
early in the interview process following statements made by a number o f different people
about the nature o f natural beauty. This subtheme is more an ontological treatment rather
than a direct treatment of moral considerability. However, this subtheme and the one
which follows will both inform how and why people express an environmental ethics for
specific places. The sense behind the subtheme, Beauty as an Intrinsic Natural Property is
that beauty actually inheres in nature. When people speak about natural beauty, they do
not think o f beauty as being in the eye o f the beholder, but as something real and nearly
tangible. Howard said this:
“...well even if you can’t explain what looks nice in nature, everyone knows what 
it is anyway. I mean, when someone says, ‘Man that sure was a beautiful sunset or 
a beautiful meadow’ everyone will make their own mental picture of a beautiful 
sunset or meadow, but it will be pretty much the same thing for everybody.”
Howard goes in to more detail with this idea o f beauty following my request to explain
how he knows that everyone has pretty much the same idea o f natural beauty.
“Because when you’re with someone else and they say, ‘Isn’t that beautiful?’ No 
one ever disagrees with them. So that tells me that some things in nature are 
beautiful to everybody no matter where you go or who you are talking to. I know 
this sounds like it contradicts the old saying, ‘Beauty is in the eye o f the beholder’ 
but maybe people aren’t that different after all. Or really, maybe there just is 
something about parts o f nature that everyone pretty much agrees on. Like the 
color green—when someone tells you, that that leaf is green and you agree with 
them, you might actually see two different shades o f green, but it’s still green and 
not red or purple or white. So, I guess I think natural beauty is the same way, we 
may have slightly different interpretations of what beautiful means, but for the 
most part everybody agrees on it.”
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One o f the most interesting aspects of the ‘Beauty’ statements by Howard came from the
fret that Howard is blind—he couldn’t see any o f the scenery at Cumberland Falls.
However, he lost his sight gradually over about 10 years (at the time o f the interview
Howard was 43 years old and had been totally blind for about 7 years) and thus relied on
his memories o f what beauty was when people would describe something to him. To me
this was an extraordinary insight—that a blind person could articulate information on
beauty in nature and what it means. Howard described beauty in very specific detail with
almost photographic-like vividness and imagery.
Chris was the wife o f a husband and wife pair that I interviewed together. This is
how she described a common attribute of all parks and the intrinsic permanence o f beauty.
“Well if something is a park, then it is there for a reason and that reason is 
probably to protect something that is beautiful. We don’t make parks to protect 
ugly parts o f nature, we have parks to protect beautiful areas. Every park I’ve 
been to, and I’ve been to a lot of parks, has had something realty beautiful to see. 
And I know what you’re thinking, it’s not just beautiful because it’s in a park; it 
was beautiful before there was a park to protect it. You know, parks can come 
and go, but what’s beautiful will always be there.”
Another quote from Howard and one from Sharon compliment each other on the exact
nature o f beauty as an intrinsic moral quality and not something that humans just
arbitrarily assign to different areas.
“Beauty in nature, at least, is as real as a tree or a mountain. If  I know that a park 
has certain things, then I know it is beautiful.” (Howard)
“If something looks nice or pretty, you know that it has things that make it that 
way. One tree or one cliff may not be beautiful, but when you put things together 
in a certain way, then they all become beautiful. That’s what scenery is all about. 
When I told you I like going to Cumberland Falls because o f the scenery, it was 
because there are so many things that all together make up a beautiful place. The 
scenery is just there and it’s made up o f everything, like the Falls and the river and 
the mountains... and the moonbow. I guess what I’m saying is that the scenery
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isn’t my idea; I mean nature put all the pieces there together to make the scenery 
so beautiful.” (Sharon)
What is curious about the notion o f beauty in nature is that it seems to transcend
place. This became particularly apparent when I asked people to talk about what they
knew about other places they thought to be beautiful
John: “Oh, Yellowstone is beautiful too. They’ve got... what’s it called... Old 
Faithful right? Yeah, that’s pretty awesome. I used to have a bunch o f pictures, 
like from a calendar or something from all sorts o f different places and 
Yellowstone was one o f them, so was some place in Hawaii and that big waterfall 
at Yosemite and Devil’s Tower. All those places are beautiful”
Interviewer: “What is it that makes them all beautiful?”
John: “It’s just nature you know. Nature is beautiful and so wherever you see 
nature you see something beautiful. You asked me what I liked about this place 
and I told you I liked it because o f the scenery. It’s the same thing with all those 
other places, I like them because they’re beautiful. Even though I’ve never been to 
them before, I know they are beautiful because I’ve seen the pictures and I know 
National Parks protect beautiful areas too.”
That beauty is transcendent o f place suggests that it is o f a higher order of things. The
place just happens to be the vehicle for twinging beauty to us. Tammy and Nicole who
were interviewed together both touch on this portable idea of beauty as welL
Tammy: “It’s easy to see why so many people go to Cumberland Falls, because it’s 
beautiful with the mountains and the river and the waterfalL”
Nicole: “Yeah, it’s just like a lot o f other places you see that you like. They are 
beautiful too ... and even if this was the first time someone came to Cumberland 
Falls it would still be beautiful because they know what nature is supposed to look 
like.”
Tammy: “Yeah, I know what beautiful means in terms of nature and it doesn’t 
matter if I’m talking about Cumberland Falls or, what was that other place— 
Yellowstone. All these spots are beautiful even if they don’t look the same.”
Nicole: “Mmm hmm, I don’t think you can have just one definition o f beautiful. 
Nature is beautiful and nature looks really different in different places, like the
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jungle and the desert and Cumberland Falls all look different, but they’re all 
beautiful too.”
A statement by Nathan seems to sum up the idea that beauty in nature is something
intrinsic and real and that people everywhere generally understand what it means to say
that someplace is naturally beautiful.
“It’s not like you don’t know what someone is talking about when they say, ‘Man 
you should go to so and so because it’s beautiful.’ When I hear that someplace is 
beautiful, I don’t need someone to explain to me why it is beautiful, I just know it 
is.”
Within this subtheme, there are a couple additional points worth mentioning. First, 
there is a rejection of anything resembling the social construction o f natural beauty. A 
number o f people whose words appear in this subtheme avow that beauty in nature just 
is—it was not created by us, nor is there much disagreement on what natural beauty is. 
Secondly, although beauty was discussed within the context o f specific places 
(Cumberland Falls and Yellowstone), natural beauty to these people was not simply within 
these parks, rather it was above and greater than these parks. I used the term ‘portable 
idea ofbeauty’ to express the transcendent nature of beauty. There may be a curious 
moral corollary to this idea o f the park as the vehicle for natural beauty. If the place is just 
that, a vehicle to display natural beauty, this might suggest that any subsequently 
expressed obligation to some place could vanish if the natural beauty were no longer there.
4.1.2 Beauty as a Subjective Evaluation
Anecdotally, most people everywhere seem to subscribe to some concept ofbeauty 
being entirely subjective. We often hear the phrase that beauty is in the eye of the 
beholder. Well, this alternate perspective was offered quite readily throughout the
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interviews. A number o f people made appeals to natural beauty that they didn’t expect
other people to agree with. While not contradictory to the previous subtheme, Beauty as
a Subjective Evaluation does eschew notions of natural beauty being something
completely concrete and firmly affixed as some objective property. Beatrice said,
“I don’t think that my views are the only ones. I mean just because I really like 
going [to Cumberland Falls] and looking at the falls doesn’t mean that everyone 
does.”
Mike S. and Trent both expand on this idea by saying,
“Some people really like going [to Niagara Falls], but I’ve been there and it was 
big and cool and all that, but 1 didn’t think it was all that beautiful—not like 
Cumberland Falls. Cumberland Falls, even though it’s a lot smaller it’s a  lot more 
beautiful a place, but others may have their own opinions.” (Mike S.)
“When I think o f nature’s beauty I think o f sunsets and mountains with snow on 
them. But I’ve also tried to convince people who have never been to Cumberland 
Falls before that this place is realty beautiful. But when they see it they usually 
seem a little let down or disappointed. I guess it’s because some people think 
bigger is more beautiful, but I think it’s just that different people think different 
things are more beautiful than others. It’s like they say, ‘beauty is in the eye o f the 
beholder.’” (Trent)
Judy describes the way that she has changed what she thinks is beautiful.
“When I lived out west (near Portland, Oregon), I thought the mountains out here 
were just little hills and I didn’t think they were very impressive, I guess. But now 
that I live out here now, I think I see them different than I saw before. I’m not 
saying that everything is the same, you know, the same level o f beautiful, but I 
think maybe you just need to realty be around it to appreciate it a lot.”
What strikes me with all o f these quotes which support a contextualized or
subjective conception o f natural beauty is that they all seem to suggest an attitude that
beauty is for humans as much as it is created by humans. Thus, when those interviewed
began to weigh in on moral commitments as tied to natural beauty, these commitments
seem to reflect a consequentialist objective that considers human pleasure in viewing
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landscapes. So, beauty was important to the extent that humans would benefit from it. 
However, the first subtheme, Beauty as an Intrinsic Natural Property seems to indicate a 
different set of duties to protect natural beauty.
4.13 Beauty as a Duty to Be Upheld
Many of the same people who described either the intrinsic quality o f natural
beauty or the subjective view ofbeauty, then went on to explain the corresponding duties
that we have to these beautiful areas or in some cases duties to other people who might
want to see the beautiful areas as well Note that the selected quotes that follow in this
subsection not only illustrate the nature ofbeauty as something worthy o f moral
consideration, but they also illustrate the fuzziness of moral commitments, with regard to
whom or what is deserving o f moral consideration. That is, the boundary between what
is, and what is not morally considerable is not clear cut. The first few quotes should also
illustrate the difficulty I had in getting people to affix their ethics to something, whether
that something was justice or care, or to a person or to another thing.
Michael talks about the tragedy o f losing beautiful natural areas.
“... I don’t know, I guess what bugs me is when you see how messed up places 
get when we don’t take care of them. Even here, this place used to be a lot nicer, 
not so much garbage. The scenery now is not as good as it used to be because of 
the pollution and garbage. It’s just wrong when people mess up the scenery like 
that. You said you wanted to talk about ethics—well it’s unethical when you turn 
something that used to be beautiful into something that’s ugly.”
My follow up question to Michael was, “Why is messing up the scenery unethical?” To
which he responded:
“Well... because we should always try to protect things that are beautiful. I mean, 
I would never do anything to take away the beauty o f this area, or any area,
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because I... it would just be wrong. If someone wanted to come in here and 
clearcut that whole area (motioning to the hillside across the river), that would just 
be so sad because it wouldn’t be as beautiful anymore.”
My second follow up: “Would it be sad or wrong because people wouldn’t be able to
enjoy the scenery like before or because the scenery itself is important regardless if anyone
ever sees it?”
“Umm... both I think. I would be mad if I knew that a place I really liked to go to 
and enjoy was getting messed up. But I think God made certain areas beautiful for 
a reason and even if a lot o f people never see them, it’s still a sin to ruin that 
beauty. I guess it’s kind o f like that old saying, ‘If a tree foils in the forest and no 
one tears it does it make a sound?’ I’d say yeah, the tree makes a sound and the 
forest is beautiful too, even if no one is there.”
Thomas, Chris’ husband o f a husband-wife pair that I interviewed together, took a very
similar approach to the duty to protect beautiful areas.
“... since I’m Catholic, you know, I believe that God created all of this for a 
purpose and I hate it when people say, well what’s wrong with cutting down all 
those trees, because a mall might be just as beautiful to someone else. That 
doesn’t make sense to me. Like she (his wife) said, I don’t think we decide what is 
beautiful, God creates what is beautiful and he wants us to protect it.”
To which, his wife responded:
“Yeah, God tells us to take care o f what He created. So it is definitely going 
against God to ruin nature for no good reason.”
However, when I asked both Thomas and Chris to explain to me why it seems okay to
ruin some areas and not others, they responded this way.
Thomas: “Well, I don’t want to come off sounding like some environmental 
wacko. I mean everybody knows that we have to use nature too. It’s not like we 
can never cut down any trees or kill any animals, you know..
Chris: “Yeah, I know that we have to have homes and buildings and we get these 
things from nature, God just wants us to be careful with how we use these things.”
Thomas: “I think what he’s getting at it is why is it okay to ruin that area but spare 
this other area if they are both beautiful. Is that right?”
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Interviewer: “Yep, that’s pretty close.”
Chris: “Oh, well, I think maybe there are shades o f what looks nice. I mean all 
nature is beautiful but we can spare some beautiful areas because we’ve got others 
that are more beautiful.”
Thomas: “I think it’s just that we protect those beautiful areas that are really 
unique. You know, we don’t protect every waterfall, only those that are unique. 
That doesn’t mean that the other waterfalls are ugly or not beautiful, but it does 
mean that a lot o f areas don’t really stand out in their beauty.”
Stuart worked for the U.S. Forest Service in Idaho for a number o f years before moving
back to Kentucky and he espoused a very pragmatic perspective on morality and beauty.
“The only reason to preserve areas is because that’s what the majority o f the 
people want. It doesn’t really matter if I think this area is great, if everyone else 
wants to turn it into a shopping mall then that’s what should be done. The same 
thing goes the other way, if everyone thinks that some area is really beautiful, then 
we should protect it for them to use and enjoy.”
Judy, who compared her experience appreciating the Cascade Mountains in Oregon and
the mountains in and around Cumberland Falls State Resort Park, had this to say about a
moral duty to protect beautiful areas.
“It’s not like I wouldn’t care if some postcard kind o f place got developed, but I 
don’t think it really is a moral thing. I might be upset if Wal-Mart stopped 
carrying my favorite brand o f cookies, but that’s not moral. I guess I’m saying 
that if something is moral, I mean ethical, then that means it is important to God. 
So, I don’t think God cares if some place that I think is pretty disappears.
Immediately after this statement, I asked Judy if morals and ethics were always about what
God thinks or says. To which, she replied,
“Yeah, like I just said if you do something right you are doing something that God 
wants you to. If you’re doing something wrong, you’re doing something that God 
doesn’t want you to do. Now the Bible tells us that we should be careful about 
how we use nature, but that’s different than saying God wants you to keep 
everything pretty.”
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While a number o f the people referred to God as an anchor for their morals
particularly as they relate to beauty, a few other people say beauty and ethics are
something apart from religious teachings. The husband and wife Tom and Carol offered a
two-part obligation to protect beautiful natural areas, neither appeal resorting to a divine
command. They suggest that beautiful areas should be protected because it will make
more people happy and it will produce a better kind o f happiness because it will be longer
lasting. Here is what Tom and Carol had to say about why we should ethically protect
beautiful areas in nature.
Tom: “Well, if the choice is between protecting an area that is very scenic or 
developing it into a shopping center or something, then I think we should protect it 
because it would be the better thing to do.”
Interviewer: “What do you mean it would be the better thing to do?”
Tom: “It’s always better to preserve beauty in nature because that’s what people 
really enjoy. I would think you would be making more people happy by keeping 
an area scenic than if you turned it into a shopping center.”
Carol: “Yeah, it’s like more people will enjoy this area as a park than they would if 
it were a strip mall. I think it’s also a different kind of enjoyment too. The type of 
enjoyment I get when I come to places like this is really different from the type of 
enjoyment I get when I go shopping. Because shopping is just something I 
convince myself I enjoy because I have to do it, you know everybody has to shop 
for stuff. But when I come here, I do it because I really want to and my enjoyment 
is more special because I could be doing anything, but I really want to do exactly 
what I’m doing.”
Tom: “Just to add to something she just said: I also think that enjoying nature is 
something different than enjoying whatever else might take its place because it’s 
longer lasting. When you buy a new pair o f shoes or a new car they both make 
you happy for some time right after you buy them, but when you enjoy a park like 
this place it seems to be something you remember and think about for a long time.”
Likewise, Don who earlier described himself as a soft atheist, had this to say about ethics
and beautiful areas.
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“There are a lot o f really beautiful places, but I don’t think we should protect 
something just because it is beautiful you know. I mean, beauty shouldn’t be a 
requirement... um I mean prerequisite for protection. Because, then we shouldn’t 
have developed any part o f nature.”
After articulating why he thought beauty was a nearly tangible thing, Howard offered this
two part duty after I asked him if places should be protected just because they look nice.
“Sure, because if there isn’t beauty then what’s the point o f caring about anything. 
Maybe you misunderstood me earlier, I wasn’t saying that we should only protect 
beautiful places, because I think all o f nature is beautiful, but obviously we have to 
get rid of some o f it to make buildings and roads. My point is that first, we should 
protect those areas that are realty spectacular. And again, even though I just said 
one word, ‘spectacular’ I think most people would feel the same way about those 
areas. Then we should protect whatever else we can because spectacular beauty 
isn’t necessarily a better beauty.”
Duty to protect beauty rested on a few different foundations: making other people 
happy, the ‘just because’ argument, and a divine command. The because God says so 
seems most prevalent, however, I will resist creating a sub-subtheme here to describe 
these different foundations ofbeauty. Further, note that the role o f religion is discussed 
again in other subthemes.
4.1.4 Management Responsibility
The idea that beauty was something worth protecting in an ethical sense appeared 
not just in terms o f individual responsibility, but a few people expressed the feeling that 
managers too have an ethical responsibility to protect beautiful areas. Beatrice made this 
comment following my question, “Who has the responsibility to see that pretty areas are 
protected?’
“Like I said before, I think it’s everybody’s responsibility, but o f course the people 
in charge [at Cumberland Falls] have the most responsibility. Even if they don’t
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think they should be taking care of the scenery, they really should because a lot of 
people really like to just go there and look at how pretty nature is.”
Stuart followed up an earlier comment on beauty with this statement about what land
managers should do ethically beyond what the law says.
“Land managers like the ones here or with the Forest Service are public 
employees, so they have to listen to what the public wants. So if the public wants 
some scenery to be protected but the law doesn’t give any guidance for how to 
protect scenery, the managers should still do it. I guess that is the ethical thing to 
do.”
And Nicole, a college student from Lexington suggested that managers have more ethical
responsibility than do visitors.
“Yeah, I guess it is ethical for me to pick up other people’s trash, but I think the 
owners of this place have more responsibility than me, but not just because it’s 
their job. You know. I think they should do more than just the average person 
because they can. It’s hard for me to come down here from Lexington and pick up 
trash everyday, but the people that work here should do it all the time even if it’s 
not part of their job.”
4.1.5 Necessary for Outdoor Recreation
When asked a question on the order of, “Why do you like Cumberland Falls?” at 
the top of the list for most people was the scenery. Scenery or natural beauty is often an 
easily accessible response to why people go to parks, not just Cumberland Falls. It is one 
thing to consider scenic beauty as a popular reason to go to a park, it is another thing to 
consider it as a necessary condition o f outdoor recreation. However, two people did seem 
to think that scenery was in some sense required for their own participation in outdoor 
recreation at Cumberland Falls.
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“I wouldn’t come here if it wasn’t a nice place to be, you know. It’s not like I 
couldn’t go someplace else that was pretty too. If I’m going to be outside on my 
days of£ I want to go someplace nice.” (Ed)
“We don’t  go to Cumberland Falls a lot, but we do like going places where it’s 
nice. I always try to take my girls someplace nice so that we can have fun. We 
always have m ore... a good time in nice places, pretty nature.” (Laurie)
While neither o f these quotes are a ringing endorsement for recreating in magnificent
areas, they both seem to speak to the necessity o f natural beauty for quality outdoor
recreation options. It may be curious that no other interviewee made explicit mention of
the necessity o f scenery for outdoor recreation experiences. However, I’d suggest that it
was implied in the context of many people who weighed in with opinions on natural
beauty.
4.1.6 Natural versus Created versus Restored
As previously discussed in the literature review, a number o f writers have made a
case for a moral distinction between naturally occurring nature and artificially occurring
nature (see Elliot 1982 and Katz 1997). As detailed in the previous subthemes, the depth
o f moral commitments in reference to beauty was not perfectly clear. In other words,
many people suggested that natural beauty carries with it a moral imperative, yet it was
not always clear what that imperative was or to whom or what it was directed. Yet, a
number of those interviewed did identify as important the distinction between natural
versus created versus restored nature. Laurie, recalls a lesson she learned about native
and non-native plant species and how each affected her conception o f ethics and beauty.
“I went to Haleakala in Hawaii a few years ago and I remember the ranger telling 
us that most o f the trees and bushes were not supposed to be there. I mean they 
did not normally, you know, grow there on their own. That was weird because I
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thought National Parks were supposed to protect like endangered species and 
things, but instead Haleakala kind of protects the stuff that hurts the endangered 
species. Native, that’s the word I was looking for. A lot o f the plants growing in 
Hawaii are not native plants, so people brought them there. So when someone 
who doesn’t know much about Hawaii looks at the scenery at Haleakala and says, 
‘Isn’t that beautiful?’ They’re realty talking about something that isn’t the way it 
should be. But it’s still beautiful, it’s just so green and you don’t realize how many 
different colors of green there are until you see something like that. It’s amazing.
I loved going there and I’d go back again too. But back to my point. I think 
knowing that something is kind o f natural makes a  difference, because then it’s just 
like your own yard. You know, what kinds of things were in your yard before 
grass? Probably not the same grass that’s growing there now. But you can still 
have a nice looking yard, it’s just different than how it would have looked before 
someone took all the trees and stuff out. You’ve got me thinking about stuff now 
that I hadn’t realty thought o f before. But I’m thinking that maybe there are 
different things that should be in different places, depending on if we’re talking 
about a place that should be like just natural or if it should be like a park where 
there’s grass and just a few trees. I think that makes a difference. You know, the 
native plants should be more important than the stuff that’s not native, because 
that stuff that is not native can grow anywhere, but the native things might be able 
to only grow in that one place.”
Michael talked about how purposeful planting of native trees is a good thing.
“I noticed a bunch of new trees in the entrance up there. Those weren’t there last 
year, so they must have planted them.... but that type o f thing doesn’t bother me 
because those kinds of trees probably would have been there anyway if humans 
didn’t build a road there in the first place. As long as they plant good trees then I 
don’t think there’s anything wrong with that.... Well, the good trees are the ones 
that belong there, not like those damn magnolias. Everybody who visits here from 
someplace else, loves the magnolias, but they don’t grow here naturally, you 
know. Somebody just thought they’d look nice, but they don’t belong here.”
And Stuart, the forester, offered a somewhat textbook response to the natural/unnatural
debate.
“Well, you’ve got to make sure that the area stays natural or else you might as well 
just start farming. I just wish more people knew what a natural forest was 
supposed to look like, then there wouldn’t be all those problems with cutting down 
trees.”
However, John and Julie, a husband and wife couple, didn’t seem to care if certain
landscapes were natural, created or artificially restored.
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Julie: “I just like looking at the pretty flowers and trees.”
John: “Yeah, both o f us do, that’s probably the main reason why we come to parks 
like this.”
Interviewer: “Does it matter to you if the place you’re visiting is all natural or if 
someone purposely planted all the trees and flowers?”
Julie: “Oh I don’t really care, it’s just nice to see them. Maybe it would be 
different if I knew something about what used to be there before, but I think 
people usually plant bushes and flowers that look pretty anyway. So I don’t think 
it matters.”
John: “Uh huh, yeah. In fact, a lot of times it looks better after somebody gets rid 
of all the weeds and stuff that might be there. That’s really what we like about 
being outside.”
4.1.7 Beauty as a Discrete versus a Continuous Variable
Two competing premises are at work in this subtheme. On the one hand is the 
premise that beauty is a discrete variable; either something is beautiful or it is not. In this 
conception, there may be different kinds ofbeauty, but not degrees. That is, a child’s 
smile can be beautiful, as can a sunset, a waterfall, or w olf dashing across a meadow. All 
of these examples represent different kinds ofbeauty. In contrast when beauty is 
conceived of as a continuous variable, then there may or may not be different kinds, but 
there are certainly degrees ofbeauty. In this way, one landscape may be more beautiful 
than another, or one vista is more visually pleasing than another. Note that discrete versus 
continuous is not a rehash o f the intrinsic versus subjective subthemes. Theoretically, 
whether someone subscribes to beauty as an intrinsic natural property or as a subjective 
evaluation holds no bearing on viewing beauty as a discrete or a continuous variable.
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These first few quotes, illustrate a conception o f the continuous nature ofbeauty.
Consider how Beatrice used a superlative to describe the scenery at Cumberland Falls.
“Well, it’s one o f  the nicest places around. There are even other fells in this area, 
but Cumberland Falls is probably the prettiest.”
Similarly, Laurie made the following observation:
“It’s not like [Haleakala] is the only beautiful place in Hawaii, but that was where I 
spent the most time. I also went to see Volcanoes [National Park] and some stuff 
on Oahu. There was realty interesting and cool stuff at those places too, but I 
think Haleakala was the most beautiful.”
And Mike S. offered up this evaluation of the scenery at Cumberland Falls compared to
other places.
“Niagara Falls is like the waterfall that everyone knows about, but it isn’t as 
beautiful as Cumberland Falls, in my opinion. You know, maybe it’s because 
there’s just all that concrete up there, but when I think o f those two places, I think 
that Niagara Falls is beautiful, but Cumberland Falls is more beautiful.”
On the other hand, several other people tended to articulate beauty as a discrete
variable, where places either were beautiful or they were not. The couple Chris and
Thomas had this to say about beauty in parks.
Chris: “Just think o f all the different parks there are and they’re all there to protect 
beautiful areas. Sometimes there are beautiful areas that aren’t inside a park, but 
that doesn’t mean they are not beautiful too. But when somebody says to me 
‘park,’ that means pretty.”
Thomas: “Yeah, parks are realty for the beautiful areas and the areas that are not 
beautiful end up going for other things.”
And John made both o f  the next two comments.
“Nature is beautiful and so wherever you see nature you see beauty.”
“I don’t think one place is more beautiful than another unless, there’s a bunch of 
garbage out there then it isn’t beautiful at all.”
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Judy returned to her comparison between her former home in Oregon and her new home
here to make the point about a discrete notion ofbeauty.
“It’s just different, you know. Sometimes I realty miss the Cascades but that 
doesn’t mean I don’t like the scenery out here too. It’s just different. I realty like 
the scenery at Cumberland Falls and there’s nowhere else like it, but it’s not the 
same type of scenery at Olympic or someplace like that.”
Lastly, there was this somewhat cryptic statement by Howard, which I’ll try to interpret.
.. spectacular beauty isn’t necessarily a better beauty.”
I think what Howard meant by this is that he believes that beauty can come in different 
forms, not necessarily degrees. Recall the context in which Howard gave this statement: 
he was discussing the occasion when some natural areas are turned over to development 
despite their beauty. He doesn’t seem to be saying that some places look better or worse, 
or that there is higher and lower beauty. In fact, he is quick to note that “all o f nature is 
beautiful,” but it is this category of spectacular beauty that is set apart from other types of 
beauty. And to reiterate, Howard disavowed any suggestion that ‘spectacular beauty’ was 
somehow better. He seems to be saying that this thing called “spectacular beauty,” is itself 
a discrete variable in much the same way that sublime beauty or powerful beauty or 
desolate beauty would be too. These types ofbeauty just speak to different things, 
different features of the landscape perhaps. And to reiterate an earlier statement by 
Howard, he believes that all beauty should be protected, but special efforts should be 
made to protect “spectacular beauty,” presumably because o f its relative scarcity.
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4.1.8 Nostalgic for Past Beauty
An inevitable outcome o f talking with long-time residents of an area is the
comparisons to earlier times. And while scenery, at least at the landscape level, seems to
be a relatively static property, four people made explicit comparisons to the halcyon
beauty o f their youth. Lifelong resident of Knox County and frequent visitor to
Cumberland Falls, Sharon, made this comment:
it’s changed. It just seemed so much nicer when we were children. O f course 
I still like [going to Cumberland Falls], but they’ve done things that I don’t agree 
with. Like putting in all that concrete and putting up those railings, none of that 
was there when I was young and it made the Falls look much nicer.”
Nathan, another lifelong resident o f southeastern Kentucky, echoed Sharon’s sentiment on
the changing nature ofbeauty at Cumberland Falls.
“I liked coming here more when I was little. It was just a nicer place to be, not so 
many people and not so much trash. People seemed to care about the place more, 
back then. I’ve got some pictures my papa took when I was little and it just 
looked so much better then.”
Two more long-time, though not lifelong, residents o f the area, Debbie and Trent,
articulated similar statements on the way the area has changed in terms ofbeauty.
However, both of their takes are slightly different from what Sharon and Nathan had to
“I think I look at this whole area different now than when I was a kid. I don’t 
think I paid too much attention to the trees and how they looked. I kind of wish I 
had because I don’t like what the trees look like now, all that kudzu and that pine 
bug make them look ugly.” (Debbie)
“My granddad lived here a long time and he always loved this part o f the state. I 
remember him telling us that this was the most beautiful place east o f the 
Mississippi I think a lot has changed since then because there’s just a lot of 
garbage around now and I don’t think o f this place as super pretty. It’s just nice.” 
(Trent)
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Sharon and Nathan both seem to have a direct referent about past beauty o f the area. 
They have a clear conception that Cumberland Falls was once more beautiful than it is 
today. Debbie and Trent on the other hand appear to offer more indirect evidence o f past 
aesthetic value.
4.1.9 Beauty as a Proxy for Environmental Health
If  an area looks good or beautiful, then it must be healthy. Health is nearly as 
troubling a notion as is beauty in terms o f searching for agreement on meaning. Arnold 
(1991) discusses the unsatisfying attempts o f the medical field to define sick as the state 
when “something was not working” (p. 6). However, in the context o f the two 
dimensions o f this subtheme, health is meant to convey the sense that 1) forests should be 
healthy; and 2) health is something real and identifiable. I won’t go into detail here with 
the problems with both of those statements. However, I will say that neither statement is 
beyond contention and I will offer a fuller critique in the following chapter.
4.1.9.1 Health equals integrity and stability
No one interviewed made specific reference to Aldo Leopold or his Land Ethic, 
however I suspect that Stuart’s education and training as a forester put him in contact 
with A Sand Countv Almanac, or at least the off-cited phrase at the end o f the book, “A 
thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty o f the biotic 
community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (Leopold, 1949, pp. 224-225). A 
statement he made suggests a clear Leopokiian approach.
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“You can tell how healthy an area is by its beauty. Beauty is a good indication o f 
ecological integrity and stability. So in that way, beauty is important because you 
can use it as a guide to forest health in general. ”
Interestingly, a comment by someone who I doubt has ever heard of Aldo Leopold or the
Land Ethic made a somewhat similar statement.
“Well, like we can tell on our woods when something’s not going right stuff starts 
dying. When the beetle kills the pine trees, you can tell right away, because they 
ain’t green no more. It just looks ugly and no one wants their land to look like 
that. It don’t look good and it ain’t good for the trees. And pretty soon you 
won’t have any trees at all.” (Mary)
While Mary doesn’t specifically wield the terms integrity and stability, her conception o f
scenery as an ecological indicator does appear to suggest that the health of her trees
implies a sturdy ‘rightness’ o f things. Mary confided that she and Nathan were married
right after they graduated high school and neither ever attended college. Her husband
Nathan expressed concern prior to the actual interview that I was some stupid
environmentalist who “wouldn’t know a dead tree from a live one.” Their lack o f higher
education and apparent distaste for environmental thought leads me to think that neither
Mary nor Nathan had ever been exposed to Aldo Leopold or his writings. Yet, Mary’s
statement bears a marked resemblance to what Stuart said and also what Leopold wrote
over 50 years ago.
Neither Stuart’s nor Mary’s words suggest an evaluation based solely on aesthetic 
sensibilities. Beauty to them does not seem restricted to an absence of natural processes. 
In this way death and decay are acceptable parts o f a larger natural beauty. When death 
and decay become preeminent as a  result of an unnatural occurrence, it is then that beauty 
suffers. So Leopold’s functional beauty concept still applies. Mary mentioned the effects 
of the southern pine beetle which has resulted in a more than 85% mortality rate in pine
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trees in southeastern Kentucky. It is not perfectly clear if the success of the southern pine 
beetle is due entirely to natural factors or if human activity has in some way aided it. 
Nonetheless, the perception of such quick and widespread damage is that it is both 
unhealthy and lacking in beauty. And this does not seem counter to Leopold’s dictum.
4.1.9.2 Health provides moral guidance
There’s a curious notion that beauty is a trigger that alerts us to moral action when
something is not the way it should be. This idea emerged in several interviews and can be
illustrated in the context o f one interview in particular. Ed, a U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service employee, offered the clearest treatment of this connection.
Ed: “We’ve done so much to screw things up in nature, that we’ve got to start 
feeing our problems now. And if that means no more gas engines in certain ponds 
or lakes then that’s what we should do.”
Interviewer: “How do you know when we’ve done... when we’ve screwed 
something up in nature?”
Ed: Well, usually you can just look at it and if something doesn’t look right then 
you know there’s a problem. If you see a bunch o f trees dying or fish dying then 
you try to figure out what the problem is.”
Interviewer: “Hmm... okay. So are you talking about...”
Ed: “You know it just looks good and you know that it’s healthy because it looks 
good. Nature doesn’t play tricks, it will tell us when something is screwed up.
And of course when you know something is wrong and if we’re the cause of what 
went wrong, then we should fix it. It’s that simple.”
Interviewer: “I’m not trying to be stupid here, but could you just explain why you 
think we should fix it?”
Ed: “Yeah, we should fix it because we caused the problem if it’s overhunting, or 
pollution, or whatever. Since we messed up, we have to fix it. You know it’s just 
the right thing to do.”
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This insight referring to our duties to heed the lessons ofbeauty as an indicator o f health 
may have been more widespread than the interviews showed. The exchange I had with 
Ed, was the only one o f its kind yet I suspect that others may have voiced similar views, if 
given the opportunity. This idea ofbeauty triggering some moral response, or more 
accurately a deviation from beauty triggering a moral response seems particularly cogent 
to the overall discussion o f this primary theme and with regards to environmental ethics in 
general.
4.1.10 Concluding Thoughts on the Beauty in Nature Theme and Subthemes
The sense o f this theme and the subthemes contained within it is one of localized
application of a general prescription which is at the heart o f any ethical discourse. Beauty
should be preserved. Beauty may or may not be some intrinsic natural property, it may or
may not be a discrete or continuous variable. What it appears to be to many of the people
quoted in this subsection is a feature o f nature which encourages some sort of ethic. Just
how beauty translates to a specific environmental ethic is unclear. In the end, however,
lingers a suggestion voiced by Michael,
"... it's unethical when you turn something that used to be beautiful into 
something that’s ugly.”
Clearly we lack precision on terms such as beautiful and ugly, but there is the suspicion
that however these terms are defined and however accurately they represent reality, there
may a peg to hang an ethical hat on. Some people were able to partition their notions of
beauty into different categories and some o f these categories were distinguished by
degrees of naturalness. Those who referenced naturalness appeared to give a nod to
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ecology. The belief that beauty is more apt to be resident in natural areas will appear 
again in the treatment given to the next theme. Beauty does seem to be a self-referencing 
good (in the same way that health and happiness are). If this is so, then it stands to reason 
that those things which promote beauty are good and those things which detract from it 
are bad, good and bad being used in the ethical sense. Parsing out these types of 
obligations is the task I’ll turn to now.
4.2 Theme 2: Responsibility to ‘The Other’
Responsibility to some other is a valid, if overly broad, description o f ethics. From 
the standpoint that ethics is a social endeavor, some other must be involved. Those to 
whom we have some direct ethical responsibility or obligation can be said to be included in 
the moral community. Thus, the responsibility to ‘the other’ simply defines who or what 
else should be in the moral community. Traditionally, this community has extended no 
further than humans, both present and future as well as those humans who are not moral 
agents: infants, severely mentally disabled, comatose, etc. Environmental ethics is “a 
principled attempt to redefine the boundaries of ethical obligation” (Rolston III, 1988 p. 
125). In other words, there may be more than just homo sapiens in the moral community. 
Within this primary theme a number o f subthemes are identified. It is within some of these 
subthemes that a new boundary is explored.
4.2.1 Nature as ‘The Other’
In general terms, it is the aspiration o f many environmental philosophers 
(pragmatists excluded) to elevate portions o f or the whole o f the natural world into the
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realm o f that which is morally considerable. Much environmental ethics attempts to 
swiftly shift the boundary o f the moral community to something beyond that o f humans. 
Various iterations o f necessary and sufficient conditions presume to justify such a move: 
sentience, subject o f a life, etc. Ideally (from the standpoint of this research), there would 
follow four dimensions to this subtheme: 1) Obligatory Responsibilities to Nature; 2) 
Nature-related Supererogatory Ethics; 3) Responsibilities based on Justice; and 4) 
Responsibilities based on Care. However, following my data analysis, these dimensions 
continue to exist mainly in my theoretical conception o f  environmental ethics. Stated 
another way, none o f the four dimensions to Nature as ‘The Other’ clearly and strongly 
emerged from the interviews. However, there were glimmers o f these non- 
anthropocentric ethics. And rather than simply dismissing these dimensions as unworthy 
of discussion, I present them here in the section numbered 4.2.1. Finally, although these 
four non-anthropocentric dimensions of environmental ethics guided the initial stages of 
research, data analysis yielded broader dimensions which subsumed the notions o f justice 
and care, as well as, obligatory and supererogatory. Indeed, this is the case with this 
primary theme, Responsibility to ‘The Other’ where particular flavors o f environmental 
ethics are best examined in light o f some more basic questions about the essence of 
environmental ethics.
I have, therefore, divided the subtheme, Nature as ‘The Other’ into these four 
dimensions to reflect one o f the original foci o f the study. (Note that Nature as ‘The 
Other’ contrasts with People as ‘The Other’ which will follow in section 4.2.2.) In my 
previous statement that these dimensions exist mainly in theoretical conception, I did not 
mean to imply that they could not and do not exist in the environmental ethics o f those
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interviewed. Rather, my questions did not seem to allow people to speak readily about 
Nature as a morally considerable other. Further, this is not to say that none o f the people 
I interviewed held a  non-anthropocentric environmental ethics, however, I could not find 
clear evidence to support such an ethics in any of the interviews. Finally, it was apparent 
from a couple people that they knew what they felt was right or moral, but they also knew 
they were unable to express their belief in words.
4.2.1.1 Obligatory responsibilities to nature
One of the original goals of this research was to determine the extent that
obligatory responsibilities to nature appeared in environmental narratives and whether
these responsibilities were somehow tied to the fam iliarity that one had with a specific
place. While a few people were able to articulate some semblance of ethical obligations,
many just responded in ways that seemed to skirt the topic of environmental ethics
altogether. Additionally, on one occasion I did reach the limit of what a person was
willing or able to divulge in terms of their own ethical perspective. To begin with, two
quotes appear to indicate the feeling that humans do have some real, non-anthropocentric
obligation to nature.
‘I t ’s just the idea that we can do anything we want, that I don’t like. We’re 
supposed to have respect for all life and you can’t do that if you just go out and 
trash everything.... Maybe what I’m saying is that we have a responsibility to 
make sure that some areas are protected and that’s what’s good about having 
parks like this.” (Beatrice)
“There’s just a lot o f arrogance, you know, like we think we know everything 
there is to know, but there’s a lot about nature we don’t know. We... everyone 
should all try harder to protect forests and rivers and stuff. It’s not just here for us 
either, it’s good to take care of these things for the animals that live there too. 
They’ve got just as much right to be there... maybe more, as we do.” (Sylvia)
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My interview with Mike S. taught me that ethics is far from being an anchor point for
some people, it is often more o f a buoy that tends to mark an arbitrary boundary, but there
is little to hold this buoy in place. This passage was one instance where I pushed the
interviewee in an attempt to anchor his ethics to some principle.
Mike S. “We’ve got to take care o f this planet because it’s the only one we’ve 
got.”
Interviewer: “So, is the only reason to protect anything here because we might 
want to use it?”
Mike S. “Yeah, pretty much. I mean.!. I guess there are some things that we 
should protect just because.”
Interviewer: “Because why? Why should we protect those things that we don’t 
need to use for ourselves?”
Mike S. “Just because. I don’t know I can’t explain it, but I know that it’s wrong 
to cut down a tree and then not use it.”
Interviewer: “But why is that wrong? I mean how do you know that that’s a 
wrong thing to do?”
Mike S. “I just know it. I can’t explain it.”
In another statement, Mike S. expressed a clear notion that an ethic promoting protection 
of nature was good because in many cases that’s what other people want us to do. 
However, as this passage illustrates he remains certain that there are actually clear 
obligations to the natural world, or at least parts of it. Yet, he was unable to express a 
notion o f why cutting down a tree that wasn’t needed was a bad thing. In other words, he 
was unable to find firm footing for his justification on why cutting a tree and not using it 
would be a bad thing. Paul Taylor (1998) might tell us that this tree has a “good o f its 
own.” Holmes Rolston III (1988) might appeal to the notion of intrinsic value. However,
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these ideas seemed foreign to Mike S. and he was the only interviewee I pushed 
specifically in reference to the idea that there exist real and true obligations to the natural 
world.
4.2.1.2 Nature directed supererogatory responsibilities
Most of the people interviewed felt comfortable with the type o f ethical approach
towards the environment where our responsibilities were more supererogatory rather than
obligatory. However, many o f the responses to my examples appeared to be more on the
order o f agreement rather than any sense of conviction. In other words, the responses to
my examples of nature-directed supererogatory ethics were more akin to ‘feel good’
statements, but I remain skeptical that those interviewed actually hold this type o f ethical
position. I think the attraction o f a supererogatory environmental ethics is that it can more
easily fit within someone’s overall ethics. A supererogatory environmental ethics almost
strives for balance with other aspects of life. Further, people are not demanded to
em brace a new set o f duties as required by an obligatory ethics. As a result, when people
were questioned about cleaning up a park on a Saturday or donating money to some
environmental cause, for the most part, they were comfortable in those scenarios. With
respect to the environment, most o f the people I interviewed had difficulty expressing
clear obligatory ethics towards the natural world or at least clear justification for their
ethic. All that said, I offer here several different statements that are indicative o f the
supererogatory dimension.
“Yeah, that [giving up a Saturday to pick up trash] would make my friends proud 
of me, but that’s not why I’d do it.” (Deborah)
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“I don’t do those kinds of things, but maybe, if I was feeling really generous or 
something, then I might donate some money.” (Thomas)
“I guess that my parents would be proud o f me if I volunteered for clean-up crews 
and stuff” (Mike W.)
“That would be kind o f honorable to do, you know like volunteer work—that’s 
always good.” (Steve)
“Well that’s like doing a really good deed. You know when you do something that 
you don’t have to do, but you do it anyway. It’s kind o f like that. I might do 
some of those things, but I wouldn’t do them all the time, because it’s just... 
there’s just more important things to do.” (Sylvia)
In each case those interviewed identified the supererogatory aspect of certain 
environmental ethics scenarios. They saw these behaviors as good deeds, but not 
necessarily things that everyone should do all the time. In this regard, some environmental 
ethics commitments do not engender wide spread acceptance as morally minimal behavior. 
What may be interesting to determine though is how these supererogatory commitments 
correspond to other community-based commitments, such as a neighborhood watch or a 
campaign to make an intersection safer. By this I mean, do these social commitments 
carry more of an obligatory tone while the environmental commitments carry more o f a 
supererogatory tone?
4.2.13 Responsibilities based on justice
Are there clear and unambiguous proscriptions against certain behaviors based on 
the rights possessed by non-human entities? At the core of justice-based responsibilities 
owed to non-humans is some conception o f rights. On one occasion, Sylvia mentioned 
that maybe animals have at least as much right to be in nature as we do. On another 
occasion, Judy made this comment:
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“I have a friend who’s really into animal rights and stuff and I don’t know... It just 
never really grabbed me you know. I’m not saying it’s wrong, but I don’t think I 
like that idea very much.”
When I asked her why she didn’t like the idea of animal rights, this is what she said.
‘I t ’s like I think we are supposed to use animals, not mistreat them or anything, 
but... I mean, where would we get all our food if we didn’t eat animals.”
And a bit later, I asked Judy if anything other than humans have rights, to which she
responded:
“Besides animals? You mean like nature and trees and stuff? No, I don’t think so. 
But again, we shouldn’t  mess it up on purpose either, because that’s not right... 
It’s not right because, it just isn’t, it’s like a sin to waste things and that’s why it’s 
wrong.”
In these few exchanges, Judy came closest of anyone to a sense o f obligation to non­
human nature, however it is an admittedly weak endorsement. Although, she responds in 
the negative when asked if other things have rights, 1 think what was troubling about this 
line o f questioning was the coupling with animal rights along with some idea o f intrinsic 
value in nature from which some other rights might follow. There was a real fear of 
admitting to anything resembling an animal rights perspective by most people. Two 
people acted quite surprised when I explained that environmental ethics is not perfectly 
coincident with an anti-hunting perspective. This was an interesting finding and it 
deserves a more lengthy treatment than is appropriate here. Therefore, I will return to the 
misconceptions of environmental ethics at the end o f this chapter, in the theme devoted to 
Op Recoining a Moral Agent and again in the last chapter o f this dissertation.
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4J.1.4. Responsibilities based on care
As noted in the literature review, care is a term often used in casual conversation.
Hanging an ethic o f care on the appearance o f this word in someone’s narrative would be
as misguided as listening for the word “happiness” in a lengthy discourse and assuming
that that person is, therefore, a utilitarian. More evidence must be uncovered before any
such proclamation can be made. In searching for a care ethic, I was listening for words
and meanings across words that would be characteristic o f care ethics. As suggested by
the literature, things like relationship, reciprocity and equal consideration would be
valuable indicators o f an ethic o f care. However, no such ethic of care was readily
expressed with respect to the natural world.
While the word ‘care’ did appear in the narratives o f a few people, none o f those
interviewed could be said to have expressed an ethic that described an intimate
relationship with Cumberland Falls, or any other place for that matter. Neither for that
matter did any o f those interviewed, even genuinely consider that nature, or parts of
nature, be clearly worthy o f moral consideration at all. The clearest acknowledgement of
care was in something that Deborah said when talking about making decisions between
areas one knows well and areas one doesn’t know well.
“I can see how the decisions that you make close to home are harder. And that 
they might... that even though you want to focus more on them, they also make it 
harder to make at times. And you may not follow your own ethics as much as you 
would with something that is far away, your ideals, I guess.”
In this passage, Deborah is clearly struggling with complexities of making tough decisions
when one is in the midst o f a situation. This type o f embeddedness is essentially
demanded o f care ethics and Deborah recognizes this. However, it does not appear that
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her concern is necessarily for nature, rather it is for all of those people who might be 
affected, as indicated by something she said shortly after the previous quote. Deborah 
noted that,
“Even though I may be against the logging and drilling, I kind o f see myself as 
removed from those things even though I drive a car and stuff. But I do know that 
people’s lives would be affected if a bunch of us got together and put a stop to the 
coal mining around here or the logging. That’s my biggest concern on the other 
side of things.”
In this respect, Deborah seems to subscribe to an ethic of care where other people are the
appropriate object o f moral concern. This passage was preceded by a long discussion on
drilling for oQ in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and the people who would be
affected by a decision not to do it.
The following brief quotes are instances o f where the word ‘care’ appeared in the
narrative, but without accompanying language suggestive o f a care ethic.
"... I care about all nature things. It’s just like you don’t want to see things get 
ruined because then nobody would go there.” (Mary)
“Most people who live here care what goes on in the park since we come here a 
lot.” (Howard)
"... I don’t know, I guess what bugs me is when you see how messed up places 
get when we don’t take care of them.” (Michael)
“It's just like they just don’t care about what other people might think about 
seeing that there.” (Michael)
“It’s like if you don’t take care o f places like Cumberland Falls, then nobody’s 
going to get to enjoy it anymore.” (Trent)
If parks need more than that then let my taxes take care of it.” (Thomas)
“Yeah, God tells us to take care of what He created. So it is definitely going 
against God to ruin nature for no good reason.” (Chris)
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I don’t care a boat getting more oil, so leave the Wildlife Refuge alone. It’s 
easy for me to be firm about these things in Kentucky, but I might not be so sure if 
I lived in one o f those places.” (Deborah)
“So, I don’t think God cares if some place that I think is pretty disappears.” (Judy)
“... people really care about the historic stuff.” (Judy)
“People seemed to care about the place more, back then.” (Nathan)
“.. . i f  people don’t start taking better care of things, then it may not be around 
here forever...” (Tom)
“We’ve got to take care of this planet because it’s the only one we’ve got.” (Mike 
S.)
“It’s not just here for us either, it’s good to take care of these things for the 
animals that live there too.” (Sylvia)
“Even if they don’t think they should be taking care of the scenery, they really 
should because a lot o f people really like to just come here and look at how pretty 
nature is.” (Beatrice)
“... if we don’t take care of places like this, then they won’t be able [to go to 
Cumberland Falls].” (Beatrice)
Using a word search function, these were the only instances o f the word care across all the
narratives. I did not include instances where the word care was embedded in another
word such as careful or carefree. This list of quotes recalls the distinctions between
different uses of the word care as described by others (Blustein 1991 and O’Neill 2000).
Blustein’s (1991) four different interpretations o f the concept o f care are: 1) to care for; 2)
to have care of; 3) to care about; and 4) to care that. To care fo r embodies “liking, having
affection for, being drawn or attracted to, or being pleased by” (p. 27). To have care o f
represents having responsibility for or managing the affairs of, in short, taking care of.
When people care about a person or something, their own welfare is somehow tied to that
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person’s or thing’s welfare. And finally, to care that is prepositional where a specific 
situation is the object o f the statement.
For the most part the word care seems to be exercised in ways that suggest 
humans should take care o f nature whenever not doing so might be detrimental to other 
people either through loss o f jobs or diminished recreation experience by ruining the 
scenery. In other words, care is more properly understood as a something we should do 
for other people rather than for nature or for the environment. There does not appear to 
be any clear use o f the word ‘care’ that indicates a position where some non-human is the 
object to which care is directed. Of course, it should be noted that even in Gilligan’s 
(1982) book-length treatment on care ethics, the word ‘care’ appears very infrequently in 
the excerpts chosen. In all of the excerpts found in In A Different Voice, the word care 
appeared only thirteen times, seven o f those times was in a single excerpt where the words 
“take care o f’ were repeated over and over, and one time in another excerpt a respondent 
spoke of choosing to go into the field o f medicine where people “care for” people. The 
word care is not rightly a litmus test for the presence of a care ethic. Rather, the 
fundamental aspect o f a care ethic is relationship with some other and the responsibility 
that follows from that relationship.
If the hope is to discover care-based ethics directed towards non-humans, there 
should exist language that reflects the relationships people have with non-humans and their 
respective responsibilities. However, indications of these types o f relationships and 
responsibilities were not evident in the narratives. In Blustein’s (1991) four interpretations 
of care, it seems that “to care for” guides us closest to real relationship and responsibility. 
O’Neil (2000) too suggests as much. With regards to non-human nature, perhaps some o f
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the excerpts related to beauty provide evidence of a relationship. Yet, this avenue poses 
other problems.
As O’Neil (2000) suggests, objects o f aesthetic appreciation should not be 
considered themselves as objects o f  moral concern. O’Neil further explains that the 
difference between someone caring for and caring about some object illustrates the 
difference between a more fundamental relationship-based caring and a more abstract, 
principled approach to a moral dilemma. In O’Neil’s view caring for someone or 
something is the language that gives a better indication o f a care ethic. When one cares 
about something, they seem to be indicating a more distant relationship and the focus of 
concern is more general and abstract than particular. In this way, caring about might 
actually be more indicative o f a justice-based ethic.
So what we are left with is scant evidence of any care-based responsibilities, with 
the notable exception of that perspective expressed by Deborah at the outset o f this 
subsection. Yet, recall that Deborah’s care-based responsibilities were not nature- 
directed, but were directed towards the welfare of other people. With this I’ll turn to a 
treatment where people are considered ‘The Other’ in moral dilemmas.
4.2.2 People as'The Other*
In many respects nature as other proved to be problematic; however, many people 
recognized that there are responsibilities to other people in environmental situations. 
Stated another way, we have direct duties to other people and thus, indirect duties to the 
environment. Therefore, the main theme, Responsibility to ‘The Other’ is most clear and 
forceful when ‘The Other’ is limited to other people. Generally, the notion of people as
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other took one of three forms. These can roughly be divided into obligations to the past, 
to the present and to the future. While it is more an indirect duty to past generations, it 
still emerged as an important point.
4.2.2.1 Cultural Heritage
A direct obligation to a past generation might read something like, “I believe that I
have a duty to respect the wishes o f my ancestors,” such as might be the case when one
knows that his/her ancestors expressly hoped that some tradition were continued. Of
course these sorts of commitments often bleed into commitments we might have to our
contemporaries where cultural ancestry might be shared. For instance, I may feel a sense
of obligation to protect the homestead in Wyoming that my great-grandmother settled.
But having never met my great-grandmother, I’m not sure if my sense o f obligation is to
her, or to the other members o f my family who are alive today and I do know. A number
of interesting axiological and ontological questions surround the idea o f obligations to
history. How and why do we value the past? At what point does something become
historically significant? I will offer a more complete treatment o f this in the following
chapter, in the literature section devoted to Responsibilities to ‘The Other.’ However, at
this point, I will just suggest that it is often not clear to whom supposed historical
obligations are directed. Are they really directed at past generations or are they, in feet,
directed at the current peoples who themselves care about past generations? The
following four quotes blur this line.
“It’s really cool to think that Daniel Boone came right through this area. That 
should be reason enough to protect it... I think we definitely have a responsibility
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to protect the historic areas and places, cause it’s part of who we are you know.” 
(Michael)
“That’s one of the biggest things I noticed when I moved here—that people really 
care about the historic stuff, like Daniel Boone and the settlers. All over 
Appalachia that kind o f stuff is important. You know, a lot of people’s families 
have lived here for a long time.” (Judy)
“I had a class last year where we talked all about the history of this area and how 
important it is to keep the history alive... So we don’t forget what our history is, 
that’s why.” (Steve)
“I guess I get as much joy out o f thinking about all the human history that’s here as 
the natural history. Not just the Daniel Boone stuff either, because he kind o f 
wiped out the Indian culture in this area, well he was one of the first to do it. I 
know some Indians and they don’t like all the attention everybody gives to Daniel 
Boone, but they do like having special places preserved so that they can protect 
their heritage. To me, that’s what’s really nice about places around here is that we 
try to respect the past even if we don’t agree with it.” (Don)
With these quotes it is not clear if the value is directly on the history of the area or only
indirectly as the history informs and defines the identity o f the people who live here. In
other words, there is concern over protecting the history o f the area because it is a means
towards preserving the current culture. Of course the value need not be an either/or
proposition, but it remains vague if the injunctions to protect historic areas and places are
done to honor the past or the present peoples.
4.2.2.2 Other Community Members
Most often the indirect duties to nature arose from direct duties to other people 
who might also want to enjoy the natural resource in a recreational way. The idea here is 
that the nature we were talking about was most certainly for humans and we have a duty 
to our fellow humans to provide pleasurable outdoor areas for recreational pursuits.
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“Well, how would you like it if you went to a park and there was nothing but trash 
everywhere? It wouldn’t be any good there. That’s the main reason for keeping 
places clean, because no one would want to go there if they were all messed up.” 
(Debbie)
“I think it would stink if they didn’t keep this place cleaa There’s just too many 
people who like coming here.” (Amy)
“Well, like I said earlier, since my dad taught us not to mess up nature when we 
were kids, I still can’t bring myself to litter. Even though I think it makes you look 
ignorant if you litter, you should still have respect for the other people who want 
to go [to Cumberland Falls], cause they probably don’t want to see your litter and 
trash laying around. I know that makes me mad when I see stuff like that.” 
(Sharon)
“Why do I think it’s wrong to mess up an area this? I don’t know, I guess cause I 
know that this is a  really popular place and lots of people like to come here. They 
probably wouldn’t like it very much if people started trashing it.” (Steve)
‘1 feel like punching them in the mouth. I’ve gone up to people who I’ve seen 
littering and given them their trash back saying, ‘I think you dropped something.’ 
It’s like they just don’t care about what other people might think about seeing that 
there.” (Michael)
“Other people kind o f let you know when you do something wrong, even if you 
think it’s okay. I wouldn’t dump my trash out at a park like this because that 
wouldn’t be nice to the other people who are here. You know, they wouldn’t like 
that and I wouldn’t like it either.” (Mike S.)
“It’s like if you don’t take care o f places like Cumberland Falls, then nobody’s 
going to get to enjoy it anymore. I think that would be the worst part o f it all, you 
know, not being able to go there anymore. I think most people feel the same way 
too, it’s just a few people that do all the damage and they kind o f ruin it for 
everybody.” (Trent)
Clearly all o f these statements put Cumberland Falls as a resource for human use and the 
duties we owe to it are only indirect as our direct duties are towards the other people who 
enjoy using Cumberland Falls themselves. In other words, several people expressed the 
notion that we have some obligations to nature or that they do indeed care about the park 
in question, but ultimately these obligations or expressions o f care are directed towards
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their fellow humans. As will be discussed in the next chapter, this need not be considered 
a flawed or incomplete environmental ethic.
4.2.23  Future Generations
John Passmore (1974) was critical of any aesthetically-based arguments to justify
duties to future generations because these arguments presuppose that we know what will
be pleasing to people not yet bom. There is some value in Passmore’s argument,
however, others, notably Eugene Hargrove (1989), disagree with Passmore on this point,
suggesting that aesthetic arguments are not nearly the elusive, ungrounded fed as
Passmore would have us believe. The few people among the interviewees who did
suggest that we have some sort o f obligation to future generations didn’t seem to
recognize the changing notions o f natural beauty that are fairly recent in America.
“I’d like to think that other people would like to go to Cumberland Falls someday 
and if we don’t take care o f places like this, then they won’t be able to. Like it 
would be a real shame if my grandchildren or great-grandchildren couldn’t enjoy 
places like Cumberland Falls too.” (Beatrice)
“Well, it’s like we’ve seen the changes here over the past eleven years and if 
people don’t start taking better care o f things, then it may not be around here 
forever and then those people in the future won’t be able to see what we had.” 
(Tom)
“Yeah, I think that would make me sad if I knew that we ruined something for 
other people down the road. Cause they’ve got as much right to come here as we 
do.” (Carol)
“You should always try to take care o f stuff because you never know if you might 
go there someday. Like I never thought I’d get to go to Hawaii, but I did and I’m 
glad that people took care o f it. Same with my daughters, I want them to be able 
to go to places like that and maybe twenty or thirty years from now, they will want 
to take their own kids to Cumberland Falls.” (Laurie)
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4.2.3 Ecology, Evolution, and the Naturalistic Fallacy
Ecology “deals mainly with the roles filled by organisms in nature and how 
environmental conditions affect and are affected by these roles” (Kupchella & Hyland, 
1986 p. 4). Evolution has been defined as simplistically as, a change in the gene pool of a 
population over time (Isaak, 1998). Both ecology and evolution have a bearing on how 
people respond to environmental ethics dilemmas. In discussing the Round River essays 
by Leopold, J. Baird Callicott (1987b) suggests that ecology “is the biological science 
which runs at right angles to evolution” (p. 162). Recall that the naturalistic fallacy tells 
us that we cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.” In this situation, we cannot prescribe 
the way the world should be by simply looking through the two lenses o f ecology and 
evolution which tell us the way the world is. Or can we? This blending o f ecology, 
evolution and the naturalistic fallacy come together in the words o f a number o f the people 
interviewed. Through their words we might see how our responsibilities to the other of 
nature come to be. Arne Naess might take pleasure in reading some o f the following 
passages as the people behind them seemed to pay little heed to the naturalistic fallacy, 
which Naess regarded as something like mental gymnastics for philosophers. O f course, 
Naess will find no eager devotees of Deep Ecology here, merely people who see no reason 
not to use scientific descriptions of things and specifically processes to give us moral 
guidance.
“That’s just the way nature works—the web. We’re supposed to make sure that 
we keep the web the way it should be.” (Ed)
“I would say that evolution kind of tells us what’s good to do. I know that stuff is 
evolving all the time so we shouldn’t mess that up. We should just kind of let 
things go the way that evolution wants them to.” (Don)
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“God made everything on earth and He wouldn’t want us to destroy his creation. I 
don’t believe in evolution or anything like that, but everybody knows that food 
webs are realty complicated and if you break just a corner of it you can break the 
whole thing.” (Debbie)
“I remember hearing something in school that the mountains around here were the 
oldest mountains anywhere. I don’t think this is about evolution or monkeys, but 
there’s kind o f this line that everything follows and God doesn’t want us to break 
that line o f things. That's why we shouldn’t make animals extinct.” (Steve)
.. macro-evolution is wrong—that's where one species turns into another, like a 
fish turns into a dog, that’s just stupid. But we know that micro-evolution works, 
because we can do that stuff in the lab—that’s like why there are a lot of different 
kinds of dogs—but they’re still all dogs. There’s a lot o f stuff about biology that 
goes against evolution, but biology makes sense... you always know what God 
wants for the earth by what biology says.” (Jon)
“I think you’ve just got to know about science and biology., uh ecology, because 
then you’ll know what’s okay to do and what’s not. I f  something goes against 
ecology, then it isn’t right because nature kind o f sets down the rules. A lot o f 
people forget that they are a part o f nature too and when people forget that they 
usually start messing things up. If people would just remember that we’d all be 
dead without nature, I think they’d take care o f things better.” (Michael)
In the previous passages I don’t think it matters if those interviewed expressed
misconceptions about ecology or evolution. What does matter is that they used either
ecology or evolution to inform their moral commitments. Ecology and/or evolution tells
what’s good and bad, or right and wrong and that we must consider what ecology and
evolution tells us is morally right. In these instances, the ‘is’ o f ecology and/or evolution
clearly illuminates the ‘ought’ o f environmental ethics. More precisely, these people seem
to say that there is a ‘should’ type o f nature that exists independent o f human influences
and we have access to this ‘should’ type o f nature by understanding ecology and
evolution. In the next chapter, I will attempt to parse out more o f this relationship.
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4JJ.1  Natural versus Artificial
The distinction between the natural and the artificial arose in the context of beauty
with some suggesting that a natural scene is more beautiful than an artificial one and
others saying that they are both beautiful The natural/artificial dichotomy is played out
again in the general context o f Responsibilities to ‘The Other’ and specifically with respect
to the notions o f ecology and evolution. Consider what Michael said immediately
following the quoted excerpt immediately above.
“But that kind stuff changes if you’re just talking about somebody’s yard or 
something because that’s not natural like this place is. Cause your yard isn’t really 
natural or anything like that. Cause you made it you know, nature didn’t make it.” 
(Michael)
So perhaps for Michael, ecology only provides moral guidance when the land is more
obviously natural than artificial
Howard and both Tammy and Nicole suggested that manipulated areas are
somehow different in terms o f our obligations to them.
“I don’t think it would be the same here if I knew that everything was made up, 
like a big water park, but still nature-like. Cause that wouldn’t really be nature, it 
would be more like a garden, just made up... The difference is that what people 
should do to protect nature is different than taking care o f a garden. Mother 
Nature knows a lot more about what the park is supposed to look like than we do. 
It’s just a lot more complicated than a lot of folks realize, you know all the 
different plants and animals and different types o f dirt and rocks. You can’t just 
go ahead an make something natural, cause it’s too complicated; so you shouldn’t 
even try.” (Howard)
Tammy: “In my biology class last year we talked a lot about the water cycle and 
why forests are so important to have clean water. Forests are better water cleaners 
than we are, so that’s another reason to protect areas like Cumberland Falls.”
Nicole: “Yeah, like everything is really connected and complicated so that even 
scientists don’t understand how everything in nature works.”
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Tammy: “My teacher had this terrarium set up in his office to show how 
everything worked together and it was amazing.”
Nicole: “Oh yeah, you can’t even imagine how complicated nature is and how easy 
it is to mess things up. That’s why a place like Cumberland Falls is important, 
because it is really complicated and it would be impossible to make something like 
that in a lab. The indoor rainforests they’ve got at museums and stuff are kind o f 
fake because they don’t have all those different things going on like there is in real 
life.”
4 3  Theme 3: Public Lands
Public lands themselves often carry much ethical baggage. Ethical and political 
ideals such as freedom, democracy, equality, and community are all woven together in 
America’s tapestry of public lands, this is certainly true for park lands or lands open for 
recreation (Dustin, McAvoy, & Schultz, 1995). That is, many of the people interviewed 
believe that public lands are not neutral in terms o f ethical obligation by nature o f why 
they were created and what they currently stand for as well as the means by which they 
have come to us today.
43.1 Intent of Public Lands or Why They Were Created
When the interview turned to specific questions o f ethics, such as what should we
do with this area here, a few people said that this just begs the question about why this
area was created in the first place. The question o f legislative intent was first raised by Ed,
an employee o f the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
Ed: “You can’t really say what is wrong or right unless you know the reasons why 
an area was set aside. 'Hiat’s why there’s nothing wrong with harvesting trees in 
the Daniel Boone (National Forest). The law says that forests are for cutting 
down trees. So I can’t say what is right or wrong about doing something to this 
park or any other place until I know why it was established.”
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Jim: “So are you saying that the law and ethics are the same thing?”
Ed: “Umm... well, no I don’t think that’s right. I think our ethics come before the 
law. But when you want to know if developing an area is right or wrong, I guess 
to me that’s not an ethical question, it’s a legal question because it depends on 
what the law says is allowed. Now I guess I can see how this might be different 
depending on if this area was meant for certain things and now the public says that 
those things are wrong, like four-wheeling or something. A lot of people like to 
go four-wheeling around here, but some environmentalists want that to stop 
because they think it’s wrong even though it’s okay to do it (in the Daniel Boone 
N.F.). So this is one example o f where ethics is different from the law.
Stuart, another one with experience as a federal employee had this to say about the
creation of protected public areas.
“Well, the way I feel about things today is that all the treasures have been pretty 
much protected... If you’re asking about additional wilderness areas, additional 
parks, I don’t think that we need them. Because I think what’s protected is what’s 
unique and you know I don’t see... unless there’s something out there that it’s 
been on private property and it’s so unique.”
1 then asked Stuart if it makes a difference if something is on private land or public land.
“No, no. If that woodland is on somebody’s private property that I know or don’t 
know... I believe in private property rights and whatever they want to do with that 
woodland, if they want to give that tract o f land into the Nature Conservancy’s 
hand or whatever, that’s fine. But I think it’s a private property issue. The thing 
with public land is that you know exactly why it was set aside in the first place, so 
that helps you decide what you should be doing with it or allowing.”
In responding to a question about why should we have parks, Beatrice suggested,
“That’s kind of hard to answer because I think there are different reasons. 
Sometimes it’s important to have parks to keep people away from certain things 
like the spotted owl, but other times you want to have parks so that people can go 
there. So, 1 guess it depends. Like Cumberland Falls, I think they wanted to make 
this a park to protect the Falls, but now it’s a park so that people can come here 
and enjoy it. But the Falls is still important.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43.2 Purpose o f Public Lands or Why We Have Them Now
None o f those quotes in the previous subsection by themselves are terribly
enlightening with respect to how perceptions o f public land may evolve. However, they
seem to take on more meaning when considered against what these same people said when
I asked them if things (values, ethics, priorities, etc.) change over time. The purpose o f
this question and the probes that followed was intended to determine if there is a different
set of guidelines for why parks were created and why they might be used now.
“Oh yeah, sure things change all the time. It’s like what I said about the four- 
wheeling, it may have been okay in the beginning, but more and more people are 
starting to think it’s a bad idea. I wouldn’t say that things always change. But like 
at Yellowstone, nobody ever thought there would be as many tourists as there are 
now. Back when they created it, those guys just wanted to preserve the land from 
being used up, they didn’t want it to be a park for tourists. But look at it now, I 
think Yellowstone is more about the tourists than anything else. There’s so many 
people who go there compared to when it was created, and that should tell you 
that things change.” (Ed)
“If you’re talking about public land, then yeah I think things change. Even though 
parks like this are nice, you wouldn’t be able to make another one now, because 
there’s not enough land. So it was easy to make parks back when there was a lot 
o f land, but other things are more important now.” (Stuart)
‘Timm... maybe that’s it. Maybe keeping people out is the reason for the start o f a 
park, but now more people see how nice they are and decide they want to go visit 
them. So, now parks are more for letting people in than keeping people out.” 
(Beatrice)
43.2.1 Recreation
Recreation was specifically mentioned by eight different people suggesting that 
parks exist very much for people’s benefit and pleasure. Two college students, Tammy 
and Nicole, both believed this to be true.
Nicole: “ ... you wouldn’t have any parks if people couldn’t come to visit them.”
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Tammy: “Yeah, because there’s this park near my house that nobody ever goes to 
and now they want to turn it into offices or something.”
Nicole: “I just think it would be stupid to have a park that people couldn’t go to 
and play and enjoy the scenery and just hang out, you know.”
Tammy: Yeah, what’s the purpose of that?”
I asked Thomas and Chris, one of the husband/wife couples, if there was any sense in
having areas set aside that nobody could use. This is how they responded.
Thomas: ‘Never go there? I guess I don’t understand the question.”
Chris: “You mean a place that no one could ever see or anything?”
Interviewer: “Yeah, you could never go there. There would be no recreation.”
Chris: I guess I can’t see it because it seems like it’s just for us to appreciate and 
to enjoy so I would hate to think that a place was preserved just for itself and not 
for mankind.”
Thomas: Maybe I don’t understand the question, maybe it’s just too theoretical I 
don’t understand it.”
Chris: Are you talking about taking an area and closing it down, protecting it so 
nobody is allowed to go there or see it or anything?”
Interviewer: “Exactly.”
Chris: “I think nature is for mankind.”
Thomas: “Anytime the government would close something off and say ‘Don’t 
come in’ then something is going on and it ain’t natural wildlife (laughing). If the 
question is, ‘Is there ever any ground for closing a natural habitat off to humanity 
and saying, ‘No one comes in. We preserve it as is. We’re not doing anything in 
there, we’re just preserving it as is and everyone stays out.”
Interviewer: “Right.”
Thomas: “That would be... I’d have to hear some justification for that policy. 
Chris: “Yeah.”
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Similarly, Mike S. spoke of the greatness o f outdoor recreation.
“I love getting outdoors and playing, you know, even if it’s just walking around.
As long as I’m outside, I’m happy. I don’t know what I’d do if I couldn’t come to 
places like this and just hang out and enjoy nature. I really don't. It’s not like 
anything else would be just as good.”
Steve made this comment about outdoor recreation in general
“I think doing things outside is always better than doing things inside, for 
recreation I mean. You know, that’s what places like this are for, so we can get 
away from work and get outside and have fiin.”
The final two people, one a former federal employee and the other a current federal
employee, noted that the word park itself means recreation. Thus, those areas that are
parks must, therefore, be for recreation. Clearly this focus on human recreational benefits
preempts or at least shifts the notion o f ethical obligations.
“Well, this is a park here, so that tells you it’s for recreation more than anything 
else. You know parks are different from forests that way. Forests can be for a lot 
of different things, not just timber, but parks are always for recreation first and 
foremost.” (Stuart)
“Different agencies manage for different things. Like I work for the United States 
Fish and Wildlife Service and we manage primarily for wildlife habitat. But this 
here is a park and I’d be willing to bet that wildlife is not the number one reason 
that this park was created. Actually, since it’s a park, you know it’s here for 
people to enjoy instead o f anything else. Parks are for people.” (Ed)
432.2  Protect Wildlife
A few folks clearly identified the role that public lands play in protecting wildlife.
Not surprisingly Ed, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife employee, made this suggestion.
“But even in parks, I’m sure that wildlife is important, it’s just not the most 
important thing. I think just about anywhere that the government owns land, they 
are concerned about the wildlife.” (Ed)
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Debbie, too, hinted that wildlife may have been an important consideration in having 
public lands.
“You’ve got to keep some areas just without anything there because if you don’t 
then too many people will go in and push the animals out. That’s probably the 
biggest reason for those places (public lands).”
And Beatrice noted her favorite part about Cumberland Falls was not the Falls at all, but
rather the sound o f the birds when she walks through the woods.
“But you know, the Falls really aren’t my favorite part, I like the spray and seeing 
all the water and everything, but usually it’s too noisy and there’s too many 
people. My favorite part about going to Cumberland Falls is walking alone on the 
trails and listening to the birds. I really like bird watching and it’s a good place to 
see and hear a lot of different kinds.”
Ownership
Public lands are a curious notion; as citizens o f some area we are constantly told 
that we, the people, own the land. However, this ownership is vastly different from the 
ownership one assumes when purchasing a plot o f real estate. Ownership o f public lands 
sounds almost fanciful in an idyllic sort of way. Sure the public by definition owns public 
land, but in what real sense do any of us have a say in what we want to do with this land? 
Our participatory democracy notwithstanding, public lands seem mostly like museum 
artifacts that we are encouraged to look at but not touch. Appointed managers ascend to 
the throne o f benevolent dictator to tell us, the public, what we can and can’t do with our 
own land.
The preceding paragraph was purposely presented as an overly harsh hyperbole o f 
the relationship between the public and public lands. Yet, it may not miss the mark by 
much, Stormann’s (2000) recent critique of the direction of public parks echoes some o f
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these sentiments. I offer the paragraph at the start o f this subsection to illustrate that a 
real sense o f ownership seems to be a distant feeling for many people. Many of the people 
I interviewed saw themselves not as part owners of the land, but as visitors to someone 
else’s property, where the laws had been laid down and were not to be challenged. (Note 
that I will return to this a similar idea in the next thematic section: On Becoming a Moral 
Agent.).
43.3.1 Land Tenure in Appalachia
Shortly after my own arrival in this part of the country (in January o f2001), I 
became aware o f the unique nature o f Appalachia and those who identified with 
Appalachia. There is a sad sort o f beauty to this area and the people. The land itself has 
known heavy industry for over 200 years. However, it has not been a consistently 
productive industry. Coal, water, cattle, and timber have all at one time or another been 
forces in the economy o f southeastern Kentucky. Few communities that exist today have 
long-term ties to industry; this in opposition to many New England towns that began and 
continue to exist as timber towns. Many places in this region are awash in apparent 
poverty; outhouses, dirt floors and corrugated metal shacks remain throughout this region. 
I have only secondary knowledge of this, from discussions with various people at Union 
College and two of those who were interviewed for this study. The people who live under 
this level o f poverty were not interviewed for this study, however, two of the people 
interviewed for this study related stories o f their kin who “lived up the hollow” and 
suggested that their views were real Appalachian views. The ‘Appalachian view’ was not 
a significant aspect of any o f the narratives, however, in those few instances in which
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Appalachia was mentioned, a consistent theme emerged. Under the primary theme o f
Public Lands and the subtheme, Ownership, the idea o f Land Tenure in Appalachia seems
to speak to the perspectives o f four different people.
“I don’t know what it’s like in other places, but we do things different around 
here. This is coal country and we know how to work with the land because we’ve 
been doing it so long. I don’t care if I’m here or on company land, the companies 
probably know how to keep the land better than the government.” (Nathan)
“I was bom here and even though I moved away for awhile I’m still Appalachian, 
So, when someone from Ohio comes here and starts criticizing things, and they’re 
not from Appalachia, then that’s just wrong. I know all about Appalachia and you 
have to know the history o f the way the land was used and owned before you can 
start judging ” (Stuart)
“My cousin lives up Stinking Creek and her family’s lived there for probably 100 
years or more. They never been here (Cumberland Falls), they probably ain’t 
never heard of it. So they don’t really care about any of this stuff you’re asking. 
But you start talking bad about their land and there’ll be trouble.” (Mary)
“You gotta know that this is Appalachia and folks don’t like hearing how bad 
they’re doing things, cause we’re kind o f  proud. If you want to find out what 
people around here realty think of nature, you should get up a hollow and talk to 
some o f them folks. Cause, they don’t care about this park, but they’ve been living 
off the land for lots o f years and they know a lot more than I do about the land and 
stuff. Cause this park isn’t realty Appalachia, even though it’s here. You got to 
get away from the government lands to see what Appalachia is about. We used to 
visit my mother’s cousins up this hollow and even when I was a kid I was afraid to 
go there because they had all these mean animals, like this rooster that used to 
attack me whenever I went near it. It wouldn’t attack anyone else, just me. Then 
one day my mother’s cousin’s husband got mad at that rooster for attacking me 
and tore it’s head right off in front o f me. I still remember that. But the worst part 
of the story is when we left, Uncle Aaron, that’s what we called him, gave me this 
board with the rooster’s legs on it and with the tendons still attached so that you 
could pull the tendons and the rooster’s fingers would open and close, (shudders)
I hated that thing, (laughing) But that’s what real Appalachia is like.” (Sharon)
The sense with all of these quotes seems to be that 1) the people from Appalachia are
somehow different than people from other places; and 2) that real/authentic Appalachian
people are different from people who go to Cumberland Falls. Anecdotally, many people
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across many geographic regions seem to enjoy espousing their group’s unique qualities. 
However, these qualities are olten difficult to identify clearly or they turn out to be not so 
unique after all. Consider how often people describe their group as “independent” or 
“hard-working.” On the other hand, the descriptions of people in the region who live up 
the hollows does seem at odds with the types of people I interviewed for this study.
Sadly, a full treatment o f these differences is for beyond the scope o f this study. It may be 
worth mentioning though, that there appeared to be a sense o f defensiveness when some 
people were asked about doing things around here in a more environmentally sensitive 
way.
Two points are offered to tie this subsection in with the foundations of the 
research. First, it is a cogent point to note that those interviewed for this research are not 
representative o f Appalachia, and indeed this was not a focus o f this study. However, I 
submit that familiarity with some other area (not Cumberland Falls) may have proved a 
more precise measure o f value to those folks living up the hollows. Secondly, the near-far 
dichotomy discussed in Chapter 1, does not appear to reflect an accurate relationship 
between humans and nature, at least with regards to the types o f questions I was asking.
Finally, there may be deeper meanings associated with some of these quotes as 
well. I did not offer specific follow-up questions or prompts, but there appears to be a 
richness of meaning embedded in this place people refer to as Appalachia. This richness is 
glimpsed through comments that people make about knowing the land and the people who 
live on and off the land. In this way, it is only through understanding the people that one 
can come to know the land. I would submit that there may be a wealth o f information
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about human-land relationships which are best accessible through listening to the stories 
that people tell about growing up in this area.
4 3 3 .2  Gifts
Only three people discussed the way that the public lands were, indeed, a gift that
previous generations have given us. Sharon recalled the talks she had with her father in
which he emphasized the gift aspect of public lands.
“And my dad was always realty good about walking and talking with us, my dad 
worked for the forestry service for years. And so he was very conscientious o f the 
land and would school us on we shouldn’t litter and we shouldn’t do certain 
things. And to this day I cannot litter. I mean, I see people litter and I think, 
‘Shame on you! How can you throw that out the window?’ because my dad just 
pounded that in to us that this was something that if we wanted to preserve it for 
everybody then we have to take care o f it. We couldn’t  trash it up. So he was 
very good at telling us about it. Because it’s a gift. It’s a gift that we’ve been 
given and it is disrespectful to not show appreciation for that gift.”
And later she went on to discuss the obligation that we have once we accept this gift o f
public lands.
“I have ownership in this place because I come here and have come here—that 
gives me ownership. And anytime you own something you have some 
responsibility for it. So in this way o f looking at it, I do feel personalty responsible 
for what happens here. 1 don’t think a lot o f people realize this—that ownership 
means you have responsibility and that visiting a place gives you ownership in that 
place. Maybe if more people realized this then there wouldn’t be as many 
problems. Like that person who broke the bottle that I cut my feet on, they 
wouldn’t do that in their own backyard, because they know they own their 
backyard, but they don’t know they own this place too .”
Ed, the Fish and Wildlife Service employee said this:
“... the government kind o f gives us opportunities to enjoy places like this, but I 
don’t think a lot o f  people realize what a privilege it is to  have land like this, cause 
a lot of countries wouldn’t do that.”
And Beatrice made this unique observation:
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“Cumberland Falls have been around a long time, longer than there was a  park 
around it. I realty like the idea that it’s a park now, because that means that we’ll 
have something to give to our children and they can give it to their children and on 
down the line. It’s just like a  gift that we keep passing on to future generations. 1 
know I’m grateful that the people before... When was this park made? Anyway, 
I’m glad that someone earlier thought it would be nice to make this a park so that 
people today can go there and enjoy it.”
43.3.3 Commodities
Lewis Hyde (1983) offers a book-length treatment on the differences between gift
economies and market economies. While a few people articulated Cumberland Falls or
other parcels o f public land as wonderful gifts, more people suggested that these types of
public lands were more akin to commodities to be used, bought and sold. (I will return to
a more theoretical discussion o f gifts in the next chapter).
“Just because people like coming to this park right now doesn’t mean that they 
always will. Cause there’s some nice timber in here and if we come up short some 
year, this would be a good place to come get it. And I don’t see anything wrong 
with that.” (Stuart)
“Well, we’re trying to figure out where to hold our church retreat, so for us this is 
just like another place to visit. I mean, I like it and all, but it’s just a piece o f land 
with some buildings on it.” (Jon)
“This is my first time here, but I grew up hearing all about it, so I kind o f knew 
what to expect. But if someone wanted to buy all the land here and make a mall I 
think that would be okay, because we could use a good mall around here. I mean, 
there’s a lot of land around here and whoever has enough money can buy it—as 
long as they don’t realty ruin anything that’s okay.” (Amy)
“I think the park should charge money to come here, because they could make a 
lot o f money, just look at all the people who are here today. I’m not talking a big 
charge, maybe just a dollar o r two, but that would realty add up over the year. 
Then they coukl do a lot more to take care o f the area.” (Tom)
“I pay to come here anyway with my taxes. I don’t know if you pay taxes here, 
but they’re realty high and I think we pay enough already. So, if they need more 
tax dollars to run this place then maybe someone else should buy it and run it 
better with private money.” (Nathan)
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4J.4 Scale
As mentioned previously, the familiar resource, Cumberland Falls, differed from 
the unfamiliar resource not only in terms o f geographic distance, but also in terms o f scale. 
A number of those interviewed did pick up on this distinction and their comments became 
the basis for this subtheme. I’ve identified two dimensions o f this subtheme: Big-scale 
Mythology and Bigger is Better. With both o f these the more general theme, Public 
Lands, remains in the background as the lands being discussed are considered as part of 
the whole system o f publicly held lands.
4J.4.1 Big-scale mythology
The knowledge that Yellowstone is such a huge park compared to Cumberland
Falls was not grasped by everyone. However, two people hinted at the idea that there is
something mythical about really big areas (although not specifically Yellowstone). The
bigness o f an area seemed to inform the admiration that was expressed for some places.
The context o f the following quotes was in response to my question, “Why do you think
people out here care about what goes on in places they don’t live?”
“Mmm... maybe because that’s where all the land is—all the land where there isn’t 
anything else. When I hear about all that land out west, I think it’s kind o f like it 
was before people got here, you know... It’s realty is weird how much land there 
is and how nobody realty lives there.” (Mike W.)
“It’s like the wild west and the cowboys. I think people love the idea o f the good 
old days and all the land that was everywhere. You could just ride your horse to 
wherever you wanted and make that your home, that was realty neat.” (Debbie)
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I’ve discovered in talking with a number of people from southeastern Kentucky (not 
necessarily as a part o f this study), that there is a shared image o f ‘the old west’ (whatever 
that is) as consisting o f vast stretches of desolate land and the ghosts o f cowboys on 
horseback galloping across the range. Whether this represents some mistaken image o f 
the contemporary American west is not important. What is important is the feeling of 
nostalgia that accompanies this image. Nostalgia might be considered the vehicle in which 
we are able to relate to distant or unfamiliar places. Nostalgia is more than a misty pining 
for the good old days; here, nostalgia represents the idea that this place—the ‘old west’— 
is most conveniently described in terms that symbolize what we’ve come to expect of 
large protected areas. The west continues to exude this aura o f the mythical frontier and 
that is why big scale public lands are necessarily out west.
43.4.2 Bigger is better
A few people made a specific comparison between Cumberland Falls and some
other place based on the notion that more value resides in larger areas and that only public
lands could now be appropriately considered that big. There does appear to be a moral
evaluation in the following statements where people employ axiological comparisons,
implying that bigger is somehow better or at least more worthy o f moral consideration.
Tammy: “I guess you hear about those places because they are so big. If 
Cumberland Falls was that big, maybe people out west would hear about it too. 
But it’s not very fair to compare this place to those places out there, because they 
are so much bigger and that makes them worth more.”
Interviewer: “And what is it specifically that makes them worth more?”
Tammy: “Just because they are so much bigger and it’s hard to have really big 
areas like that.”
186
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
And this from Deborah and Mike S. who both expressed a similar view:
“Anytime you can protect more o f something that is better. Even though you can’t 
really compare Cumberland Falls to Yellowstone, just because Yellowstone is so 
much bigger, I think I’d say that it is more important.” (Deborah)
“Yeah, well just think how big this area is compared to Yosemite or something. 
Those places out west are huge, you know and that’s what makes them so special, 
they’re just a lot bigger than the parks we have here. I think it would be great to 
see some o f those really big areas, just because we don’t have stuff like that 
around here.” (Mike S.)
While still within the general idea that bigger is better, with two quotes, Stuart suggested
that big areas are better because they are more real
“Yellowstone is an ecosystem, you know. You just can’t protect really small areas 
and expect that they will stay the same, or stay natural Yellowstone is something 
like a million acres and that’s so that everything that is important is protected. But 
here, you can’t guarantee that Cumberland Falls won’t get messed up by someone 
else, because they didn’t protect as much land. You’ve got to have big chunks o f 
land to protect ecosystems and that means you have to focus on land out west.”
And,
“Yellowstone is the real deal it’s the way it should be. Even after those fires, it is 
the same. I can almost guarantee you that this place isn’t as natural as 
Yellowstone. And this just goes back to because it isn’t as big.”
4.4 Theme 4: On Becoming a M oral Agent
The idea behind this theme is that one is not always a moral agent. This might be 
stated in one o f two ways. I may not consider myself to be in a position to make a moral 
decision because someone else is the moral agent. Or, I am not required to be a moral 
agent in this situation because it is not a situation involving morals at all. In the general 
sense a moral agent is one who has the ability to recognize a moral dilemma and to act in 
such a way to satisfy the resolution o f that dilemma. As humans are the only species that
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recognize the phenomenon o f morality, only humans can be moral agents. However, not 
all humans are moral agents; infants, for example, do not possess the ability to recognize 
moral dilemmas nor do they possess the ability to act on them.
This final theme, On Becoming a Moral Agent address several different aspects of 
interview responses. I suspect the interview questions about justice and care were just too 
abstract for most folks to relate to. And this is no doubt true to some extent; however, I 
sensed later that 1 was simply asking such questions wherein I assumed a pre-condition 
that may not have been there to begin with. The pre-condition was that o f moral agent. 
With some o f the interviews, it became clear that a sense o f agency was at least as 
important as any discussion on justice/care or obligatory/supererogatory. While narratives 
related to moral agency tended to be very widespread, some common elements emerged. 
The subthemes that follow illustrate the general tone o f five different aspects o f becoming 
a moral agent. That is, the five subthemes in this section represent the range of responses 
that people gave about why they should or should not do something that I had previously 
considered ethical.
4.4.1 Not My Problem to Solve
Probably the most convenient response in establishing ethical agency about 
environmental problems at different parks was something like, “It’s realty not my problem 
to solve.” If I do not see myself in a position to act on a moral dilemma, in some sense I 
am not a moral agent. This is a bit nebulous in terms o f a subtheme because it also begs 
the question, “Why?’ “Why” questions throughout this study tended to elucidate 
somewhat evasive or circular responses. I will offer some examples of this phenomenon in
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the final chapter. However, at this point I would suggest that probing questions with 
“why” simply end up begging a new set o f assumptions. Ultimately asking for clarification 
or justification through a “why” question requires interviewees to articulate a response 
which answers the question and at the same time is consistent with their previous 
discussion. Given the hypothetical nature o f these interviews, this may be a difficult task. 
On a few occasions people were able to articulate a reasoned response to my probe of 
“Why” particularly as the original question pertained to ethics in some form or another. 
Within this subtheme, two types of responses seemed to be given, “I pay my taxes, so it’s 
not my problem” or “The park pays people to do that kind of work.”
4.4.1.1 Taxpayer
Anecdotally, the taxpayer argument seems pretty widespread when it comes to
various questions about public lands. This argument is particularly popular when
discussing fees on public lands (arguably another ethical debate). However, only two
people offered this type o f response as to why they were not required to practice
supererogatory ethics.
“I know this sounds cold and it might not be what you want to hear, but I think my 
taxes should be going to solve those types o f problems (buying more land, pitching 
in on clean-up days). So, no I don’t see any reason to go out do all sorts of good 
deeds when I’m there. If parks need more than that then let my taxes take care of 
it.” (Thomas)
“... if you’re asking if it’s my responsibility to go out and pick up other people’s 
trash, then I’d say no. That’s what I pay taxes for. Either get the tax money going 
to what it should or get rid o f the taxes and then maybe I’d do that other stuff.” 
(Stuart)
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In reference to taxes absolving moral agency it seems that if  someone pays taxes then this 
transfer o f money results in a transfer of a moral burden to  someone else. This is one 
illustration of what Stanley Milgram referred to as “Agentic Shift” (Milgram, 1983). 
Milgram’s famous experiment in which subjects thought they were administering painful 
electronic shocks to another person seated out of view, but not out o f earshot gave us an 
illustration of the phenomenon o f agentic shift. In Milgram’s study, the person 
administering the “shocks” was told by an authority figure to  continue with the experiment 
despite the escalating pleas o f agony heard in the adjacent room  where the other subject 
was supposedly receiving the shock. Although Milgram was primarily concerned with 
individuals giving up their morality in the face of some other authority, the term “agentic 
shift” applies here as well where it means simply a phenomenon whereby one is placed in a 
situation that shifts his/her moral burden to another person or agent. The act of paying 
taxes is this situation. And the shift that occurs from being a taxpayer is just one instance 
of agentic shift. By paying my taxes, in a sense I am purchasing an absolution that I 
practice supererogatory ethics. Note that examples o f obligatory ethics tend to remain. 
Thus, I am not absolved o f littering or tearing up an area o r purposefully polluting. This is 
not surprising since supererogatory ethics may be easily overridden by other more pressing 
or obligatory needs. What I am absolved of doing is picking up other people’s trash 
and/or doing those things that might bring me praise.
4.4.1.2 Park Employees
The park employees argument is another instance o f  agentic shift, where the 
person being interviewed sensed no moral commitment to practice supererogatory ethics
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because that would infringe on the job o f various park employees. Two different people
suggested that one reason that supererogatory ethics are beyond their realm o f concern is
because park employees would be out of work or some such idea. Yet, in this regard
there exists a moral commitment to those whose jobs may be lost.
“Yeah... I mean I guess it would be nice to go out an pick up trash and stuff, but 
what about the people that work there. I mean that’s their job, right? Maybe 
there’s a lot o f trash, you know, more than the workers can pick up by themselves. 
So that would make it okay, but I don’t think it’s right to ruin somebody’s job 
over it.” (Sylvia)
“You mean doing things like the park rangers do? (referring to picking up garbage) 
No I don’t think I’d do that, that’s what those guys get paid to do. I could even 
see how that might make them mad, like if I thought they weren’t doing a good 
job, you know. I don’t litter or throw my trash on the ground, but I don’t think 
it’s my job to pick up after other people who do—that’s what the park rangers are 
for.” (Julie)
However, Julie’s husband, John, offered a slightly different take.
“Well, I sometimes pick up trash and throw it away, I don’t think it’s a big deal to 
the rangers. I also think they work hard doing other stuff and seeing someone help 
with the trash might... they might like that.”
As with the taxation argument, citing park employees as a reason that one need not 
practice supererogatory ethics appears to be another illustration o f agentic shift.
4.4.2 Origins of Moral Agency
This subtheme is clearly a question for high level philosophical reasoning. A 
question such as, “How do we know what is right?” is one that has been debated as long 
as there has been ethics. Searching for the origins o f moral agency may be another way to 
get at that question as this search takes us to that point in time when someone is able to 
recognize a moral dilemma. However, the questions I asked in the interviews and their
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subsequent responses did not approach that degree of self-reflection. The interpretation o f 
my question was, fundamentally, “How did you learn what’s right and wrong?” And 
subsequently, “How do you know that’s right or wrong?’ These questions and their 
assorted probes were intended to uncover how people tell right from wrong and what 
foundations they rely on for those judgments. In answering these questions, people were 
reflecting on their own personal sense o f right and wrong, rather than some universally 
prescribed set o f rules. Two clear dimensions emerged from these questions, and there 
was some overlap between them as well.
4.4.2.1 Religion
Perhaps no other source o f morality/ethics came up as often as the invocation of 
religion. In attempting to understand how people described ethics in a general sense, I 
also asked them how they know what makes something either wrong or right. Nearly 
every interviewee had something to say about ethics being a specific application of 
religious principles. Christianity is a pervasive presence in the area o f Cumberland Falls as 
well as the several counties immediately surrounding this area. Baptists and Pentecostals 
seem to be the best represented denominations in this part of state. O f the twenty-eight 
different people I interviewed, twenty-three spoke freely about their religion. A number of 
folks mentioned with pride the church they attend. Thus, one might surmise that a 
religious foundation for one’s ethics in these cases is considered securely anchored by 
those interviewed. In other words, when referring to the Bible or some Divine source o f 
authority, no other justification is needed to explain one’s ethics. Although religion was a 
topic that emerged fairly readily, I did not make it a theme unto itself because it was
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mostly used to describe reasons for and against acting a certain way and also to serve as
guidance in situations o f uncertainty. That is, religion became another source o f
determining moral agency.
I will not reproduce every quote that supports the idea that religion is where one
gets his/her ethics; I will simply offer a handful o f statements representing the general tone
o f this idea. The first group o f quotes followed a question I asked on tire order o f  “How
do you know what is right or wrong?”
“Well that’s pretty easy for us. As traditional Roman Catholics, you start with the 
10 Commandments. And from there you go to the Bible and the teachings o f the 
Church. You can throw out all the laws in the world, but the 2000 years o f 
Church history tells us what’s right and wrong.” (Thomas)
.. there are some (ethics) that I would get from Christianity. Although it’s 
interesting when you hear how people interpret them in general, they’re not always 
as they really area in the Bible once you look at it.” (Deborah)
“Just read your Bible. The Bible has all the answers.” (Debbie)
“That’s why there is so much immoral people in the world, because they don’t read 
their Bible. We read the Bible every day and that always reminds us o f what to 
do.” (Mary)
‘I f  you think something might be wrong, it probably is. God gives us the power to 
know what’s right and wrong. But you have to listen to yourself... or that voice 
telling you to look out. That’s God using your own voice to talk to yourself. But 
some people stop listening to that voice and that’s when they get in trouble. When 
someone says that they didn’t know they shouldn’t have done something, that’s a 
lie. They just stopped listening to God telling them it was wrong.” (Nathan)
“You know, even people who don’t know the Bible, still know what’s wrong and 
right. They know this because God puts that kind o f knowledge in our hearts from 
the beginning.” (Trent)
“That’s what the Bible says. Actually that’s what the Lord says. You know what 
is good or bad because the Lord tells us so.” (Mike W.)
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“I think if you’re religious, and even if you’re not really religious, but if you have 
the foundation that you believe in a higher power, then you believe that you have 
dominion over everything, but a responsibility to everything too.” (Sharon).
The sense of these several quotes above is that God is the ultimate source o f determining
right and wrong. Related to this idea was an interesting exchange on the nature o f right
and wrong in a discussion with a young married couple, Jon and Amy.
Amy: “When I think of right or wrong I always think o f that as a religious type of 
thing. Religion tell us... well, God tells us when we do something wrong by 
making us feel guilty. That’s how 1 know when I do something wrong.”
Interviewer: “So you don’t know if something is wrong until you feel guilty about 
it?’
Amy: “No, you still know some things are always wrong like murder. I don’t have 
to kill someone to know it’s wrong. The Bible tells me that it’s wrong in the 10 
Commandments.”
Jon: “Guilt is what God gives us to remind us that we made a mistake, but He also 
already told us everything we need to know about how to live in the Bible.”
4 A 2 2  Parents
While most o f the people first identified religion as a basis for their ethics, a large
number of people also pointed to their parents or their upbringing as a source for ethics.
However, this response was often itself tied to religious teachings, as is evidenced by the
first two of the following five quotes.
“I guess, my parents taught me what was right or wrong, just like their parents 
taught them. So, it kind of gets passed down through the generations. O f course, 
everyone reads the Bible, so that is really where right and wrong come from.” 
(Judy)
“Just life experiences and what your parents teach you. They tell you that it’s 
wrong to steal, so you grow up learning that it’s wrong to steal I never realty 
went to church, but my parents did, so I guess they got a lot o f their morals from 
going to church.” (Michael)
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“My Mom and Dad and my Grandmother, who lives with us. They all taught all o f 
us right from wrong.” (Tammy)
“I guess you just learn that stuff from your parents when you’re really young, 
because I can’t remember how I learned that some things are wrong. Maybe I was 
just too little to remember.” (Nicole)
“If you are brought up right, then you know what’s good and bad. As long as 
you’re parents teach you that when you’re young, you will always know.” (Sylvia)
In general, the questions specifically pertaining to ethics elicited fairly brief
responses. In other words, people tended not to offer on their own further clarification or
explication on ethics questions. Additionally, when I probed or asked for further
clarification, more brief responses followed—a frequent conclusion to this line of
questioning was on the order of, “I don’t know, you just know it.”. That said, two
different people offered fairly lengthy, if somewhat awkward systems of morality. I’ll
discuss both o f these situations in the next subsection, because they do pertain to when,
where and why someone would consider themselves a moral agent.
4.4.2.3 Morals versus Ethics
Two different people developed a curious framework for discussing morals and 
ethics. Although each person was interviewed separately, and these responses came about 
through the course o f different series o f questions, the overall picture o f morals and ethics 
painted by these two people was remarkably similar. The general sense of both Sharon 
and Sylvia is that morality and ethics are not the same thing. Morality is what God tells 
people to do or not to do and ethics is what people tell each other to do or not to do. In 
this sense, ethics appears as a corrupt, jury-rigged tool for an ungodly and imperfect
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world. As such, sometimes people act unethically but at the same time they act morally
and vice versa. The following example illustrates this kind of thinking.
Sharon: “To me, ethics is different from morals. I can be ethical but immoral Of 
course that’s not a good thing to be (laughing), but it is possible. I can also be 
immoral... ummm... unethical but also moral. So there’s a difference.”
Interviewer: “I’m not sure I understand, could you explain that a little more?’
Sharon: “I think morals come from God. So when somebody does something 
immoral they are doing something that God says is wrong. But ethics, like 
business ethics, God didn’t make those up, we did, human beings made ethics. So, 
like here’s an example where they are different. I could make one photocopy at 
work and that’s probably not unethical because it’s just one—it’s no big deal. But 
that would be immoral because God would think that is stealing—it doesn’t 
matter to Him if it’s a little or a lot. It’s still stealing.
Interviewer: “Okay, I think I see. Can you think of an example where someone is 
doing something unethical but moral?’
Sharon: “I was afraid you were going to ask me that (laughing). Umm... how 
about... Oh, I know. Like when you asked me about littering. The Bible doesn’t 
say anything about littering, so that would not make someone immoral if they 
littered, but ethically, littering is wrong. Everybody knows that littering is wrong, 
even though the Bible doesn’t say anything about littering.”
Sylvia, who admitted to reading some philosophy suggested that morality is different from
ethics for similar reasons as those offered by Sharon.
Sylvia: ‘The stuff we know that’s wrong that comes from God is just wrong 
because that’s what God says. But then there’s that other stuff that people say is 
wrong because we figured out there are problems that go along with it. Like that 
stuff with DDT back in the 60’s. It wasn’t until fish and birds started dying a lot 
that someone said it was unethical to use DDT.”
Jim: “You mentioned that you’ve read some philosophy. Does the term 
‘consequentialist ethics’ mean anything to you?’
Sylvia: “Yeah, ethics are consequentialist. That’s right.”
Jim: “So, some ethics are consequentialist, like using DDT. That’s only bad 
because we know it is harmful to other critters. But some other ethics, like what 
God says, are non-consequentialist... ”
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Sylvia: “No, what God tells us in the Bible are more like our morals. Ethics are 
different than what's in the Bible. I know this sounds weird, but I don’t think 
ethics and morals are the same thing. Everybody has ethics, but not everyone has 
morals, because not everyone believes in the Bible. But that's usually okay 
because they talk about die same things for different reasons. Like the Bible says 
‘Thou shah not kill.’ Ethics also says people shouldn’t  kill, but they don’t use 
God’s reason. I guess it might be unethical to kill because, you would go to jail 
and you couldn’t take care o f your family or something like that.”
4.43 I Was Not the Cause
A refrain commonly heard among young children goes something like this, “But I
didn’t do it” and therefore I shouldn’t be responsible for fixing the problem nor do I need
to worry about what to do. Apparently this excuse persists into adulthood for different
sorts o f problems. Although, two o f the three people who offered this retort also
recognized the childish nature o f the argument.
“... if it’s just a pop can or two, that’s probably not that big a deal, but I don’t 
want to go follow people around with a trash bag. You know, they should pick up 
their own garbage.” (Michael)
“When one o f my girls says, ‘But she did it,’ I usually say, ‘Well, you’ve both got 
to fix it. That’s kind of the way that I feel about picking up other people’s trash, 
you know. Who cares if someone else dropped something, people should still pick 
it up, but a lot o f people don’t feel that way I guess, or there wouldn’t be so much 
garbage.” (Laurie)
“I wouldn’t do those things (participate in a clean up day or help rebuild a section 
of trail) if I didn’t do any o f it. Make the people who did mess up the place go out 
and fix it. But that doesn’t sound very good, so maybe I would pick up other 
people’s trash.” (Amy)
Thus, since the issue is whether or not someone has caused a problem, the question o f
moral agency rests not just on ability to recognize a moral dilemma and ability to act in
resolution o f this dilemma, but also on who were the parties responsible for this dilemma.
Cast in this light, if someone does not see him/herself as responsible for the creation o f a
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moral dilemma, then they are not obligated to act towards its resolution and are thus not a 
moral agent. Obviously there are problems in this interpretation o f moral agency, 
however, I suspect that it does capture the sense o f some people to justify removing 
themselves from commitments that they feel are not required of them.
4.4.4 Familiarity
In the original conception o f this study, I viewed familiarity as one of three major 
variables to consider. However, familiarity seemed to work best not as a source of 
determining justice or care, but as a filter for defining moral agency. In the same way that 
some people described lack o f moral agency in terms of things like, “Not my problem,” or 
“I didn’t cause it,” familiarity speaks to the hesitancy of assuming a moral burden. All o f 
the people interviewed were able to identify Cumberland Falls as a place that they were 
more familiar with than some other place (usually Yellowstone). However, nothing 
consistent in terms o f ethical orientation or obligation followed from this familiarity. In 
fact, quite the opposite was true: most people made a point o f saying that nature is nature 
no matter where it is and how much one knows about it. That said, the next few quotes 
illustrate how familiarity did emerge as a subtheme in determining moral agency. This first 
exchange occurred between Deborah and I as we talked about what one should do to help 
certain areas.
Deborah: “Well, I guess I feel it’s all part o f the same thing. Except I can have 
more direct influence on what’s right here and so I pay attention more to what’s 
here. Although, when I think about some of the parks out west that are really 
spectacular and maybe need more protection in some ways. As far as how much 
money would be allocated, anything like that, I’m not sure I could make a 
judgment about that, because Great Smokey Mountains is the highest attended one 
and this is the one I use. So, it’s hard to make choices about that. I guess I’ll just
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reiterate what I started out to say, I think it’s all important. For instance the 
Wildlife Refuge in Alaska is very important, and the saltmarsh habitat, and a lot of 
places that are not right here with me. I would be able to donate some money, or 
write about it, or talk to people about it, but I feel like there is enough to do right 
here”
Interviewer: “So, am I hearing you right when I say that there isn’t any ethical 
difference between what you know a lot about here and
Deborah: “I think that’s pretty close, although I’d probably say that... Yeah, I 
think you’re definitely paraphrasing what I stud very well. You made me think, 
again listening a bit more to my own thoughts, that I would say in all honesty, 
myself and other people, we might be able to be more fanatical about a place like 
Yellowstone, or the wildlife refuge that our lovely administration is planning to 
drill, because it is not our backyard. Because we’re not using it and because we 
are not the people that are right there affected by it. So, sometimes it’s harder to 
make those black and white choices when you’re right there in the middle o f it 
because I do see the needs o f the mountain bikers, well not mountain bikers, but 
four-wheelers tearing up the trails. And then I think well, we realty do need some 
extra land for this or that and we don’t need to cut so much national forest. So I 
can see how the decisions that you make close to home are harder. And that they 
might... that even though you want to focus more on them, they also make it 
harder to make at times. And you may not follow your own ethics as much as you 
would with something that is far away, your ideals, I guess. So, how you treat 
what’s close to you might be a better view o f your ethics, than what you think o f 
as lofty ideals.”
Amy, who has lived her whole life near Cumberland Falls but was visiting it for the first
time had this to say:
“I just don’t know a lot about what goes on here, maybe if I knew more I could 
say yeah, that sounds like a good idea. But I just don’t know. A lot of times 
people talk about things that they don’t know enough about and that makes them 
sound stupid. Like all that talk about evolution, if the people who believe in 
evolution could hear themselves talk, they would see how stupid they sound, cause 
they just don’t know what they’re talking about.”
To which, her husband, Jon, replied,
“Yeah, I never understand those evolution people because they talk so much about 
stuff that they don’t understand. If you don’t understand something, you should 
just keep quiet about it.”
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This is a cogent point about staying out o f an argument unless one knows the issue or the 
facts. This is particularly noteworthy when they expressed a hesitancy to get involved in 
questions of environmental ethics for places and/or issues they knew little about. So 
without a certain level of familiarity h is difficult to determine the moral issues. Curiously 
this speaks to another fundamental aspect o f care ethics—understanding particulars and 
context, which I will discuss in the following subsection.
4.4.4.1 Not enough information to act
The point o f departure for most folks when abandoning some sort o f principled
ethical position seems to be when more and more previously unknown pieces of
information come into play. In other words, an original ethical position may end up being
questioned because new information has come to light. This is hardly a new insight as it
recalls the foundations of a care ethic when one o f the young girls interviewed by Carol
Gilligan was hesitant to respond to the Heinz dilemma without learning more about the
situation. And in the following quotes this hesitancy does underscore the tenuous nature
of environmental ethics in some cases. Deborah addresses this uncertainty in discussing
how she feels about the spotted owl issue in Washington and the Bush Administration’s
proposal to drill for oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.
“I do think we have a tendency to be less realistic about things we don’t know as 
well... Because I’m not living out west, you know the spotted owl thing—I’m 
kind of removed from that, so I can support that—yeah, give the spotted owl 
room. Or I don’t care about getting more oil, so leave the Wildlife Refuge alone. 
It’s easy for me to be firm about these things in Kentucky, but I might not be so 
sure if I lived in one o f those places.”
She goes on to say:
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I think I would try to understand the situation before I jumped in there and 
tried to do something. One thing that came about recently was at Pine Mountain 
Settlement School. It's a historic place that was a school started by some outside 
women back in the early part o f the 20th Century. But it’s had this long history o f 
serving the region. They do environmental education for kids out there. They 
have historic buildings. They do a lot o f good work for the region and for people 
as a whole. They also employ something like forty or sixty people in the area.
And they were being threatened by some surface mining that was right around the 
property. So I felt that this was an issue that I could do more about, that I could 
feel good about getting out, standing up and saying, ‘Hey, this needs to be done 
this way and for these reasons.’ And I felt that way, I think, because I really felt 
like I understood the... I knew the organization and I knew what they had done, 
all the good things that they did. I knew the issue of strip mining. Sometimes I 
hesitate to get involved on things where I don’t know the ramifications. Whereas, 
maybe when I was younger I would have done that more. So, I’m sort of 
sidestepping this thing because I’m not sure I have a really clear understanding. I 
feel like I’ve got to make my decisions based on each case.”
Asking Trent about his level of commitmen t to different natural areas he responded that
things might be different depending on how much he knew about an area.
“Initially I would say I wouldn’t be as aggressive. For one, it’s just the lack o f 
knowledge o f those places and the lack o f importance of those places. There are 
so many other places that might ring a bell when you mention the name but you 
don’t know what’s behind the scenes.”
And Tom and Don voiced similar sentiments.
“I don’t even know what kinds o f problems there are in Yellowstone. So, I don’t 
know what I’d do in a situation. If  you tell me about the problems then I could 
give a better answer.” (Tom)
“... there are just too many unknowns about [Yellowstone]. I mean, I’ve never 
even been there so I wouldn’t know what’s right or wrong. I don’t think there’s 
anything wrong with relative morality, because I think it’s wrong to make 
decisions on things that you don’t know anything about.” (Don)
With all of these quotes, the basic hesitancy to accept responsibility as a moral agent is
rooted in a lack o f familiarity with the situation. However, this does not appear to be an
insurmountable hurdle towards gaining moral agency. Like Tom said, “If you tell me
more about the problems, then I could give a better answer,” meaning that he is willing to
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make some recommendations or say what is right or wrong, but not until he feels he has a 
good understanding, or a greater familiarity with the situation.
4.4.4.2 Not my place to judge or criticize
The idea behind this dimension is that even if  the situation is a moral one and even 
if I know something (though not a lot) about the situation, it is not my place to jump in 
and make a judgment. Three people expressed this idea clearly, but two o f them only in 
the context o f the problem being reversed. The original scenario had people responding to 
problems at some park out west. The reversed situation involved this park, their park, 
suffering problems that people from far away were taking an interest in. Sharon and I had 
this exchange:
Sharon: “I guess, I know I would have that right [to voice concern over the 
management of public lands away from her home], but I would be less likely to 
voice it there as opposed to here. Because this is my home, and this is my 
backyard. And I would feel like probably they wouldn’t want me coming there 
and barking up their tree about a park I know nothing about. I would think it 
would be unwelcome and it would not be viewed as helpful or good, but rather as 
interfering or badgering. And so I would be less likely to say anything on that 
end.”
Inteviewer: Maybe the same example, just switching it around. Somebody from 
California or New York hears that, ‘Ah, those hillbillies, they just dump their 
garbage into the river. We should just shut down the whole river and keep people 
from going to it.’ How would that kind o f sentiment strike you?”
Sharon: “Uhh... get the hell out o f my backyard! (laughing) Don’t be coming here 
and telling me that... even though it’s wrong. It’s clearly wrong and you make a 
very good point. I guess it’s a hard pill to swallow, if someone comes here from 
somewhere else and says, ‘These hicks down here don’t know how to take care o f 
their natural resources. Look at this garbage,’ It would be offensive to have 
someone else point that out to us and make it known in any public way, shape or 
form. And so my reaction would be, ‘Why don’t you keep your afiairs in 
California where you’ve got a stake in something and leave us the hell alone.’
Isn’t that horrible? I never realized I felt that way.”
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Interviewer: “No... no. I think that’s very reasonable.”
Sharon: “I feel like a hypocrite.”
Interviewer: “No... no. Without giving away too much o f where I come down on 
this, I’ll just say I think that’s a  very reasonable response. Why do you think you 
answer that way though?”
Sharon: “Well, because it would be... I would feel like you coming here from 
California. I would feel like what you said was judging me on something you have 
no right to judge me on. Like I would never tell another mother how to raise her 
kids, unless she was doing something really horrible to them, because it’s not my 
place to do that.”
Nathan and Mary had this to say,
Nathan: “Nobody has the right to come down here and tell us what to do with our 
land. If you don’t live here, keep your mouth shut.”
Mary: “There are a lot of people from Ohio who come down here and they act like 
they know everything. But they don’t know anything about this area. So, they 
shouldn’t say anything about stuff they don’t like. They can just go on home, if 
they don’t like it.”
For Sharon, Nathan and Mary, the question was not so much if something was right or 
wrong, but it was more a question o f having the right to comment on the rightness or 
wrongness of the situation. In this case those who don’t live around this area lack 
membership in the community and this lack o f membership is most evident when people 
show that they are unfamiliar with how people live here.
4.4.5 This is Not a Question of Morals
This subtheme was difficult to identify with specific quotes, however, it became 
clear upon my recollection of the difficulty that a number of interviewees had with some of 
the ethics questions. Recall that the overarching theme is On Becoming a Moral Agent.
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Well, in order to do this, one must first be in a moral situation. There was a sense among 
many o f the people interviewed that various hypothetical environmental scenarios offered 
were not moral at all, but were, in feet, something less. I use the term less here to connote 
that ethics or morality represents a class o f proscriptions and/or prescriptions that are, at 
least, o f lasting importance if they do not transcend time altogether. Ethics are neither 
inconsequential nor immaterial Those behaviors and beliefs that fell within the realm o f 
ethics are those things that most people would agree are worthy o f careful thought or 
cautious actions. This reflects some o f the perspectives of ethics as discussed in Chapter 2 
of this document.
There is much presumption in the field of environmental ethics that every issue o f 
environmental concern is therefore an issue o f moral import—so long as humans are either 
the cause o f the issue or are affected by the issue. In other words, all topics that might 
emerge under the general rubric o f environmental issues are, themselves, moral issues. 
Within the broad region o f ‘shoulds’ and ‘oughts’ environmental philosophers would 
argue that humans have near innumerable direct obligations to the natural world or at least 
indirectly through the people who need or use the environment. These obligations can be 
either hard or soft, justice-based or care based, deontological or teleological. Whatever 
they are they effuse through environmental discourse. However, at the risk of leveling the 
Ivory Tower charge, it appears that a broad chasm exists between the ‘shoulds’ and 
‘oughts’ of environmental philosophers and the ‘shoulds’ and ‘oughts’ o f the people in this 
study.
I offer the following quotes to illustrate the uncertainty about when an 
environmental situation is or is not also a moral situation.
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“It doesn’t take a lot to do the right thing, you know you usually know what 
you’re supposed to do most o f the time. Sometimes when I see someone litter, I 
get upset and think that that person is just rude, but I wouldn’t call that person 
unethical” (John)
“I don’t mind hunting because I think that we are supposed to use whatever God 
gave us, but use it in a good way. It doesn’t bother me when environmentalists 
protest against hunting, I just think they don’t know what it’s about. When they 
say stuff like hunting is bad and cruel I don’t think they know where their 
hamburger comes from and stuff like that. It isn’t good to kill an animal unless 
you’re going to use it, but as long as you do that, it really isn’t too big a deal I 
think there’s a lot more important stuff to worry about than hunting or the 
environment.” (Steve)
“Is this environmental ethics? I thought that was just like no hunting and fishing. I 
don’t think making parks or keeping parks clean is the same as environmental 
ethics unless some animals might get killed.” (Laurie)
‘Tor me, it’s really not a priority, you know. I like going to parks and everything, 
but I’ve got bigger things on my plate than if some little forest bums up or gets cut 
down. My ethics don’t really include anything with the environment, I think you 
do those kinds of things (pro-environmental behaviors) just to be polite or helpful 
but not because God says you have to.” (Thomas)
“It’s like it’s just something nice to do for the other people living there. I don’t 
think that anyone should expect it though.” (Chris)
In these passages, my examples o f ethics seemed to be interpreted as etiquette or just a
general rule that if broken yields no lasting reprobation. In the words of these people,
there was little sense o f obligation or o f decisions/actions o f lasting importance. Etiquette,
o f course, can take on a moral dimension during instances when one foils to follow some
prescribed etiquette and it is viewed as being disrespectful or even hurtful to another.
That said, I believe that many o f the people I interviewed saw environmental ethics as a
stretch beyond the boundaries o f their own well-worn social ethics.
So the question then arises, are environmental ethics too difficult a topic to
articulate or are people just too reluctant to discuss it? I suspect both foctors may be at
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work. As a number of the interviewees suggested, there is not a clear boundary defining 
environmental ethics. For this reason, some people may be unable to determine if some 
issue is or is not an environmental ethics issue. On the other hand, there may be those 
people who suspect that we do have commitments (either direct or indirect) to the 
environment, but they lack the confidence in discussing these commitments because it is 
not something many o f us consider on a consistent basis.
4.5 Summary of Results
The four primary themes in this study coalesce into a picture of this more general 
thing called environmental ethics. Beauty in Nature is that aspect o f environmental 
discourse which seems extremely accessible in the sense that people speak readily o f it and 
in some cases use it as a guide for environmental prescriptions. Attempting to unpack the 
logic and the language in the theme Responsibilities to ‘The Other’ illustrated a number of 
difficulties in this type o f research. These difficulties will be taken up in greater detail in 
the following two chapters. However, at this point I will suggest that the essence of 
understanding Responsibilities to ‘The Other’ rests upon a firm and clear image of the 
scope o f responsibilities as well as identifying candidates for ‘The Other.’ Public Lands, 
as a theme, yielded some interesting insights into understanding how the feet that 
something is a park, or a publicly-held resource can confound obligations that we might 
have to the nature contained within the boundaries o f this resource. Finally, the theme On 
Becoming A Moral Agent laid bare the assumptions I held in defining the limits of 
environmental ethics.
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In the next chapter, I’ll offer some additional commentary on the relationship 
between these four themes with specific attention given to the meta-themes: 
Responsibilities to ‘The Other’ and On Becoming a moral agent. Further, each theme is 
explored in greater detail with supporting literature. The idea it to return to the literature 
as a means of contextualizing the data from the interviews. Additionally, I will use this 
brief review of the literature to expand upon my commentary o f the themes and subthemes 
in this chapter.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
In laying out the map of this chapter, the reader should consider three primary 
points. First, the four primary themes as discussed in the previous chapter do not float 
freely, detached from the general field o f environmental ethics. Rather each o f these 
themes directly relates to many of the most fundamental aspects o f the field (obligations 
and duties, excellence, and promoting good). Secondly, this chapter, as a discussion, is 
not meant to offer ultimate conclusions so much as it is meant to frame the themes with 
the literature that most informs them. That said, conclusions are essential to finalizing any 
discussion; therefore, following a literature-based discussion o f each theme, I will address 
the importance and value o f each theme as it relates to the literature and offer my own 
commentary on how my findings might advance our understanding of environmental ethics 
discourse. Finally, the reader should consider these discussions and conclusions as a 
means to other ends. The discussions I put forth in this chapter are intended to inform my 
larger conclusions in the final chapter o f this document. That is, do not consider the 
discussions in this chapter as the final treatment 1 will afford each of the themes. On the 
contrary, consider these thematic discussions as the basis for more wide-reaching 
conclusions in that eponymous last chapter.
The origins o f this study rested on the interplay between familiarity with specific 
places and the possible variation o f people’s ethics. Chapter 2 of this document provided 
a review of a number o f standard and substandard environmental ethical positions. That 
review was intended to illuminate the scope o f different ethical theories and perspectives. 
Through the course o f the interviews, four central and meaningful themes emerged. These
208
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
four themes are 1) Beauty in Nature; 2) Responsibilities to ‘The Other’, 3) Public Lands; 
and 4) On Becoming a Moral Agent. Collectively, these four themes combine to explain 
the nature of environmental ethics as expressed through some specific, hypothetical 
examples. These themes do not parallel the standard ethical positions, nor are they meant 
to be exhaustive in the sense of fully addressing the scope o f environmental ethics. 
Ultimately, these four themes achieve two things. First, they offer a challenge to some 
portions o f the standard ethical positions. Second, the four themes and their associated 
subthemes document the process of environmental ethics discourse.
As just noted, the original topic areas, o f familiarity, obligatory/supererogatory, 
and justice/care, laid the foundation for the study and I provided supporting literature for 
these topics in Chapter 2 o f this document. However, I have yet to address the literature 
surrounding the four primary themes that emerged from the interviews. To this end, I will 
explore each of these four themes through their respective literature. In doing so, the 
position o f the themes and the validity o f existing environmental ethics frameworks can be 
considered. Note that this is less a second literature review and more a blending of 
literature accompanied by portions of narratives and interspersed with my own 
conclusions. In this regard, I will use the literature to complement portions o f the 
narratives and vice versa. Further note that the literature associated with each o f the 
primary themes is vast; however, I will opt for depth rather than breadth in this treatment 
so as to discuss more concisely the primary points o f interest as identified through the data 
analysis.
Essentially, in this penultimate chapter I intend to illustrate the significance o f the 
data as it stands on its own and as it relates to the current standard positions in
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environmental ethics. In illustrating these things, I will review relevant literature and offer 
my own commentary. And it is through these illustrations that I lay the foundation for the 
conclusions in the final chapter in this document.
5.1 A Discussion of Beauty in Nature
Recall from the previous chapter that beauty in nature seemed to assume moral
qualities for a variety o f reasons: because that’s what people want to see, it makes us
happy, God created nature this way, and beauty is healthy and healthy is good. O f course
the specificity o f commitments with regards to protecting beautiful areas differed. Yet, in
the end, there seemed to be some agreement that if an area is beautiful, then it should be
protected. 1*11 refer again to three quotes which seem to drive this point home.
.. it’s unethical when you turn something that used to be beautiful into 
something that’s ugly.” (Michael)
and,
“Even if they don’t think they should be taking care of the scenery, they really 
should because a lot of people really like to just go there and look at how pretty 
nature is.” (Beatrice)
and this one from Howard.
“Sure, because if there isn’t beauty then what’s the point of caring about 
anything?”
Beauty in the natural world has been a topic o f inquiry for as long as humans have 
talked about beauty itself, although Hargrove (1989) documents that the earliest 
expressions o f positive attitudes towards nature appeared in poetry and landscape 
gardening in the early 1700’s. And over the years natural beauty emerged as a value in 
assorted pieces o f legislation such as the acts that created the earliest National Parks
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(Runte, 1997). And more recently the National Environmental Policy Act makes specific 
mention o f aesthetic values. However, Callicott (1987) notes that “natural aesthetics is a 
pitifully underworked topic in Western philosophical and critical literature” (p. 159). This 
may be due in part to the intangible nature of beauty. For such a common term, it seems 
to be something that resists easy definition. Yet, in an effort to move the discussion 
forward a somewhat rudimentary definition of beauty is offered: the nature o f beauty in 
this study centers on what is pleasing to the eye when visiting some natural area. And the 
primary question we will try to answer at the end o f this discussion on beauty is: Is beauty 
a necessary and sufficient condition for protecting natural areas?
5.1.1 Anticipated versus Unexpected Beauty
From here two paths diverge. On the one hand, beauty may arise from instances 
when one is caught unawares, “as the sudden contact with an aspect of reality that one has 
not known before; it is the antithesis o f the acquired taste for certain landscapes or the 
warm feeling for places that one knows well” (Tuan, 1974p. 94). Here the recognition of 
beauty occurs when one encounters something unsuspected. Yet this seems to yield an 
incomplete account o f what people refer to as beauty in nature. Our other path illuminates 
this conditioned possibility. Here, a part of what is pleasing to the eye inevitably is tied to 
some concept of the expectation o f beauty. Nassauer (1997) suggests that the 
“picturesque was a cultural idea about how nature looks. It designated recognizable 
features o f nature so that these features could be arranged for human enjoyment” (p. 68). 
As illustration, this same notion was expressed during the interviews by Howard when he 
said, “If I know that a park has certain things, then I know it is beautiful.” In this way, the
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expectation of beauty becomes a prerequisite for the actual experience of beauty. I’ll refer 
again to something Nicole said to illustrate this even further.
“ ... and even if this was the first time someone came to Cumberland Falls it would
still be beautiful because they know what nature is supposed to look like.”
So, despite Tuan’s evaluation o f beauty as a sudden surprise, it would be wrong to ignore 
those instances when our expectations color what we believe a natural area should look 
like. When expectations and reality meet, a landscape is evaluated positively, or as 
beautiful In cases o f discord, landscapes are evaluated negatively, or as less than 
beautiful. The literature devoted to expectations realized and unrealized is more in line 
with the works o f psychologists, and thus, 1 will opt out of exploring this avenue in any 
depth. However, 1 will suggest that features defining expectations o f beauty may parallel 
features that define expectations o f ethical behavior as they both depend on the promotion 
o f some good.
This path leading in two directions (anticipated versus unexpected) informs some 
o f the important notions o f beauty when considering the words o f those interviewed for 
this study. However, there exist other dichotomous descriptions o f natural beauty. And it 
is through these other dichotomous descriptions that I now turn in an effort to consider 
some of the other subthemes within the theme o f Beauty in Nature.
S.I.2 Fixed versus Fluid Beauty
In an early work on environmental ethics, John Passmore (1974) took a dim view 
of any aesthetic justification for preserving nature, suggesting that these justifications “rest 
on the presumption that our descendents will still delight in what now delights only some
212
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of us and did not delight our predecessors” (p. 3). Passmore believes that aesthetic
appreciation of nature may well be a fad imported from older Asian perspectives of nature.
Eugene Hargrove (1989) addressed Passmore’s conception of natural beauty and morality
in his own book and offered the following assessment.
My account differs from Passmore’s in two important respects. (1) I argue that the 
aesthetic attitudes toward nature that have developed in the West during the past 
three centuries are too well grounded in Western Culture and science to be passed 
off as a fad or as an Oriental intrusion. (2) I allow for a greater degree o f diversity 
in aesthetic tastes in Western civilization than Passmore (p. 79).
It seems that Passmore subscribes to a snapshot, bounded notion o f beauty in nature that,
were it true, would be troublesome. Hargrove, on the other hand, allies himself with a
more fluid idea o f natural beauty.
This distinction does appear to parallel the divergent paths alluded to earlier. In
this way, Passmore’s beauty suggests an expectation of beauty whereby some specific
natural object represents a type in a larger inventory of things that possess natural beauty.
Conversely, Hargrove’s beauty is more akin to the surprising notion of that sudden
encounter with unexpected.
5.1.3 Discrete versus Continuous Part II
Moving this discussion outward a bit more, these comparisons further relate to 
another dichotomous view o f natural beauty: as a discrete versus a continuous variable. 
Beauty as a discrete variable yields two crisp categories—an object is either beautiful or it 
is not. As a continuous variable, certain objects can be more or less beautiful than other 
objects.
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Over 200 years ago, Immanuel Kant suggested that there are two ways to talk
about aesthetics in nature: as sublime and as beautiful.
Things that are sublime ‘arouse enjoyment but with horror.’ Things that are 
beautiful ‘also occasion a pleasant sensation but one that is joyous and smiling.’ In 
order that the former impression could occur to us in due strength, we must have a 
feeling o f the sublime, and in order to enjoy the latter well, a feeling of the 
beautiful. Tall oaks and lonely shadows in a sacred grove are sublime; flower 
beds, low hedges and trees trimmed in figures beautiful...The sublime moves, the 
beautiful charms (Kant, 1763/1965 p. 47).
Although Kant may paint a different picture of what many of us today would consider
beautiful, his general point is noteworthy: some features in nature are, indeed, beautiful,
other features may not be. Yet, those that are not beautiful are not without aesthetic
value. Despite this view that embraces a range o f aesthetic taste, beauty remains an
either/or proposition. Recall Howard’s term ‘spectacular beauty.’ I offered an
interpretation o f his term that might differentiate spectacular beauty from other ‘types’ of
beauty such as desolate beauty, sublime beauty, and powerful beauty. These categories,
though different, yield no indication of superiority between them, nor o f gradations of
greater or lesser value within a category. Thus, each o f these examples would itself be a
discrete category. Hargrove, I believe, would appreciate this level o f distinction and he
would applaud a pluralist view of natural beauty—one that is open to reinterpretation and
reevaluation.
Kant’s division between the sublime and the beautiful may hold less force today for 
the simple reason that our collective view of nature has changed much in the past two 
centuries. That Kant’s conception of the sublime seems slightly misplaced today suggests 
that even these subcategories of beauty lack any standardized definition. In this way, 
aesthetic justifications for preserving nature need not be conceived o f as an either/or (is it
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beautiful or not), but rather as means by which many different meanings and associations 
can follow. Thus, different people (read: generations), contra Passmore, may find 
different meanings and descriptions o f nature, but all existing beneath a larger umbrella o f 
beauty. Peter Singer (1993) is likewise supportive o f aesthetically-based justifications, 
noting that
Arguments for preservation based on the beauty of wilderness are sometimes 
treated as if they were of little weight because they are ‘merely aesthetic’. That is 
a mistake. We go to great lengths to preserve the artistic treasures o f earlier 
human civilizations (p. 271).
Although he makes no commitment to beauty as a discrete or continuous variable, by
explicitly stating that beauty is relevant criterion upon which to base one’s preservation
ethic, Singer does endorse beauty as a more or less permanent fixture in nature.
5.1.4 Beauty that Divides versus Unites
For the most part, when people discuss aesthetics or beauty in nature, there is a 
definitive, bounded and easily identifiable object to which these sentiments are directed.
It’s almost too easy to speak of the majesty o f that mountain, or the power o f that 
waterfall or the cool beauty of that stream. Even when some people direct their accolades 
towards whole vistas, this simply expands the object to a broader collective, but not 
necessarily coincident with anything on an ecological scale. Discussing natural beauty at 
this scale and with these types of terms belies the expanse and connectedness of the 
natural world. In this sense, perhaps problems remain with the idea that natural beauty is a 
valid starting point.
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A few people seem to have identified this shortcoming. Allen Carlson, (1979)
identified two main ways that people have aesthetically considered nature. In one way,
what Carlson refers to as the nature-as-object model, he contends that this approach
breaks apart nature into discrete and self-contained units and ignores that these parts all
must be a part of a larger organic whole. Carlson likens nature appreciation to art
appreciation when he writes,
If to aesthetically appreciate art we have knowledge o f artistic traditions and style 
within those traditions, then to aesthetically appreciate nature we must have 
knowledge of the different environments o f nature and o f the systems and elements 
within those environments (p. 270).
Marcia Eaton (1997) takes Carlson’s ideas and works in her own thoughts when she
suggests that simple landscape appreciation is incomplete and possibly counterproductive
to preservation efforts if it is not informed by knowledge o f natural processes. Her maxim
involving the twinning of knowledge and efforts directed towards preservation goes,
“Knowledge redirects attention, which motivates a desire for more knowledge, which
redirects attention, and so on and so on and so on” (Eaton, 1997 p. 89). This brings to
mind the maxim offered by Freeman Tilden when discussing the value of environmental
interpretation as a tool for instilling the desire to protect natural areas.
Through interpretation, understanding. Through understanding, appreciation. 
Through appreciation, protection (Tilden, 1977 p. 38).
In the minds o f Carlson, Eaton, and Tilden, hope for protecting beautiful nature rests not
so much in the beauty, but rather in the unexplored knowledge that many people have yet
to encounter with regards to the natural world and ecology. Eaton (1997) describes this
as a knowledge-based theory o f nature appreciation. On the other side o f the coin,
perhaps, is the concern that a decidedly cognitive approach to nature appreciation,
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somehow misses the mark particularly when many people express passionate sentiments
about preserving areas based solely on the affective reactions encouraged by natural
beauty (Carroll, 199S). Flowing from this critique is the idea that there exist many places
that do not evoke our passions in the same ways that other parts o f nature do. So how to
treat these objects or areas?
A couple o f years ago, Wayne Ouderkirk (1999) posed the question, “Can nature
be evil?” In one interpretation o f this question, Ouderkirk supposes that if there is beauty,
then surely there must be ugliness too, for how else would we be able recognize the
visually pleasing in the first place? Callicott (1987) is concerned that “nonscenic,
nonpicturesque nonlandscapes are aesthetic nonresources and thus become available for
less exalted uses” (p. 160). So, if there is truth in the notion that some aspects o f nature
lack beauty, then how are we to treat them? Ouderidrk’s response to this question rests
on the writings o f St. Augustine who wrote that many natural objects should be seen as
but one part of “the annointed order of things transitory” (Augustine, 1977 p. 82).
Augustine goes on to say,
Of this order the beauty does not strike us, because by our mortal frailty, we are so 
involved in a part of it that we cannot perceive the whole, in which these fragments 
that offend us are harmonized with the most accurate fitness and beauty.
So, what Ouderkirk suggests, using Augustine’s writings, is that all nature is beautiful and
our failure to see that in any one instance or example is more a function o f human myopia
than any lack o f intrinsic beauty in nature.
While Ouderkirk and Augustine were concerned with the inability to see the forest
through the trees, so to speak, Kant suggested that some people are simply unable to see
any beauty in nature at all. In writing about the beautiful and the sublime, Kant
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(1763/1965) recognized the tendency for some people to see beauty while others see 
nothing at all
The various feelings o f enjoyment or o f displeasure rest not so much upon the 
nature o f the external things that arouse them as upon each person’s own 
disposition to be moved by these pleasures or pain. This accounts for the joy o f 
some people over things that cause aversion in others, or the amorous passion so 
often a puzzle to everybody, or the lively antipathy one feels toward something 
that to another is quite indifferent (p. 45).
Of course a number of people who were interviewed subscribed to this perspective as
well, noting that what pleases them, may not please other people in the same way or even
at all. Consider again the words o f  Beatrice and Trent:
“I don’t think that my views are the only ones. I mean just because I really like 
going [to Cumberland Falls] and looking at the fells doesn’t mean that everyone 
does.” (Beatrice)
“... I think it’s just that different people think different things are more beautiful 
than others. It’s like they say, ‘beauty is in the eye of the beholder.’” (Trent)
So if the notion o f natural beauty is, at best, open to interpretation, then what avenues are
available to those who would hope to hitch an environmental ethics to conceptions o f
beauty? I sense that when viewing natural beauty in this light, the question does not lend
itself well to a clear and forceful answer. This uncertainty emerged in both the narratives
and in the literature. Allen Carlson (1981) and Eaton (1997) may again provide guidance.
Carlson suggests we pay greater attention to the many forces that contributed to us being
able to appreciate natural beauty in the first place. And Marcia Muelder Eaton’s intention
is to close the gap between the aesthetically beautiful and the ecologically beautiful,
because she sees this gap as counterproductive to any widespread agreement on what
beautiful nature is.
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5.1.5 Reviewing the Beauty Dichotomies
Up to this point, beauty in the nature has been considered from a number of 
competing perspectives. We first approached the topic o f natural beauty as either a 
response to the expected definition of what nature should be like or as a  response to the 
unexpected revealing of a previously ‘hidden’ part of nature. In this dichotomy, our 
evaluations of beauty in nature rests upon one o f two personal preconditions. Either we 
suddenly encounter the unexpected—letting nature take us by surprise, or we approach 
nature with some formalized expectation of beauty; such that when this expectation is 
realized, then we recognize beauty in nature. Secondly, Passmore’s and Hargrove’s 
visions o f nature respectively painted beauty as a snapshot and as a fluid and changing 
property. If beauty in nature is more of a snapshot nature, then this might suggest that we 
hold some expectation o f what beauty in nature is and should be. If, however, natural 
beauty is more fluid and changing across peoples and times, then we might find ourselves 
opening up to the unanticipated and anxiously awaiting that sudden surprise. Thirdly, 
beauty in nature was considered as both a discrete and as a continuous variable. In one 
sense, any environmental ethic that rests on discrete natural beauty would demand fairly 
small set of obligations. I f ‘A’ is beautiful then it requires us to do ‘B’ or ‘C’ or some 
other clear prescription. On the other hand, an environmental ethics that follows a 
continuous perspective o f natural beauty may require more complicated directives, since 
some areas could be said to be more or less beautiful than others and thus there might 
exist varying degrees o f commitments. And lastly, natural beauty was discussed as it 
applies to specific parts of nature and as it applies to much larger collectives, such as the 
landscape or ecosystem. The inability to see the forest for the trees seems to be an apt
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analogy for this perspective as an ethic directed at incomplete collections may be easier to 
focus on, but less useful in engineering worthwhile change in the same way that animal 
rights/liberation too falls short as a comprehensive environmental ethic (Callicott, 1980). 
What is needed is clarification on how we can use the concept of natural beauty to guide 
us towards an environmental ethics.
5.1.6 Letting Beauty be the Guide
Noting that there exist some distinctions in the way that natural beauty is
conceived of seems to offer little guidance to how humans should treat areas of natural
beauty, in the normative sense. In other words, there is not a clear progression between
natural beauty and environmental ethics. Further, it is not a foregone conclusion that
because something is beautiful that it therefore deserves some degree o f ethical treatment.
O’Neil (2000) makes this point when he contends that things which “can be objects of
aesthetic appreciation... cannot properly be foci o f moral concern” (p. 183). Nassauer
(1997) suggests that aesthetic appreciation by most people is divorced from moral
requirements representing just ‘trivial decoration’ and ‘social conformity’. And Callicott
(1987b) notes the tension between an obligatory type ethics and beauty, when he says,
An ethic is onerous, burdensome—according to Leopold’s own definition, ‘a 
limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence.’ Beauty on the other 
hand, is attractive... Duty is demanding—often something to shirk; beauty is 
seductive—something to love and cherish (p. 158).
What is needed then is some idea or suggestion that both beauty and ethics can lean on.
As it turns out, there may be such a keystone after all.
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Over ISO years ago, the landscape artist, Thomas Cole (1836/1965) remarked that 
“there is in the human mind an almost inseparable connexion between the beautiful and the 
good, so that if we contemplate the one the other seems present” (p. 99). And nineteenth 
century French author, Stendhal, remarked that “Beauty is the promise of happiness.” So 
we are left with the possibility that beauty is generally accepted as a good thing and 
something to be valued, yet by themselves, there is little to anchor these suppositions to a 
moral commitment. In an attempt to respond to this disconnect, I’d suggest that there 
exist at least three different options to build a bridge between beauty and ethics. And 
while all are anthropocentric at their core, the potential for securing protection for areas o f 
natural beauty seems quite strong. First, there are those responsibilities and obligations 
that we have to our fellow humans with regard to respecting their preferences for beauty, 
particularly if these preferences promote other ethical ideals such as self-reflection, 
serenity, cultivation of a generous spirit, and general eudaimonia. A second option hinges 
on wielding beauty as tool for evaluating health of ecosystems, landscapes, watersheds, 
etc. And thirdly, there is the suggestion that current generations have obligations to 
respect the wishes of past generations when those wishes are made explicit. In this last 
instance, where previous generations have made the commitment to protect natural 
beauty, so we inherit this commitment as well.
Our first option suggests that natural beauty may be a valuable reminder of, or 
even a guide to, human flourishing. However, before defending this suggestion, I’ll lay my 
foundation on beauty as a pervasive and ubiquitous quality in nature. One of Howard’s 
many thoughtfiil comments during the interviews supports this view.
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when you’re with someone else and they say, ‘Isn’t that beautiful?’ No one 
ever disagrees with them. So that tells me that some things in nature are beautiful 
to everybody no matter where you go or who you are talking to.”
And these two comments from John and Nicole,
“It’s just nature you know. Nature is beautiful and so wherever you see nature 
you see something beautiful.” (John)
I don’t think you can have just one definition of beautiful. Nature is beautiful and 
nature looks really different in different places, like the jungle and the desert and 
Cumberland Falls all look different, but they’re all beautiful too.” (Nicole)
Yet beauty may not be simple window dressing, a passive and passing visual
experience. I am not alone in suggesting that beauty, wherever it is found, carries with it a
force that demands attention and commitment. And it should come as no surprise that
natural beauty has been described as an agent for bringing out the best in humanity (Nash,
1982). John Muir (1901/1990) noted that the hunger for natural beauty “may heal and
cheer and give strength to body and soul alike” (p. 96). Inherent in these views is the
sense that the beauty, resident in the natural world elevates us all. Further, considering
natural beauty in these terms, shifts the focus o f the argument away from some algorithm
or formula where the output is some quantitative assessment o f visual preference
(Jubenville & Twight, 1993 p. 168).
Beauty must necessarily be a broad category because it spills into so many different
aspects of life. Not only do we use the term beautiful to describe landscapes and other
parts of nature, but we use the term beautiful to describe our spouses and our children as
if beauty in these cases meant the appropriation o f ‘love’ as a visual property. We use the
term beautiful to describe art, music and drama in the sense that all o f those endeavors
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should strive towards some perfect end. ‘Beautiful’ takes on qualities o f excellence when 
we describe efforts on the baseball diamond, basketball court, or soccer pitch.
In reference to nature, some use the term beauty to describe our admiration and 
appreciation “of the achievement o f complex form that is entirety unplanned” (Hettinger & 
Throop, 1999 p. 14). And recall that Tuan (1974) suggested that “Beauty is felt as the 
sudden contact with an aspect of reality that one has not known before.. (p. 94). And 
for some, beauty in nature seems to speak to Augustine’s belief in Divine perfection with a 
curious Panglossian type optimism where “All events are interconnected in this best of all 
possible worlds...” (Voltaire, 1761/1962). Therefore, with beauty holding court over 
many different aspects o f life, there is no sense in limiting its meaning with regard to the 
way we speak o f the natural world. And it is through this open-endedness that natural 
beauty can become something approaching universal appeal. Following which, if beauty in 
nature is generally conceived of as a universal good, then surety it is not a leap to extend 
this acknowledgement to an ethical commitment to protect what many or most people 
believe to be beautiful. By this measure, we accept that many people believe in nature’s 
beauty and in some way benefit from it. Our hard or soft obligations to protect natural 
beauty then would follow from our entrenched obligations to promote the welfare and 
encourage the flourishing o f others.
The second option for bridging beauty and ethics returns to a pragmatic approach 
which considers beauty as a proxy for a healthy nature. Marcia Muelder Eaton (1997) 
authored an essay that speaks to this type o f bridge. In her essay, she begins with a simple 
description of the aesthetic—as “anything that draws attention to intrinsic properties of 
objects and events” (p. 88). Thus, beauty is intrinsically good. Similarly, health is also
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intrinsically good, no one need offer a justification why health is good—it simply is. In 
describing picturesque landscapes, Nassauer (1997) notes that “the picturesque has been 
so successful in becoming popular culture that scenic landscapes are often assumed to be 
ecologically healthy” (p. 68). This statement is clearly a non sequitur in which beauty 
should not be an indicator o f health in all cases. Callicott (1987b) illustrates this when he 
bemoans the pleasant appearance o f invasive vegetation such as “the attractive purple 
flower of centaurea or the vivid orange of hawkweed” (pp. 162-163). Our Montana 
landscape suffers the scourge o f purple knapweed. Conversely, blackened landscapes 
following a natural fire might be drastically unappealing to many people; however, there 
may be much health resident in this seemingly barren landscape.
Of course, the embedded tradition of Aldo Leopold’s (1949) Land Ethic has 
securely hitched notions o f beauty to ecological concepts o f stability and integrity. It 
matters little if someone is a student of Leopold’s Land Ethic or not; beauty has been and 
continues to be an indicator o f ecological health. In the interviews, Stuart, the former 
forestry student and U.S. Forest Service employee cited Leopold’s Land Ethic almost 
verbatim. Mary, a high school graduate who has lived in rural southeastern Kentucky her 
whole life, similarly identifies an absence o f natural beauty as an indication of some 
ecological problem. Yet, despite the uncertainty o f using beauty as a proxy for health, we 
might ask the question, how did these two come to be paired in the first place?
I sense an evolutionary explanation to this pairing as humans have come to 
appreciate the bounty that beautiful landscapes provide. In some respects this reflects E. 
O. Wilson’s biophilia hypothesis, which posits a genetic predisposition to affiliate with life 
(Wilson, 1993). Although, biophilia is not perfectly coincident with an inherited tendency
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to prefer natural beauty, there does exist a connection. This connection is noted by
Michael Soule (1993), when he recalls the “ultimate object of love is the beautiful” and
biophilia is the love o f life. Allen Carlson (1981), too, offers what I believe is an
unintended endorsement o f the biophilia hypothesis when he writes,
We do not aesthetically appreciate simply with our five senses, but rather with an 
important part o f our whole emotional and psychological selves. Consequently, 
what and how we aesthetically appreciate cannot but play a role in the shaping of 
our emotional and psychological being. This in turn helps to determine what we 
think and do, and think is correct for ourselves and others to think and do. In 
short, our aesthetic appreciation is a significant factor in shaping and forming our 
ethical views (p. 24).
The potential of the biophilia hypothesis rests upon an inborn propensity to appreciate
certain things in our ecological setting. Appreciating these things may likewise encourage
an evolutionary advantage. Without delving too deeply into the biophilia hypothesis, I’ll
simply suggest that it is within the bounds o f reason to consider human conceptions of
natural beauty as derivative of our evolutionary heritage. Several of the interviewees
explicitly disavowed any subscription to evolutionary theory; however, their critiques
interestingly offer some endorsement of an evolutionary explanation for the pairing of
beauty with health. Debbie at one point mentioned that God doesn’t make ugly things, by
extension, God made all o f nature beautiful. Debbie later made this comment,
“God made everything on earth and He wouldn’t want us to destroy his creation. I 
don’t believe in evolution or anything like that, but everybody knows that food 
webs are really complicated and if you break just a comer of it you can break the 
whole thing.”
In Debbie’s perspective, health and beauty are tied together, and despite her distinct 
separation of evolutionary theory from the natural world, she leaves the door open as to
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why humans associate beauty and nature beyond an explanation involving the 
supernatural.
Of course, this biophilia hypothesis makes little distinction between some o f the
different kinds of beauty that I mentioned previously: sublime beauty, spectacular beauty,
desolate beauty, etc. All of these types o f beauty would be equally appealing so long as
some degree o f life was resident in the landscapes. Recall Kant’s distinction between the
beautiful and the sublime, where the beautiful was almost tame and garden-like and the
sublime was frightening and mysterious. Hargrove (1989) follows Kant’s conception o f
the sublime in an evolutionary view o f beauty.
... a person who appreciated the sublime could not look at the world as a place 
created solely for human use or perhaps even for human purposes at all In this 
sense the sublime signified the end o f the age in which natural objects were 
evaluated exclusively in terms o f human uses and needs (p. 87).
And later, in discussing how sublime beauty seemed to erase the need for a human
evaluator from the equation,
While the earlier conception o f time in terms of human history was picturesque, 
geologic time was sublime (p. 88).
The third possible avenue for bridging beauty and ethics rests upon the perspective 
that all generations have obligations to respect the wishes of past generations when these 
wishes are made explicit. In this sense, the responsibility to protect natural beauty stems 
from a type of public acknowledgement that such and such was valued by this generation 
in the past and therefore our generation has a duty to continue to honor that value. In 
tying each of the four themes of my research together, I will explore the notion of 
respecting the wishes o f past generations in reference to the other three themes, A 
Discussion o f The Responsibility to ‘The Other’ and A Discussion o f Public Lands.
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Before embarking on that discussion, let us consider what we can take away from 
this discussion on beauty. Further, how can we answer the question first proffered at the 
outset o f this section devoted to beauty? We began this discussion with various 
interpretations of beauty in nature: anticipated/unexpected, fixed/fluid, 
discrete/continuous, etc. Clearly there is much variety in the general concept of beauty. 
And if the notion of natural beauty is, at best, open to interpretation, then what avenues 
are available to those who would hope to hitch an environmental ethics to conceptions of 
beauty? Stated another way, is beauty a necessary and sufficient condition for an 
environmental ethics designed to protect natural areas? Necessary—yes, sufficient—no. 
It seems that however we conceive o f beauty in nature, it is supremely important to many 
people; yet beauty, by itself does not take us far enough. And there may exist the 
persistent caution that beauty, as a wholly human concept, imprisons us in an exclusively 
anthropocentric environmental ethics.
However, non-anthropocentrists may find comfort in beauty as well. Recall the 
shared visions held by Carlson, Eaton and Tilden. All three o f them seem to allow beauty 
to be a guide, leading all o f us towards a more heightened awareness which in turn 
encourages greater attention and devotion leading ultimately to a more complete 
ecological understanding and appreciation for the natural world. So beauty is a 
conveniently necessary condition upon which we find ourselves compelled to discover 
more o f the wonder o f nature. It is from discovering this wonder that non- 
anthropocentrists may find their promise. Because although beauty is in some respects 
necessary to achieve a better understanding o f nature, it is not the sufficient condition 
upon which any rigorous environmental ethics can survive. Therefore some other
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conditions are needed. I believe we may find another o f these conditions in the following 
discussion devoted to the second theme o f the research: Responsibilities to ‘The Other.’
5.2 A Discussion of The Responsibility to ‘The Other’
The modern tradition o f Cartesian dualism has been called into question a number 
o f times in the post-modern era. However, identifying the ‘us’ and the ‘them’ remains a 
common method of description and categorization. A guiding question we might use for 
this subsection may be expressed in two parts: A) “Do we have ethical responsibilities to 
non-humans?” and B) “I f ‘A,’ then, what form do these responsibilities take?” The 
environmental ethical ‘Other’, existing as an object to which humans have direct 
obligations, resists easy identification (Rolston III, 1999). It is this resistance that proved 
most telling in the hesitanee that most o f those interviewed showed when asked to 
consider some type o f obligatory ethic directed towards nature. That is, the interviewees 
had difficulty in identifying clear ethical prescriptions directed towards non-humans.
Despite this hesitancy, nearly all environmental ethicists contend that nature, in 
general or in some specific form, should rightly be considered one of the others to whom 
we owe ethical obligations. (The environmental pragmatists, as discussed in Chapter 2 are 
the obvious exception to this approach.) However, should we attempt to follow some 
non-anthropocentric ethics, where should this journey begin? Most typically non- 
anthropocentric ethics begin with the presumption o f intrinsic value in non-human things. 
Once we acknowledge some sort of intrinsic value, the human responsibilities to others
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expands to obligations beyond just those owed to other humans. And our obligations to 
non-humans become direct rather than just indirect.
5.2.1 Intrinsic and Instrument Value
As previously presented, it has been argued that this intrinsic value resides in the
possession o f interests (Singer, 1993), all Hfe, the biocentric perspective (Taylor, 1998),
and in collections and relationships of things, such as ecosystems, the ecocentric
perspective (Rolston III, 1987, 1988). Barrett (1999) notes that,
Ecocentrists share biocentrists’ belief in the intrinsic worth o f non-human elements 
o f the biosphere. By emphasizing interactions, however, ecocentrists also share 
anthropocentrists’ instrumental valuation o f the natural environment. Ecocentrism 
thus shares important common ground with both biocentrism and 
anthropocentrism, even if proponents o f each sometimes clash (p. 33).
Reading ecocentrism this way seems to blur the line between an anthropocentric
environmental ethics and a non-anthropocentric one. To reframe the nature of this
blurring is the idea that instrumental value may not be entirely separate from or at odds
with intrinsic value. Indeed, these two conceptions of value may travel in concert rather
than each one on its own solitary trek. What is generally agreed upon is the notion that
nature does have some value, so perhaps this is a worthy starting point. Stated another
way, nature is not axiologically neutral (Ouderkirk, 1999).
Assuming nature has some value, what responsibilities flow from this? On this
task, the options are less clear. In order to find these responsibilities it seems we must
again try to determine if nature is property an object worthy o f direct moral consideration.
As a moral realist, Rolston believes that there is no doubt to the assumption that values
truly exist in the world beyond the human ability to evaluate. Yet, Kellert and Wilson
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(1996), with their attention to biophilia tend towards a softer, or more human-centered 
moral realism. In their view value inherently exists, but not in the objects themselves, but 
within the essences of the evaluators. Their moral realism suggests that humans, through 
the process o f evolution, have become genetically predisposed to appreciate nature.
Bissell (1999) summarizes the position of Kellert and Wilson in that, they believe “that 
environmental ethics based on either altruistic or anthropocentric considerations alone fails 
to account for all human values and fails to recognize all of the values represented in 
nature” (p. 215).
O f course, others, such as Norton (1996), Light and Katz (1996) are quite hesitant 
to recognize any obscure or not-readily-apparent intrinsic value in the natural object or the 
inborn capacity to sense value in humans. On one extreme, environmentalists such as 
Rolston would have us recognize intrinsic value in nature and honor direct duties to the 
natural world, either in whole or in part. On the other extreme, environmental pragmatists 
would have us continue to recognize human-centered values and perhaps expand our 
notion of these values such that we assume many more indirect duties to the natural world. 
In this respect, issues of environmental justice may cause us to care more for the 
environment such that the basic rights o f humans are not compromised.
There were brief and fleeting hints o f intrinsic value expressed by some of those 
interviewed. Beatrice made this comment,
“We’re supposed to have respect for all life.”
And, Sylvia expressed this sentiment about the wildlife that lives in and around 
Cumberland Falls,
“They’ve got just as much right to be there... maybe more, as we do.”
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Yet, neither o f these comments offers an unqualified endorsement o f intrinsic value
in nature. Much more common were comments that expressly identified that nature was
here for humans to use however we see fit so long as our behaviors do not harm other
people. And from that perspective it follows that the duties we have to nature are really
only duties to other people with regards to how nature is seen or experienced by others.
07460 (2000) pointedly notes that “many environmentalists overlook an important
distinction between intrinsic value and moral standing and attribute the latter to natural
objects when only the former is warranted” (p. 185). If moral standing is not so perfectly
paired with intrinsic value as O’NeO believes, then perhaps the energies directed at
securing only direct duties to nature, may be overstated. O f course it has been suggested
that this distinction between direct and indirect duties may itself be a non-issue in the end.
... this characterization o f anthropocentric ethics requires an important 
qualification: certainty there is nothing in principle which prevents a human- 
centered ethic (an ethic which excludes nature from the domain of moral standing) 
from proposing human duties to the environment—and in this sense, nature would 
not be beyond the boundaries o f ethical concern. O f course, these would not be 
direct duties to nature (we can only have direct duties to those with moral 
standing), but still we might well think that our direct duties to the human species 
demands indirect duties to the environment, since how we behave towards the 
environment obviously will affect the quality o f life o f our own species (Berthold- 
Bond, 2000 p. 8).
Within the scope o f this research, anthropocentric environmental ethics seem less 
suspicious, or at least it exhibits greater, articulated clarity than any non-anthropocentric 
ethics. Where there seems to be such little support for direct duties to nature, I suggest 
that environmental ethics be viewed through two different lenses. These lenses describe 
two broad, sweeping categories whereby the fundamental bases of our ‘Responsibilities to 
‘The Other” can be examined in a different light. We might conceive o f ethics as either
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entirely culturally constructed or as predominantly evo lutionarily-based. The implication 
for this distinction is that our responsibilities to nature may be dynamic and changing over 
time in the sense that they are culturally derived or they may be more static in the sense 
that they are evo lutionarily-based. Recall that many people described ethics and/or 
morality as an interpretation or an outgrowth o f their religious perspective. In order to 
accommodate this perspective, I’ll consider those people for whom ethics was coincident 
with religion to view ethics through a culturally-derived lens.
5.2.2 As a Purely Cultural Construct
Beginning with ethics as a cultural derivative, a host o f social constructions come 
to the fold. Even focusing just on environmental ethics, rather than ethics in general, it 
seems the web o f social constructions is too tangled to discern relationships and to which 
anchors people ultimately attach concepts. Peterson (1999) noted that “nature can be 
understood as socially constructed in two senses: in different culture’s interpretations o f 
the nonhuman world and in the physical ways that humans have shaped even areas that 
they think of as ‘natural’” (p. 339). Social constructionism is not the focus o f this 
dissertation, nor even this chapter, section or subsection. It is offered only as the briefest 
of illustrations on the difficulty in determining some foundation upon which an 
environmental ethics can rest. If  indeed, social construction challenges the true-ness o f 
nature or the wild or wildlife, then how can we properly be directed to protect those 
things which may have no real meaning beyond what we somewhat arbitrarily assign? 
Social construction o f anything, is ultimately an exercise in both epistemology and 
ontology. Epistemologically, Meno’s paradox questions how it is possible to seek
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knowledge o f something if one does not know precisely what one is looking for; and if 
one does recognize it, then one already knew it and did not need to seek knowledge o f it 
in the first place. So searching for some truth or knowledge about nature simply begs the 
question, “But, what is ‘nature’ anyway?” This, o f course, leads to an ontological account 
o f nature whereby we ultimately question i f ‘nature’ is something real in the world at all.
A less troubling path might begin with the question whether we are each contemplating 
the same ‘nature’, as differences at this level might yield different commitments. Hargrove 
(1989) answers this latter question stating, “the ontological argument for the preservation 
o f nature... is primarily aesthetic and ethical, not metaphysical. It is not intended to prove 
that nature exists, which is taken as a given, but to show that humans have a duty to act so 
as to ensure the continuation o f nature in its appropriate, natural form” (p. 192). All o f  
this suggests that in hoping to determine the responsibilities for some other we ultimately 
have to understand the nature of that other.
So, social constructionism is one puzzle that a culturally-derived environmental 
ethics must attempt to solve. Of course Hargrove (1989) sees no reason to quibble about 
social constructions of nature, his responsibilities to ‘the other’ are once again grounded in 
beauty. Simply stated, his take is that any ethical requirement or duty is designed to 
promote some good. And “the duty specifically to promote and preserve natural beauty 
arises out of the recognition that not only artistic beauty but also natural beauty 
constitutes an aesthetic good that makes up part o f the general good that exists and ought 
to exist in the world” (p. 192).
Yet, Hargrove’s position is not entirety convincing as it is not prima facie apparent 
that natural beauty is everywhere or even universally agreed upon. So the social
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constructionism hurdle remains; and this is no small challenge, given the host o f meanings 
and values that seem to be firmly affixed to all parts o f nature including the whole. Anna 
Peterson (1999) refers to a work by Adrienne Rich (1994) in which Rich describes the 
simple practice of referring to a specific bird by the name o f Great Blue Heron. Peterson 
(1999) writes, “When humans put a name on something, they usually endow it with a host 
o f other characteristics as well” (p. 339). And there is the belief that cultural expectations 
o f the way that nature should appear has led to “a contrived and frequently misleading 
nature” (Nassauer, 1997 p. 68). Without a doubt, nature in whole or in part carries with it 
so many value-laden terms and ideas that we can scarcely hope to identify them all or even 
understand completely how they color our views.
Another challenge in the culturally-derived view o f ethics concerns the ever- 
expanding knowledge that we have been steadily building about the natural world. One 
hundred years ago, we understood little of natural processes. Fifty years ago, most people 
had never heard o f ecology. Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring ushered in the widespread use 
o f the term environmentalist. And even fifteen years ago, our degree of understanding of 
processes at the molecular level, pales to what we now know. “Many o f the details o f the 
ways in which individual landscapes work are not only inconspicuous, they are invisible” 
(Eaton, 1997 p. 92). In turn, some of our environmental ethics seem to lose their vigor as 
we become more aware o f the complexity and the important, but sometimes very distant 
relations between things. My example here rests upon the traditional notions o f animal- 
rights and other individualistic environmental ethics. Singer’s utilitarianism and Tom 
Regan’s rights-based argument both offer fairly clear guidance about what is right and 
wrong. However, their focus on the individual allows real harm towards collectives. In
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this way, Singer, Regan and other individually-based ethicists, seem content to isolate 
good/bad and right/wrong only as it applies to individuals and avoid the complications that 
accompany the perspective o f seeing all individuals as members o f a  larger community. In 
identifying appropriate responsibilities to non-human others we’ve drawn our line in the 
sand, but we know come to find out that our line excludes more than it includes and for 
shaky reasons. Rolston (1988), an admitted ethical holist, believes that ethical sins against 
types are much more than just compounded sins against many, many tokens—or 
individuals o f that species. Yet Rolston too is not above criticism, his spooky Holism fails 
to resonate with many because it is so hard to envision duties to something that resists 
convenient identification.
Where does this leave us? First, the social construction of nature raises questions 
about our ability to prescribe both direct and indirect duties to the natural work!. Despite 
efforts to dismiss social constructionism as a diversionary intellectual pursuit without 
much applied merit, so long as disagreements persist in terms of what nature is, we will 
find ourselves disagreeing on what nature should be. Secondly, our purely culturally 
derived environmental ethics offers a flexibility to incorporate new information and keep 
pace with scientific understandings o f the natural world. Yet, this flexibility produces less 
vigorous prescriptions as we never know what tomorrow will bring that might shed more 
light our understandings o f the environment on new or different duties to the natural 
world.
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5.2 J  The Evolutionary Tarn
Do our ethics transcend our human existence or are ethics simply a convenient 
tool? This question arose in a couple of contexts during the narratives when people would 
suggest that ethics are either immutable or that they are simply spatially and temporally 
negotiated rules o f conduct. Definitively answering this question is well beyond the scope 
o f this dissertation, but I will reaffirm that ethics from an evolutionary standpoint need not 
be counter to reproductive success and thus an evolutionary explanation is not without 
merit. Callicott (1989) believes that ethics “arise in association with the survival 
advantages of society or community” (p. 165). In this respect, ethics do not transcend 
humanity, but are, perhaps, coincident with h. Yet, as evolution simply means change, 
ethics may similarly change as necessitated by selection pressures. Kerr (2000) describes 
this idea further,
According to Darwin and other evolutionary thinkers, selection pressures can 
account only for some sympathetic feelings among humans with whom one lives in 
community, possibly only one’s own kin. How does Callicott justify the more 
extensive sympathy required by an ecocentric ethics? Because the sentiments are 
tendencies, Callicott explains, additional knowledge gained from ecology as to 
what constitutes true community will ‘reveal new relations among objects which, 
once revealed, stir our ancient centers o f moral feeling (p. 90).
The evolutionary turn to ethics seems readily apparent in E.O. Wilson’s biophilia
hypothesis. It is similarly apparent in Leopold’s A  Sand Countv Almanac and in
Callicott’s conception o f environmental ethics which is heavily informed by Leopold and
Darwin. Callicott (1987b) describes his ethics as blended with Leopold’s through the lens
of evolutionaiy theory, “ecology, as Leopold pictures is, is the biological science which
runs at right angles to evolution. Evolution lends to perception a certain depth, ‘that
incredible sweep of millennia’ while ecology provides it breadth” (p. 162). Yet, while
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ecology and evolutionary theory support one another, an ethic derived from one or both of 
these concepts runs headlong into one o f the persistent concerns in environmental ethics. 
That values cannot derive from facts poses a tricky challenge for environmental 
philosophers. Environmental philosophers seem to search for an elusive but steady 
footing upon the shifting sands of scientific knowledge. The philosophical charge of 
naturalistic fallacy bemoans the rapid discoveries in ecology and evolution. Our facts and 
values, no longer so distinct, seem to advance together with each new discovery. Yet, this 
means the scientific canvassing of the natural world seems to leave few stable moral 
footholds. Despite this challenge, if ethics are evolutionarily-based, then we might 
presume them to be static, or at least more invariant than culturally-derived ethics.
5.2.4 Erasing Or Ignoring the Naturalistic Fallacy?
In her book, Living in Integrity, Laura Westra (1998) suggests that “nothing can 
be moral that is in conflict with the physical realities o f our existence or cannot be seen to 
fit within the natural laws o f our environment in order to support the primacy o f integrity” 
(p. 24). The challenge o f erasing the naturalistic fallacy is rooted in the separation of feet 
from value, o f is from ought, and of description from prescription. Kerr (2000) is 
committed to erasing the naturalistic fallacy when he suggests that, “much 
nonanthropocentric theory has committed the naturalistic fallacy because it has deployed 
various forms o f empirical naturalism, and that to meet this challenge 
nonanthropocentrism must employ a form o f meta-physically based nonanthropocentrism” 
(p. 85). The modem project, which began so forcefully with Rene Descartes’ separation 
of mind and body, echoes today in the canyons o f environmental philosophy, where the
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way the world is, inevitably informs the way(s) we believe the world should be. I contend 
that the naturalistic fallacy is an outmoded byproduct o f Cartesian dualism which countless 
post-modern critiques have so thoroughly addressed. Thus, perhaps the mental 
gymnastics required for erasing the fallacy have been, at best, misdirected effort. Rather, 
might the naturalistic fallacy be ignored from the perspective o f environmental ethics 
where facts and values seem to reveal themselves simultaneously and where indirect duties 
following an anthropocentric ethic require no such fact/value distinctions? Or better, is it 
fair to suggest that the naturalistic fallacy may have merit in social ethics but not in 
environmental ethics? I offer this question based on the difference between the “is” in 
human behavior and the “is” in the natural world. The naturalistic fallacy may be a valid 
concern in social ethics where human behavior is the fact of the matter, it may not be a 
concern in environmental ethics where the “is” o f nature rests beyond the realm of 
morality. In other words, humans can be separated from the natural world, but we cannot 
be separated from humanity.
Rolston (197S) notes that “what is ethically puzzling, and exciting, in the marriage 
and mutual transformation of ecological description and evaluation is that here an ‘ought’ 
is not so much derived from an ‘is’ as discovered simultaneously with it” (p. 78). This 
notion not only sheds new light on our responsibilities to other, but whether we are moral 
agents at all. This latter perspective will be discussed in the final section o f this chapter; 
however, here I will say that moral agency seems less clear-cut when questions continue 
to arise in reference to when, if  and how values arise in the natural world. I will restrict 
my argument here to the suggestion that distinguishing facts from values with respect to 
the natural world may not be all that important after all.
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Recall that few people interviewed for this study were able to articulate much in
the way of direct duties to the natural world, either in whole or in part. However, many
people were quick to identify and recognize the duties that we owe to our fellow
humans—these being indirect duties to the natural world. It just so happens that how we
treat the environment, quite often affects other people, sometimes in negative ways. From
this perspective, it matters little which comes first in the natural world: facts or values.
Thus it would follow whatever I determine as being an environmentally ethical good or
right course of action, wQl ultimately be a byproduct o f my behaviors directed towards
other humans. Insofar as I act to protect and preserve nature in an effort to promote a
quality of life among members o f my own species, I am doing what I should be doing. Yet
this still seems to violate the naturalistic fallacy. In responding to charges o f committing
the naturalistic fallacy, noted moral development theorist, Lawrence Kohlberg (1971a)
offered this response,
The third form o f the ‘naturalistic fallacy which we are committing is that of 
asserting that any conception o f what moral judgment ought to be must rest on an 
adequate conception o f what it is. The feet that our conception o f the moral 
‘works’ empirically is important for its philosophic adequacy (p. 222).
Kohlberg’s contention is that the fallacy will inevitably be violated at some stage, but his
point is that we must begin our moral assumptions somewhere. Were Kohlberg an
ecocentric, environmental ethicist, I believe he would suggest that no environmental ethic
can begin without first understanding the nature o f the environment in all its magnificent
complexity. On the flip-side, if Kohlberg subscribed to a more anthropocentric,
environmental ethics, he might likewise continue to dismiss this aspect o f the naturalistic
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fallacy by claiming that identifying those indirect duties to nature is fundamental if we are 
to promote courses of action that are ethically good for our fellow humans.
O f course, the concern raised by the legion o f non-anthropocentric environmental 
ethicists remains. Anthropocentric ethical approaches offer little guidance in how to deal 
with environmental harms where there are no evident human interests. Additionally, these 
same ethical approaches fail to recognize the unfortunate byproduct of a purely utilitarian 
outlook. Traditional utilitarian ethics prescribe that actions should promote aggregate 
good or minimize aggregate bad across all members o f the moral community. Yet, one’s 
good may conflict with another’s bad—this is especially true in instances o f environmental 
conflict where ‘good’ and ‘bad’ inevitably expand their meanings beyond simple human 
evaluations. Similarly, Kant’s deontological ethics as expressed with his Categorical 
Imperative provides little guidance for resolving cases o f conflicting duties. More, there is 
the question whether something as obtuse as “nature” can indeed claim rights at all 
(Perhac Jr., 1999).
With the preceding discussion, the challenge o f the naturalistic fallacy, I propose 
that the naturalistic fallacy be dismissed as foundationally unimportant. This is not to say 
that it does not hold sway over other ethical debates, but understanding the fundamental 
nature o f things (in the most descriptive sense) is essential to mapping appropriate 
prescriptions. However, we are still left with how this applies to ‘The Other’ in the sense 
o f those non-humans to whom we may owe direct duties.
‘The Other’ remains a confusing notion. The tension between individually-based 
ethics and holistic ethics (as described in Chapter 2) introduced this confusion. And as we 
are left with no firm answers on ‘The Other,’ we end up questioning what, if any,
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responsibilities we might have with regards to this other. Ignoring the naturalistic fallacy
goes some way towards clearing the waters, as we need not be unnecessarily constrained
in our efforts to do the right thing by the suggestion that we’ve simply used ecology or
evolutionary biology to tell us what that right thing is in the normative sense. A number of
those interviewed did seem to ignore the naturalistic fallacy:
“That’s just the way nature works—the web. We’re supposed to make sure that 
we keep the web the way it should be.” (Ed)
‘T would say that evolution kind of tells us what’s good to do. I know that stuff is 
evolving all the time so we shouldn’t mess that up.” (Don)
“I think you’ve got to know about science and biology., uh ecology, because then 
you’ll know what’s okay to do and what’s not.” (Michael)
With these excerpts and others like them, it seems that many people subscribe to the idea 
that ‘The Other’ in some sense is non-human. In the instance of these three quotes, ‘The 
Other’ in feet seems to be a general composite of nature; yet it does not follow that this 
composite can be found on equal footing with other humans. From this follow two 
important points. First, that humans do indeed have some responsibilities to this non­
human other; however, just what those responsibilities are remain unclear. And what is 
more unclear is if those duties are direct towards nature or only indirect as they are meant 
to protect other humans from harm. Secondly, these responsibilities are knowable; they 
are not left unrevealed, nor are they confounded amid other ethical prescriptions. Despite 
the uncertainty of ethical prescription and direct/indirect duties, there exist some obvious 
choices.
As mentioned previously, a number o f people referenced some Divine plan as the 
authority which outlines our responsibilities to nature. However, this acquiescence to God
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need not weaken an environmental ethic. It is the factual knowledge o f ecology and 
evolution which ultimately gives strength to the ‘shoulds’ and ‘oughts’ o f the people 
mentioned above, not the belief that some higher power created this planet and all life 
upon it. In this respect, those responsibilities we have to ‘The Other’ speak to the theist 
and atheist alike.
From the discussion related to this theme, it does appear we have responsibilities 
to non-human human nature; however, it is less clear if these responsibilities are in the 
form o f direct duties to the natural world or if they’re simply indirect as how we treat 
nature inevitably affects how we treat other humans and ourselves. Ignoring the 
naturalistic fallacy seems the most prudential path we might take towards resolving some 
of the philosophical challenges of identifying these responsibilities to nature. And this 
ignoring is not without foundation. Bernard Williams (1985) makes a circumspect case 
for ignoring the naturalistic fallacy in all ethics as a matter of linguistics. That is, Williams 
feels the naturalistic fallacy is more a challenge to defining what is good than anything 
else. And in this respect ignoring the naturalistic fallacy allows us to use beauty, as 
something good and worthy of protection, as a description that encourages a 
prescription—or in other words we’ve derived an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.’ Therefore, we can 
at once use the necessary condition o f natural beauty as a reason for an environmental 
ethics and whether or not this reason violates the naturalistic fallacy is unimportant. But 
more valuable is the connection we now have to protecting ecological and evolutionary 
processes, because here too we need not worry about deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.’
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S3 A Discussion of Public Lands
It is difficult to offer an objective treatment o f any topic, when the topic itself is so 
thoroughly wrapped in meanings, assumptions, and perhaps even its own ethical 
directives. Public lands, specifically park lands, seem to be rich with meanings, good and 
bad and right and wrong. I’ve no doubt that at least some o f what I had originally hoped 
to study, was confounded by the nature o f publicly-held lands. A great deal has been 
written about public lands and from many different angles. My discussion here will 
concern public lands as an ethical object—a perspective that appears to have been largely 
ignored, notwithstanding the obvious treatment of Garrett Hardin's Tragedy o f the 
Commons. However, as will be shown, public lands represent a significant assumption o f 
environmental ethics.
Within the notion o f public lands lay a myriad o f value-laden concepts: ownership, 
gift, commodity, utility, and image. Environmental ethics weave throughout these 
concepts and others that describe public lands. A guiding question for this section might 
be, “How do public lands inform our responsibilities to others?" In order to focus this 
discussion a bit more, I’ll partition this section into various subsections that roughly 
parallel the subthemes recognized in the interviews.
5J.1  Intent o f Public Lands
Few people are privy to  the legislative history responsible for the creation of 
various public lands. With the exception o f small, municipally-owned resources, the 
original intent o f the creation o f  public land may be entirely hidden. As a result, ethical 
prescriptions may be created ex nihilo without any reference to the wishes and desires o f
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the people involved in setting aside the land in public trust. Or these ethical prescriptions
may simply be presumed from the ‘signs’ and practices o f managers who are themselves
products of that original legislative narrative. Heyd (2000) suggests that
“an ethic o f protecting the sustained use o f certain features o f the natural 
environment (commonly called ‘natural resources’) arises through social learning 
triggered by some availability crisis; the ethic, though is maintained only as long as 
communal control o f the territory is a given” (p. 419).
This observation is worth further review. Heyd offers up a perspective on the origin and
continuance of an environmental ethic. Without delving into the arena of moral realism,
Heyd could probably make a decent case for ethics as a natural outcome of scarcity. In
this respect, environmental ethics arise when it becomes clear that the continued existence
of some object, or perhaps, collection of objects, is threatened. Heyd goes on to suggest
that this ethic is perpetuated so long as those who created the ethic continue to dictate
how the resources are used. This latter point has direct bearing on how public lands factor
into this equation.
By definition, public lands have a somewhat nebulous concept o f control—as in 
who controls this land? Stated another way it is not obvious where the decisions on how 
to manage a specific area come from. The public? The resource managers? The 
government agency that ‘owns’ the land such as the USFS or the NPS? At the federal 
level, most Americans can identify that they, themselves, do ‘own’ or control the national 
parks or forests in the sense that they are citizens o f the country. Similarly state 
ownership speaks to a smaller constituency yet the same fuzzy notions o f ownership 
remain at the state level as well Cumberland Falls is a state park, controlled by the 
Commonwealth o f Kentucky. Yet Kentucky residents are not privileged above non-
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residents. Nor are non-Americans discriminated against when visiting National Parks. All
visitors, regardless o f where their home currently is, are entitled to the same degree o f
hospitality and concern. So, if everyone, to some extent, controls the resources at
Cumberland Falls and Yellowstone, then where does the ethic come from? Heyd (2000)
draws this conclusion,
In conditions o f open access to outsiders, the conservation ethic tends to M l apart, 
although it is restorable if  community control over the territory is reestablished (p. 
419).
So we seem to be left with an AWOL ethics, a normative commitment that is Absent 
Without Leave, and a scattered pattern of ownership/control This ethic might be 
considered AWOL because it was presumably implied to some extent during the creation 
o f some park, however, it has all but disappeared today. Clearly a rigorous environmental 
ethics need not depend on specified legislative intent, however, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, a number o f those interviewed did suggest that knowing why and under 
what circumstances an area was set aside is important in determining some prescribed 
behaviors). The question o f ‘ownership’ is but a minor point in discussing the ethics o f 
managing public land, but it bears on some other related questions. For instance, is public 
land a uniform thing, such that public land is public land is public land? Or do some types 
o f public land demand different types o f ethics? For instance, should the NPS follow a 
deontologically-based preservationist ethic while the USFS practices a consequential 
utilitarian ethics? Or, do ethics derived from a group claiming familiarity count more than 
ethics of everyone? This latter question, o f course, recalls earlier discussions in Chapter 2 
on the contrast between ethics o f  justice and care.
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In describing the work o f the pragmatist, John Dewey, Minteer makes this 
comment, “Dewey suggested that we need to construct the unique ‘good’ of each 
situation; a good that is to be ‘discovered, projected, and attained on the basis o f the exact 
defect and trouble to be rectified’” (Minteer, 2001 p. 68). The pragmatist project seems 
to get at the first o f the two questions offered at the end of the preceding paragraph. 
Pragmatists would respond that public land is not public land is not public land, because 
public land may vary in important respects depending on the agency that oversees it (state 
vs. federal) and how it is classified (park vs. forest vs. wildlife preserve). In other words, 
defining a problem as that which is found on public land may be too imprecise; a problem 
must be defined at a more specific scale. And I’d hazard to say that they would not 
concur that a park is a park is a park. To wit, Yellowstone is not Central Park is not 
Cumberland Falls. Each o f these parks contains a wealth o f information and meaning that 
inevitably discerns it from all others. Moreover, each park is unique in some sense as to 
the people who live nearby and their ethics may vary greatly (Berthold-Bond, 2000). 
Stated another way, there is reason to believe that meanings, values, and issues associated 
with any specific park are not shared by people who live near other parks. In the end, 
environmental ethics, as directed towards parkland, may resist any uniform, monistic 
treatment. From this it appears that the intent (original meaning) o f any particular park is 
at least unique in the sense that the collection of circumstances that combined to bring a 
specific park into existence may be irreproducible. And if this is true, then it may be too 
ambitious to hope for any single unifying environmental ethical theory that can apply to 
each and every example o f public land.
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5.3.2 Purpose of Public Lands
The purpose of public lands is to be distinguished from the intent o f public lands 
through the shifting of verb tenses. Where ‘intent’ recalls the objectives and motives o f 
those instrumental people in the past, ‘purpose’ reflects the here and now. ‘Intent’ 
describes what was the case, ‘purpose’ describes what is the case. This distinction is 
necessary because more than one person interviewed suggested that intents and purposes 
may very well change over time. The ideas o f land as property shifted from the time of 
John Locke to the ideas espoused by Thomas Jefferson (Browers, 1999). Restricting the 
focus of public land to just parks, simplifies this analysis, but only somewhat. Eloquently 
stated by noted landscape architect, Albert Rutledge, (1971), “parks are for people.”
Parks may well be for people, but just how we make use o f them can change over time.
Eric Katz (2000) comments that “modernity can only appreciate the lion in two 
ways—through science or hunting. But we need something more—something mystical, 
ritualistic, or sacred” (p. 106). Can we interpret park land in the same way suggesting that 
we only appreciate it through science and recreation? I’d suggest that in many instances 
small scale park lands were intended to satisfy recreational desires; more recently though, 
small scale park lands have become valuable for scientific utility: havens for song birds, 
controls of water quality, plots for measuring the spread o f exotic vegetation. If  the 
current purposes are changing in this way, then might it be possible that future changes are 
on the horizon? Katz’ encouragement towards a mystical and sacred relationship with the 
lion may be possible for park land as well. And while the sacredness o f the lion echoes 
cultures long gone, the sacredness o f small parks seems to echo the words ofThoreau and 
Emerson. Yet, not only will these public parks shrink the distance between culture and
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nature, but they may also fulfill a purpose suggested by Hannah Arendt (1958) as a means 
to examine one’s place in a community. In this respect, an environmental ethic that grows 
from a public park no longer is AWOL, but it returns home again to encourage those 
living near the park to understand the park as a foundational member o f a community— 
community, here, is expanded to the meaning described by Leopold.
53 3  Gift or Commodity
In a book-length treatment o f gifts, Lewis Hyde (1983) discusses the differences in
obligations between receiving a gift and purchasing a commodity. Jim Lichatowich (1999)
brings this contrasting o f gifts and commodities closer to my research when he discusses
the public nature o f wildlife, specifically salmon. Parks, as a form o f public land, may be
best considered as gifts. And just as we have responsibilities to those gifts we receive
from friends, so we too must worry about the public lands we are gifted. A few people, in
this study commented on how parks are a form of gift; recall Beatrice’s comment,
“I really like the idea that it’s a park now, because that means that we’ll have 
something to give to our children and they can give it to their children and on 
down the line. It’s just like a gift that we keep passing on to future generations.”
And Ed, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service employee, suggested that giving land to the
public was something to be grateful and thankful for.
Distinguishing between gifts and commodities is an illuminating way to consider
the different obligations that people feel they owe to other people with regards to public
land. Hyde (1983) notes that
Gifts are a class o f  property whose value lies only in their use and which literally 
cease to exist as gifts if they are not constantly consumed. When gifts are sold, 
they change their nature as much as water changes when it freezes, and no
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rationalist telling o f the constant elemental structure can replace the feeling that it 
is lost (p. 21).
This suggests that if the original transfer o f land was meant as a gift, it can cease to be a
gift at the point when those who accept the gift laude over its commodious value and
worship its real estate more than enjoying the land through using it. Obviously the type
and degree of use must in some sense be tempered with the goal o f maintaining the land;
however, use need not be considered coincident with traditional notions of consumption in
the sense that using a bushel o f com naturally results in the steady depletion of the gift.
Using park land can not only be sustainable, but may even result in a net increase of the
gift if more land is added to the original stock through public pressure to increase park
lands; or if more people make use of the land than originally intended, so the gift grows
again. This reading o f use or consumption is important, because as Hyde noted elsewhere
that, “gifts are always used, consumed, or eaten... when the gift is used, it is not used up.
Quite the opposite, in feet: the gift that is not used will be lost, while the one that is passed
along remains abundant” (p. 21).
The practice o f gift giving has a long tradition, fer longer than the practice of
commodity exchange in market economies. The death of a gift is when it becomes an
object of property, with value artificially assigned through a constructed system of
accounting. Jim Lichatowich (1999) believes that the true nature o f gifts has been lost,
Nowadays we thmk o f gift as a commodity: once it is given, the receiver takes 
possession o f and it becomes his or her property. But in ancient economies, a gift 
was not a possession; in feet, it couldn’t be owned. Rather, it had to be passed on. 
The very act o f accepting a gift meant that the receiver also accepted an obligation 
to return it in kind to the giver (p. 34).
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I f  Lichatowich is correct and we no longer appreciate gifts in the way that we should, 
what implications does this have on our obligations to keep and protect public lands? 
Indeed might this shift to parks as commodities be illustrated through the privatization of 
parks through concessionaires and user fees?
Public lands represent a type of gift that is in eternal exchange, so long as one new 
person can make use o f the land, then the gift has been passed on again. Where the 
situation becomes cloudy is when we attempt to determine just who is doing the giving. 
And if we cannot determine precisely who is doing the giving, we fell victim to believing 
that public lands are really no one's responsibility. The gift economies traditionally moved 
in a circle. Lewis Hyde maps an amazing circuit o f Polynesian island kingdoms where 
gifts passed from one island nation to another taking as many as ten years to complete the 
circuit. In this conception o f gift exchange, the giver o f a gift necessarily must receive a 
gift in kind, if not immediately then within a year or so o f the first gift. However, how 
does this idea translate to our notion of public lands as gifts among many people?
This issue o f groups giving and receiving gifts does not appear to be that great a 
problem. Hyde (1983) notes that, “while gifts are marked by motion and momentum at 
the level of the individual, gift exchange at the level o f the group offers equilibrium and 
coherence, a kind o f anarchist stability” (pp. 74-75). Yet, it seems we are still left with 
two challenges: 1) identifying the giver; and 2) identifying the reciprocal transfer, as must 
occur with all gift exchanges. I’ll tackle this second challenge first.
Gifts should never be given in order that someone becomes indebted to another— 
this is not the nature o f a gift. However, each gift demands a return gift in kind. So if one 
group of people, decides to give their children and other future generations the gift of
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public land, how are they to be repaid? Hyde comments on the reciprocal gifts given to
scientists and scholars who have given to some community their intellectual gifts through
publishing in appropriate journals. These scientists and scholars receive no financial
remuneration, yet they do receive recognition and status. This recognition and status is
believed to be sufficiently reciprocal to maintain the persistent flow of the gift exchange.
We might use this same concept in identifying the reciprocal transfer o f public land from
one generation to the next. We have recognized the "gifts’ o f John Muir by naming some
public lands after him: John Muir Woods. We are grateful to President Teddy Roosevelt,
and have so named public lands for him. We also continue to pay respect to these and
other public-land gift givers by recognizing their achievements through our continued
study of their efforts. These examples are easy to find, as the original gift givers are easily
distinguished. But how do we recognize and give status to all the intervening generations
who keep the public land in trust? How will we be recognized by our children and
grandchildren for keeping public lands available for them? It is easy to remark on the
efforts behind the original transfer, but o f what value is our passive stewardship?
My answers to these questions and the first challenge listed above (identifying the
giver), require another turn. I don’t see any way that we can recognize the transfer of
public lands from a previous generation to our own in the sense that reciprocal giving is a
hard practice to fulfill. A remedy may be found in Hyde’s work again where he notes that
the ties of gift exchange gain strength and power when they are expanded beyond a two
person/group equation.
Reciprocal giving is a form o f gift exchange, but it is the simplest. The gift moves 
in a circle, and two people do not make much o f a circle. Two points establish a 
line, but a circle lies in a  plane and needs at least three points... When a gift moves
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in a circle its motion is beyond the control o f the personal ego, and so each bearer 
must be a part of the group and each donation is an act of social faith (Hyde, 1983
p. 16).
In this way, our generation need not search for ways to honor and recognize the
generation immediately preceding us. The public lands they entrusted to us were given as
an act o f social faith that we gladly accepted without any need to reciprocate in kind. Our
gift will be, and must be, the steadfast care o f the public land in such a way that it can
continue to be used and enjoyed by future generations.
There is great promise in public lands from the perspective o f honoring obligations
to past, present and future generations and how each o f these generations in essence owns
the lands. In discussing the way that public lands are indeed owned, Nassauer (1997)
comments thusly as follows,
People take care of what they own. Land ownership can mean holding title to 
land. It can also have a broader meaning that extends to the land over which we 
feel a sense of ownership: our street, our neighborhood, our park, our school, our 
town (p. 69).
This broader type of ownership is qualitatively different than the ownership one assumes 
through a market purchase. This type o f ownership embraces generations, rather than 
partitioning people into owners and non-owners. Nassauer goes on to suggest that 
publicly-owned land advances an ethical permanence that is difficult to apply towards 
more fragmented areas o f privately-held land. Public land, parks in particular, resist 
changes (though they are not entirely immune) to how they are perceived; parks have a 
longevity and this longevity may reflect real economic values. John Crompton’s (2001) 
study of property values near park land attests to this, but his is a controversial path to 
follow for it again leads us towards viewing parks as commodities.
252
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The dark side o f the gift is when someone presumes ownership as in a birthright. 
It’s been noted that some people “assume the parks to be their rightful inheritance” 
(Nassauer, 1997 p. 69). In this view, the park is less a gift than a commodity o f financial 
value. When the gift o f a park is coupled with property values and inheritance vocabulary, 
the park drifts from whatever noble intentions gave birth to h. But the tendency to see 
parks as market goods is not the only trapping. Even when we view parks as true gifts 
passed on from previous generations, we are not similarly deeded a clarity o f options for 
appropriate treatment or expectations for the park. Witness the effect o f the current 
exploration of user foes for various public lands. At the crux o f considering public lands 
as gifts is the idea that with gift ownership comes responsibility and once responsibility is 
assumed then it becomes a bit clearer that public land is indeed a feature o f some natural 
areas that informs environmental ethics.
5.3.4 Responsibilities o f Public Ownership
Similar to the discussion of Beauty in Nature, this discussion o f Public Lands 
also raises fundamental questions about our Responsibilities to ‘The Other*. Since, it is 
not always clear what responsibilities we have with regards to our parks, we find ourselves 
in this dialogue—trying to discover and determine an environmental ethic. In fact, this is 
the ambiguity o f much environmental ethics in a nutshell. Is it indeed my responsibility to 
pick up other people’s trash? Do I have any direct obligations to the birds and the trees 
that five in this park? How much is too much when I devote my time to taking care o f a 
public resource, and why do I seem to be the only one who cares? These questions and
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others came out in some o f the narratives. Consider the words o f Julie, Sylvia, and 
Thomas.
“I don’t think it’s my job to pick up after other people... that’s what the park 
rangers are for.” (Julie)
“I might do some o f those things [helping to clean up the park], but I wouldn’t do 
them all the time, because it’s just... there’s just more important things to do.” 
(Sylvia)
“For me, [taking care o f park land] is really not a priority, you know. I like going 
to parks and everything, but I’ve got bigger things on my plate than if some little 
forest burns up or gets cut down. My ethics don’t really include anything with the 
environment...” (Thomas)
Responsibilities o f public ownership are ill-defined. Given the uncertain definition 
o f what public ownership means, it is not surprising that the responsibilities we have to 
these gifts o f public land are similarly unclear. It is neither intuitive, nor culturally 
prescribed what each of us should be doing with regards to keeping our public lands in 
fine stupe. More, it may not always be apparent why we should keep the lands in fine 
shape to begin with. Aside from pleasing environments in which to recreate and the 
treacherous fiscal justifications o f property values, some people have argued that public 
lands help to fulfill our own social identity (Arendt, 19S8; Nassauer, 1997). Combining 
these reasons and doubtless others, the ultimate hope o f parks as objects of moral concern 
will be a return to the feeling that parks were a great gift, one that was unexpected and 
perhaps, even undeserved. Long-time National Park Service park ranger, Tom Milligan, 
stated, “Parks are going to have to become a privilege, not something you just take for 
granted” (Wren, 1972 p. 161). If  nothing else, a privilege is characteristic of a true gift.
254
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
This discussions on the intent and purpose o f public lands sheds new tight on 
another view of public land as a thing which truly can be given and received in the same 
way that more tangible gifts can. Yet as Sharon noted in her interview, accepting a gift 
demands responsibility and she felt that few people recognized that. However, it is not 
clear that public lands should be considered gifts in the sense of being a privilege as much 
as public lands should be an a priori birthright. Gift or commodity, privilege or birthright, 
our obligations towards any object may well vary. Both gifts and commodities can be said 
to be valuable, yet when value is assigned to commodities it tends to evoke a 
methodological, cost-benefit approach to determining good and bad actions. Ultimately 
this path leads to some formulation of utilitarian calculus, invoking compensatory rules for 
decision making in much the same way that one would compare different makes/models of 
cars when considering a consumer purchase. However, a different sort o f value emerges 
when public lands are considered as gifts. The values we assign to gifts seem to surround 
a greater moral commitment. It is more grievous to ill-use a gift than a commodity 
because commodities, by their nature are open to renewal, repurchase, and reacquisition. 
Gifts, on the other hand, while they may be used (but not necessarily used up), assume 
values beyond traditional market factors. Gifts might be said to embody protected values. 
These protected values are those values which resist trade-ofls (as would be allowed in 
compensatory rules for decision-making) and are often valued above and beyond any 
market-based determinations (Baron & Spranca, 1997). Thus, the protected values which 
we assign to gifts encourage a greater degree o f moral commitment on our part. The 
challenge, then, is to promote a view of public land rightly as a gift rather than a birthright 
or some assumed feature o f living in a democracy.
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In responding to the guiding question o f this section (How do public lands inform 
our responsibilities to others?), we can answer this in two ways. First, public lands inform 
our obligations to past, present, and future generations to the extent that public lands 
embody values and goods that seem to transcend across time. The values identified in the 
1872 legislation responsible for the creation of Yellowstone National Park continue to 
resonate with us today. Here we can see how beauty in nature might help us. Beauty 
does not appear to be some fickle judgment that we freely change and redefine.
Hargrove’s (1989) perspective o f natural beauty as that which approaches universal appeal 
seems more likely. As a result, we honor our obligations to past, present and future 
generations by setting aside areas in the public domain that many, if not most, people 
would agree are beautiful
The second response to our guiding question might take us back to an earlier 
question. How does this aspect o f public land factor into the necessary and sufficient 
conditions needed to frame an environmental ethics? Public land, I submit, is another 
necessary but not sufficient condition. Although the ‘ownership’ o f the resource is a 
considerable force in how we evaluate vast stretches of wildlands, it should not rightly be 
the ultimate variable determining how we construct an environmental ethics. Setting up 
different ethics depending on different types o f ownership may give the appearance of 
degrading the value o f an environmental ethic in the first place. Because in this 
conception, any environmental ethic would simply follow from, rather than precede, the 
transient landowners’ wishes. However, I think this misrepresents the issue. An 
environmental ethics is not simply doing what the landowner wants, rather landowners 
contribute to the overall production o f an ethics. It is possible to have an environmental
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ethics spanning NPS lands and USFS lands despite their differing views on resource 
management. Similarly, it is possible to have an environmental ethics governing private 
land too. Of course the force o f private property rights is itself considerable. Yet, I 
believe that the hope in developing an environmental ethics across all types o f land 
ownership rests in promoting moral agency in people who may have never considered 
themselves morally responsible with regards to the environment.
5.4 A Discussion On Becoming a Moral Agent
Identifying the boundaries o f the moral proved to be one of the most difficult 
aspects of my data analysis and it continues to be a troubling topic in the literature and my 
own thinking. Therefore I will find myself concluding that much more work needs to be 
done in the field o f environmental ethics with regards to moral agency. This section will 
illustrate this through a discussion of the various criteria required for moral agency and 
morality.
Firstly, it is unclear what constitutes the moral in environmental ethics contexts.
Put simply, how do we know if some environmental issue is indeed a moral issue? In a 
discussion of ethics in general, Tom Beauchamp (1991) discusses four features or “marks 
o f the moral” They are:
1. A judgment, principle, or ideal is moral only if a person (or alternatively a 
society) accepts it as a supremely authoritative or overriding guide to action.
2. Moral statements are distinguished from others by their prescriptive form; that 
is, they are action-guiding imperatives that do not describe states o f affairs.
3. Moral statements are statements that should apply in a similar way to all people 
situated in relatively similar circumstance; that is, moral statements must be 
universalizable.
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4. It is necessary for a moral action-guide to have some direct reference to human 
flourishing, to consider the welfare o f others, or at least to be concerned with 
harm and benefit to other persons.
Of course Beauchamp’s description of ethics fails to include many o f the instances o f
environmental ethics in reference to two o f his points. Point number one refers to ethics
as that which is supremely authoritative or overriding. Williams (1985) employed similar
language And it has been noted that “everyone who uses the word ‘moral’ in a way that
expects others to listen and to take notice ought to be able to agree that what is being
talked about is something of social importance, potentially interesting to large numbers o f
people over long periods o f time” (Burtness, 1999 p. 22). However, many instances of
environmental ethics proposed in this study failed to achieve this level o f reverence or
‘supremely authoritative’ guidance. Secondly, Beauchamp’s point number four considers
the moral community as consisting of only humans. Thus, non-human harms or benefits
are only considered if there is a coincident human harm or benefit. O f course Peter
Singer’s (1993) general moral principle is that o f “equal consideration of interests”
whereby the welfare o f all those with interests (coincident with sentience) must be
considered.
Despite all the work being done in environmental ethics today and all that has been 
done over the past three decades, the ‘ethical’ realm remains ill-defined. Perhaps, the 
problem rests in an observation made between the urban and the wild, “We live in one 
world (the built) and we worship the other” (King, 2000 p. 115). In King’s view, the 
perception held by many of us that we live beyond nature sets up the environment as this 
‘other-worldly’ thing. However, we do live in social situations and therefore we are able 
to easily discuss (if not always agree) on our social obligations. Yet, the perceived
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distance between humans and the environment perhaps makes it more difficult to consider 
any direct relationship that would demand moral agency. As a result of this difficulty, it is 
no wonder there is disagreement on whether or not some actions are moral
That much disagreement exists on when some behaviors are moral seems to reflect 
the subjectivity of our own individual ethical boundaries, particularly when we are 
challenged to welcome non-humans into the moral community. In a recent article in 
Environmental Ethics, one writer commented that “Western civilization has given me the 
luxury o f being an environmentalist. I am insulated against nature and this insulation gives 
me the luxury of no longer needing to see nature as a threat” (Schmidtz, 2000). Hargrove 
(2000) drew a similar conclusion when he noted that those with generally high standards 
of living continue to be the ones who are more likely to express concern for the 
environment. Yet, there is not universal agreement on the necessary and sufficient 
conditions required when caring for the environment. Similarly, there remains an 
elusiveness in defining those things that make up the category of environmental ethics.
So, we are still left with a large question mark in our search for some thing that can be 
discretely defined as environmental ethics. The larger question, o f what makes someone a 
moral agent requires an answer before we can consider if someone should or should not be 
an ethical agent with regards to the environment. To this end, Til begin with a discussion 
of what defines a moral situation.
In Chapter 2 1 offered some defining features o f morality. Further, distinctions 
were drawn between ethics, convention, and etiquette. These simple descriptions were 
sufficient at that point. However, with the discovery o f the fourth theme, On Becoming a 
Moral Agent, a fuller treatment o f the general topic o f morality is needed. Clearly the
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narratives raised issues o f identifying, defining, and distinguishing ethical aspects o f 
environmental issues. In an effort to document some additional features that contribute to 
environmental ethics, 1 will offer a more thorough treatment of ethics in general In his 
book, simply titled Ethics, William Frankena (1973) sketches a conception o f various 
normative judgments where some are moral and some are non-moral. Figure 4 illustrates 
his conception.
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Figure 4: Schematic o f the moral and the non-moral normative judgments (Adapted from 
Frankena 1973)
In Frankena’s view, there are boundaries which separate the moral realm from the 
non-moral realm. Within each of these realms we are called upon to make different types 
o f judgments; these may be judgments o f obligation or judgments of value. And within 
each o f these types of judgments are examples o f the particular and the general. I’ll offer 
a few examples to illustrate how some o f these things are distinguished. Frankena 
suggests that the statement, “We ought to keep our agreements” is an example o f a 
general judgment o f obligation in the moral realm. The statement, “That is a nice shirt” is 
an example of a particular judgment o f value in the non-moral realm. The statement,
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“Sheila is a caring person” is an example o f a particular judgment o f value in the moral 
realm. And, the statement, “John should read the latest Harry Potter book” is an example 
o f a particular judgment o f obligation in the non-moral realm.
Frankena makes it clear that “morality must be distinguished from prudence” (p.
7). In this conception, prudence may be an important consideration in non-moral 
judgments, but it should not enter into those judgments deemed moral. The assumption 
behind this perspective is that “there are moral issues and non-moral issues, and that moral 
issues ought to be thought about and handled in a different way from non-moral issues.” 
And further, that if something is a moral issue, “it has to do with what is right and what is 
wrong, and this determination overrides all other considerations” (Burtness, 1999 p. 31). 
This is not to suggest that the realm o f the non-moral is represented by judgments lacking 
importance; it simply means that “building a case for a moral judgment involves a quite 
different set of presuppositions and procedures from those employed when making a case 
for a non-moral judgment” (Burtness, 1999 p. 31).
Approaching ethics in this way where the moral is distinctly separate from the non- 
moral and obligations and values are equally distinct allows for a convenient partitioning 
o f various statements that people might make. However, real life rarely provides such 
discrete categories and this is especially true in the case o f ethics. Burtness (1999) offers a 
nice critique o f Frankena's organizational representation o f morality. Burtness notes that, 
“in the real world, what Frankena calls non-moral obligations and values invade what he 
calls moral obligations and values” (p. 33). Thus, Frankena’s non-moral categorizations 
may find themselves creeping inexorably towards the moral. The further the ‘clear’
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distinction between the moral and the non-moral is examined, the more problematic it 
becomes.
Frankena is an advocate of deontological ethics, or ethics of duty. He draws sharp 
boundaries around the moral and the non-moral. Burtness is a follower of teleological 
ethics, or goal-driven ethics, specifically utilitarianism. Burtness’ utilitarianism recognizes 
the infused nature o f ethics into many different aspects o f life. To recall one of Frankena’s 
non-moral statements, “That is a nice shirt,” Burtness might argue that this simple 
statement may have many moral dimensions to it. Was the shirt produced in a sweatshop 
using child labor? Does purchasing this shirt enjoin one to an elite club? Are there hurtful 
or offensive words printed on the shirt? Where Frankena would view ethics as 
conveniently partitioned off from many aspects o f everyday life, Burtness would view 
ethics as weaving throughout and coming into contact with just about every aspect o f our 
lives. What bearing this has on this research returns again to the distinction between 
justice and care and obligatory and supererogatory.
Ethics of justice are essentially a deontological ethics of duty, while ethics of care 
are teleological ethics where some consequence is o f concern. But recall from Chapter 2 
that care ethics and justice ethics are both obligatory. Obligatory ethics represent the 
moral minimum—generally, those ‘Do Nots’ that each and every one of us must follow: 
Do not steal, do not harm the innocent, etc. Supererogatory ethics are those ethics we 
perform above and beyond the minimum. Generally worded in the positive, we should be 
charitable, we should be courageous, etc. In making his case for morality, Frankena aligns 
himself with moral minimums. The approach favored by Burtness is more of a blending of 
obligatory and supererogatory, and the term he employs is “degrees of moral density.”
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For Burtness, the “degrees of moral density” allows people to differentiate between those
things o f great moral import and those things o f little moral import, yet all things carry
with them some moral dimension.
While I find promise in Burtness’ idea, I’m left with the feeling that little moral
import might just as well mean ‘no moral import’ in many cases. This is particularly true
in the sense of some responses in this study, such as when John suggested that rudeness is
outside the ethical realm,
“It doesn’t take a lot to do the right thing, you know you usually know what 
you’re supposed to do most o f the time. Sometimes when I see someone litter, I 
get upset and think that that person is just rude, but I wouldn’t call that person 
unethical.” (John)
In reference to the littering example John was responding to, Burtness would suggest that 
this is a  moral issue and perhaps one with something more than the minimum degrees of 
moral density. However, in practice, John does not seem to feel littering meets the 
standard o f morality that Burtness might use.
Other people expressed similar reservations in identifying a scenario as moral.
“Is this environmental ethics? I thought that was just like no hunting and fishing. I 
don’t think making parks or keeping parks clean is the same as environmental 
ethics unless some animals might get kilted.” (Laurie)
Laurie’s comment illustrates that in her mind environmental ethics was a very specific set
of things tied just to hunting and fishing. Therefore, issues o f environmental concern not
tied to hunting and fishing seem to be outside the realm o f environmental ethics. So we
are left with the question, how are we to describe these ‘not quite moral’ situations? As I
stated earlier, I see some promise in Burtness’ concept o f degrees o f moral density.
However, I tend to believe that, in practice at least, situations involving minimal degrees
263
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of moral density are essentially non-moral for many people. What is needed is a type of 
threshold above which only those instances of morality will pass. Rather than a threshold, 
I’ll suggest the notion of a moral filter which allows the moral situations through, but the 
non-moral remain on the outside.
5.4.1 The Moral Filter
Earlier, when discussing the difference between the moral and the non-moral, I 
offered a contrast between Frankena’s deontological ethics and Burtness’ teleological 
ethics. And while Burtness’ view of ‘degrees of moral density’ seems more reasonable, I 
suspect that those instances with minimum degrees o f moral density can be considered, in 
effect, non-moral in the sense that many people simply foil to recognize or identify with 
the tenuous moral connections in the first place. However, simply recognizing that ethics 
effuse throughout everyday life does little to explain why so many people in this study had 
difficulty expressing ethical views or directives in different situations. On the one hand I 
might suggest that my own conceptions o f environmental ethics were not categorically 
environmental ethics to several o f the people interviewed as witnessed by the quotes in 
section 4.4.4 This Is Not a Question o f Morals. On the other hand, perhaps environmental 
ethics language is vague and poorly understood in general. In this sense, the cues towards 
various ethical perspectives or orientations may not transpose themselves into 
environmental discourse where the object of moral concern is non-human. To illustrate 
this, talking about care with respect to a family member or a close friend is essentially 
effortless, familiar, and full o f  meaning. However, these same expressions seem to ring 
hollow for most people when they are applied to nature or some specific place, not
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necessarily because they don’t have value, but because they are rarely discussed in such
terms. In other words, it is a qualitatively different phenomenon to discuss care for fellow
humans as it is to discuss care for collective non-humans such as parks or forests or
ecosystems. King (1991) suggests as much in his challenge to care ethic ists to transpose
human-human care language into the nature-human discourse.
Yet the suggestion that human-human ethical approaches are wholly inadequate to
address nature-human relations goes too for. While difficulties may exist in how we
traditionally apply human-human ethics to the non-human, we may simply need to
reconceive of ways in which our nature-based language reflects ethical obligations.
Although it was difficult to identify unequivocally ethics of justice and care and direct
obligatory ethics and nature-directed supererogatory ethics, it is not necessarily the case
that people do not possess these ethics. At this point, I am simply willing to accept the
possibility that Kohlbergian and Gilligan-like approaches to interpreting ethical responses
may be insufficient to apply towards environmental ethics situations. And to quote Native
American author, N. Scott Momaday,
It seems to me that in a sense we are all made of words; that our most essential 
being consists in language. It is the element in which we think and dream and act, 
in which we live our daily lives. There is no way in which we can exist apart from 
the morality of a verbal dimension (1983 p. 44).
Following Momaday’s observation, the language needed for environmental ethics is ‘out
there’ somewhere, it just remains to be identified, understood and commonly used.
Likewise, we might turn to the words ofNineteenth century English poet Emily Dickinson
(1961) as encouragement in allowing continuing discourse to bring about a real
environmental ethics.
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A word is dead 
When it is said,
Some say.
I say it just 
Begins to live 
That day.
There is not a widely understood language o f environmental ethics. Words and phrases 
that environmental philosophers entice us to embrace, such as animal rights, caring about 
nature and, direct obligations to the non-human world, have yet to resonate with the 
masses. Yet, “words can take on new meanings and open up whole new lines of thoughts 
once they are spoken and set free in the public domain” (Bronson, 2001 p. 36)
“If environmental ethics is to become effective, it must center on the ideas that 
actually determine how people choose to live” (Gare, 1998 p. 20). This statement seems 
to strike at the heart of the problems I encountered in trying to force a discussion of 
environmental ethics where one may not have been appropriate. The welfare of ‘nature' 
was not linguistically or cognitively accessible to most o f the people interviewed. It was 
not something that they had thought about in great detail, nor was it something that they 
had experience in articulating. Finally, it was not considered something of great and 
lasting importance like any ethical determination should be. In this respect, I contend that 
there exists a moral filter with regards to environmental ethics. This filter is such that it 
only allows through those instances or cases where there are issues o f unquestioned moral 
import. And for the most part, many things that philosophers, academicians and 
researchers would consider to be environmental ethics fail to pass through the filter of
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many people who do not confront themselves with issues o f environmental concern on a 
regular basis. This disconnect seems to leave us floating free, without a tether to anchor 
the environmental ethics o f the ivory tower to those outside the tower. Clearly this is 
unsatisfying, for it seems that the ability to recognize issues o f unquestioned moral import 
reside in but a handful of people—Philosopher Kings, if you will. I’ll suggest though that 
our hope for a widespread environmental ethics is not so distant a goal after all. Yet, to 
reach this goal all of us must become more informed about ecology, ethics in general, and 
our role as citizens in a community.
5.4.2 Adjusting the Filter
The moral filter for most people seems to be calibrated to issues of catastrophic 
importance or to issues of ultimately great human concern. The challenge then might be 
to recalibrate the moral filter such that more environmental issues are perceived as 
situations worthy of purposeful ethical reflection. King (2000) suggests that “an 
environmentally responsible culture should be one in which citizens take responsibility for 
the domesticated environments in which they live, as well as for their effects on wild 
nature” (p. 115). An answer to this calibration is to return to the legacy o f David Hume 
and other ethicists who valued sentiment and feeling.
In describing a Humean approach ethics, Welchman (1999) notes that “internalists, 
such as David Hume, have held that theoretical justifications will not motivate an agent to 
act independent o f interests, wants, or needs internal to the agents character whose 
satisfaction depends upon realizing the objectives o f a given theory” (p. 412). Too often 
environmental ethics are presented, at best, as outside the moral realm and, at worst, as
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contrary to other ethical considerations. Adjusting the moral filter will necessarily result in 
more things competing for one’s cognitive energies. Further, the more ethical 
prescriptions and proscriptions we must follow, the greater the challenge will be to our 
personal autonomy. However, these additional, new, environmental ethics need not be 
overwhelming nor obscenely burdensome.
One key to successfully adjusting the moral filter might be to show how sentiments 
towards other people and sentiments towards nature or aspects o f nature can be piggy­
backed upon one another. Thus, sentiment toward some other is the shared objective. In 
this way, we would hope to encourage others to identify themselves as members o f a 
community. This membership acknowledges relationship in the sense o f that which is 
paramount to ethics of care. Just as care ethics have offered promise in social ethics, 
likewise care ethics may gamer support for environmental ethics where talk o f rights and 
justice seems to miss the mark.
The second key is to work towards identifying a sufficient range o f options for 
people to choose from when considering environmental ethics dilemmas. This range of 
options is one critical aspect o f preserving autonomy (Raz, 1986). Differences in how 
language is used to express these different sentiments may still remain, but the root 
concern is that minimum level o f sentiment that results in its passage through the filter.
Welchman (1999) is concerned that simple sentiment is an insufficient foundation 
upon which to build an environmental ethics. She notes that “one cannot similarly hope to 
discover human dispositions that can be expected absolutely and universally to motivate 
humans to act to preserve nature” (p. 412). Yet, her declaration seems overstated. If 
ethics are one of many social institutions that “are necessary for the survival and
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flourishing o f human life and for the preservation o f global ecosystems that sustain that 
life” (Burtness, 1999 p. 18), then there is no reason why naturally occurring dispositions 
towards nature might not arise. The challenge seems to be in finding those all important 
connections that all people can identify with and develop feelings towards. It has been 
suggested by many that modem life has simply obscured these natural connections and the 
din o f culture has simply drowned out nature’s harmony (Abram, 1996; King, 2000). Don 
Ihde (1983) notes as much when he wrote, ‘‘nature is at best a background, often 
spectacular but not itself a force to be reckoned with” (p. 22). So our challenge is to bring 
nature to the foreground.
One approach to finding these connections was discussed by noted environmental 
philosophers, Jim Cheney and Anthony Weston. Cheney and Weston (1999) suggest that 
there has been confusion concerning what comes first: knowledge of ‘the other’ or an 
ethical approach to ‘the other.’ Cheney and Weston believe that we should first recognize 
an ethical relationship to other things before we attempt to understand them (in some 
scientific sense). This perspective is contra Rolston (1997), who suggests that, “We 
cannot correctly value what we do not to some degree correctly know” (p. 40). Cheney’s 
and Weston’s suggestion has two widespread applications. First, by approaching ‘the 
other’ ethically before approaching them some other way, we allow ourselves to embrace 
the natural sentiment that we may have lost sight o f through our modem empirical lens. 
Yet, perhaps, it is more than just appreciating an object o f aesthetic sensibility. Some have 
argued that valuing nature at the outset, sets the stage for the identification of the 
environment as part o f our system of basic human rights (Collins-Chobanian, 2000), where 
a healthy environment is a prerequisite for all other human rights. In this way, valuing
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nature whether instrumentaUy or intrinsically demands some moral commitment. As a 
result the moral filter is less restrictive in what it lets pass through.
So in helping to define and establish moral agency we are left with two tasks. The 
first task is to adjust the moral filter. Too often people feel that various environmental 
issues lack a moral component. Promoting a fuller and more comprehensive 
understanding of ecology and evolution is one step towards identifying the moral 
component in environmental issues. Because, if the scope and complexity of ecology and 
evolution are acknowledged then a stronger case can be made for protecting the 
environment. And as was discussed with regards to the theme Beauty in Nature, ecology 
and evolution are fundamental components o f our aesthetic appreciation. The second task 
involves determining what language is appropriate for an environmental ethics. If the 
language documented as belonging to justice and care in social ethics is insufficient, then 
what language can be used? It does not appear that discussing environmental issues in 
those terms associated with our social ethics does much to advance an environmental 
ethics. If this is true, then any attempt at establishing moral agency must figuratively and 
literally speak to the ways people feel comfortable expressing their commitments to the 
natural world.
5.5 Mapping the Themes onto Environmental Ethics
Back in Chapter 2, the Literature Review, an overview o f traditional environmental 
ethics positions was offered. Among those traditional positions were things such as 
animal rights, holistic environmental ethics, deep ecology, and environmental pragmatism. 
The review in this chapter was presented in order that the data derived from the interviews
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might be contextualized. The original intent o f the research was to explore specific 
aspects o f some o f the standard views o f environmental ethics. For instance, one goal was 
to determine the extent that principles o f justice and principles o f care emerged with 
regards to more and lesser known natural areas. Viewed this way, it is not clear how the 
four primary themes contribute to the knowledge we currently have about standard 
environmental ethics positions. The purpose of this section is to map out those 
relationships between the four themes and the standard environmental ethics positions.
From the previous treatment given to standard environmental ethics, it appears that 
three different variables compete with each other and within themselves in varying 
degrees. One variable that describes environmental ethics is the tension between a fully 
anthropocentric ethic and some non-anthropocentric ethic. This tension unfolds in the 
standard positions with environmental pragmatism embracing anthropocentrism as the 
only approach that is understandable to humans, for the non-anthropocentrists, the Deep 
Ecologists appear to be the self-appointed guardians against our perfect hubris. A second 
variable concerns the focus on individual life versus a focus on groups, systems, or 
collections. Peter Singer’s utilitarian brand o f animal liberation urges us to consider the 
good and bad as it affects each and every individual. Rolston’s systemic value, Callicott’s 
Darwinian-based ethics, or Leopold’ Land Ethic, all o f these purposefully shift our focus 
from individuals to collections. Finally, there exists a tension between the obligatory and 
the supererogatory. Tom Regan’s case for animal rights represents an example of an 
obligatory form o f environmental ethics. Not quite as codified as the obligatory ethics, 
there exists glimmers o f supererogatory environmental ethics too. For instance, Louke
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van Wensveen’s (2000) book-length treatment of environmentally directed virtues 
represents a supererogatory ethical system.
These three tensions seem to run at right angles to each other such that a three- 
dimensional grid appears.
Individuals versus 
Collections
Anthropocentric versus 
Nonanthropocentric
Obligatory versus 
Supererogatory
Figure 5: Three main tensions in environmental ethics.
These three tensions compete within themselves and with one another in how 
different people conceive of environmental ethics. Over twenty years ago one noted 
environmental philosopher commented that, “environmental ethics has no precisely fixed 
conventional definition in glossaries of philosophical terminology” (Callicott, 1980 p.
311). Unfortunately, we seem still to be mired in a confusing morass o f terms, foci, and 
competing obligations. However, this lack of precision does not preclude any analysis of 
various environmental ethics perspectives. To begin with, let’s see how the theme ‘Beauty 
in Nature’ can be mapped onto this three-dimensional grid.
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5.5.1 Mapping ‘Beauty in Nature’
Recall that the primary emphasis with this theme was that natural beauty was 
supremely important to some people. There was some disagreement on whether beauty 
was an intrinsic natural property or if it is merely a subjective evaluation. Yet, either as an 
intrinsic property or as a subjective evaluation, beauty in nature remained an important 
focal point of one’s environmental ethics. However, despite the high level o f importance 
attached to beauty, the commitments expressed by different people varied. Recall these 
two contrasting perspectives.
“... we should always try to protect things that are beautiful.” (Michael)
and
“The only reason to preserve areas is because that’s what the majority o f people 
want.” (Stuart)
So Michael suggests a strong imperative to protect natural beauty. However, Stuart 
favors a democratic approach wherein the vox populi decides when and where to afford 
protection for natural areas.
The question then is how can we map this information onto an understanding of 
traditional notions of environmental ethics? Most would agree that beauty is a uniquely 
human category. Regardless o f the contention o f some to describe beauty in nature as an 
intrinsic natural property, in the end it takes a human to construct the boundary conditions 
of natural beauty and from there determine which things may gain membership. Therefore 
we can locate ‘Beauty in Nature’ as something that foils much closer to the 
anthropocentric end o f the continuum than the non-anthropocentric end. This takes care 
of the Y axis, but what about the other two dimensions?
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In theory beauty in nature can be atomized down from landscapes to individuals, 
and even to portions o f individuals (“a fierce green fire” in a w olfs eyes). Yet, in this 
study the theme o f ‘Beauty in Nature’ fell most on a landscape, a mountain, a river, or a 
gorge. In other words, this theme applied primarily to collections rather than to 
individuals. Despite the singularity o f a landscape, a mountain, a river, and a gorge, these 
things are indeed more collections than individuals because their identity is built upon the 
inclusion o f many features. A mountain may be described as beautiful, but it is so because 
o f many other features on and around it: the conifers that acquiesce at the timberline, the 
hardwoods that girdle the lower elevations and wash new colors over the hillside as the 
seasons change, and the late season snow that persists on the summit even into summer. 
Each of these things and others combine to solicit from us an evaluation o f “Beautiful!” 
From here, it seems that beauty, at least as expressed by those in this study, tends more 
towards collections than individuals.
Lastly we need to map ‘Beauty in Nature’ onto the dimension o f obligatory and 
supererogatory. This dimension is not as clear as the other two with regards to the words 
of the respondents. Aside from hard obligation expressed by Michael and the more 
utilitarian-based duties expressed by Stuart, there are not many obvious prescriptions. In 
this sense, I don’t feel there is any direct evidence o f obligatory or supererogatory ethics 
as they apply to duties to protect natural beauty. However, the next theme, 
‘Responsibilities to ‘The Other” provides some insight into the level and specificity o f 
commitment offered by some of the respondents.
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5.5.2 Mapping ‘ Responsibilities to the Other*
Few of the respondents expressed a non-anthropocentric obligation towards 
nature. Indeed most o f the responsibilities expressed were specifically directed towards 
others who may want to visit the park in question. In this respect, the responsibilities to 
‘the other’ are nearly always anthropocentric responsibilities. There was a willingness to 
consider obligations to groups o f people and not only to individuals. Consider again the 
words o f those who believe in some type of bequest value and thus an obligation to future 
generations.
“I’d like to think that other people would like to go to Cumberland Falls someday 
and if we don’t take care o f places like this, then they won’t be able to.” (Beatrice)
“. . . i f  people don’t start taking better care o f things, then it may not be around 
here forever and then those people in the future won’t be able to see what we 
had.” (Tom)
“Yeah, I think that would make me sad if I knew that we ruined something for 
other people down the road. Cause they’ve got as much right to come here as we 
do.” (Carol)
However, I’d hasten to add that where some considered responsibilities to future 
generations as a group obligation, the way that others worded this obligation suggests a 
responsibility to a collection o f individuals such as expressed by all the people cited in 
section 4.2.2.2: Other Community Members.
In attempting to determine if our responsibilities are moral minimums or less, 
binding, but more noble pursuits, the data seems to suggest that many o f the 
responsibilities are supererogatory. As disappointing as this may be, this by itself does not 
preclude environmental ethics from being considered in the larger context o f morality. 
Further, as will be discussed in my final discussion on the moral filter in the last chapter,
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this supererogatory ethical focus may be a valuable starting point in our efforts to adjust 
the filter.
So responsibilities to ‘the other’ in this research tends to cluster at the 
anthropocentric end o f the Y-axis and at the supererogatory end o f the X-axis. There 
were examples of both responsibilities to individuals and groups and thus across the 
continuum of the Z-axis.
5.5.3 Mapping ‘Public Lands’
Public land can be either a strong commitment to anthropocentric value or a strong 
commitment to non-anthropocentric values. An anthropocentric commitment would 
concern protecting those values that public land primarily provides for other humans: 
aesthetics, clean air and water, higher property values, and of course outdoor recreatioa 
Non-anthropocentric values protected by public land are reflected through legislative 
directives in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Endangered Species 
Act (ESA). NEPA demands consideration o f biodiversity and ecosystem management. 
The ESA, as its name implies, elevates the existence value of species to a level never 
before recognized by government legislation. The people interviewed for this study 
tended to conceive o f public lands almost exclusively as that which is good for human use, 
recreational or otherwise. In other words, commitments to protect public lands are 
followed because they are good for humanity.
Charles Taylor (1991) suggested that the rise o f individualism is one of the great 
worries of our time. He does not dispute the value o f individualism, but rather he sees it 
as having contributed to the demise of community and a sense o f belonging to something
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greater. With regards to public land, I offered a critical view o f them in section 4.2.2.2: 
Ownership. One would hope that public lands encourage a return to community and 
invigorate a sense o f belonging. To some extent this did seem to emerge in some o f the 
narratives. Trent, after all, recognized that he would be more aggressive in defending 
those lands he is more connected to. However, for the most part, many o f those 
interviewed offered what I would consider a lukewarm endorsement for anything other 
than the individual benefits that accrue through public land.
In mapping the obligatory versus supererogatory nature o f commitments to protect 
public land, it seems that the narratives provided little definitive answers to this. To 
conceptualize how this might be considered, Til offer these two examples. One who 
contends that protecting the existence o f public land, whether for anthropocentric or non- 
anthropocentric reasons, is a requirement o f living in a democracy would hold an 
obligatory orientation. However, if one sees public lands as a luxury or gift, then he/she 
would subscribe to more o f a supererogatory orientation. I’d suggest that the data from 
the interviews tends towards a more supererogatory orientation with regards to our 
commitments to protect public land, but the evidence to support this view is not terribly 
strong.
5.5.4 Mapping 'On Becoming a Moral Agent'
This theme is the most challenging  one to map because, to some extent it begs its 
own set of questions from which the three dimensional grid was derived. As a result, 
there is an element o f circularity when attempting to map ‘On Becoming a Moral Agent.’
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That said, there does appear to be enough consistency in the narratives that some mapping 
can be done.
As mentioned previously there was a pervasive thread o f anthropocentrism
throughout the interviews. From this perspective, it would appear that anthropocentrism
is a requirement for ethics, even environmental ethics. Thus, based on the narratives, one
does not become a moral agent until it can be established that actions directed towards the
environment will in some way affect the welfare or violate the rights of other humans.
This is perhaps the most troubling finding o f this research as most o f the respondents
seemed to reject any subscription to moral agency based on non-human interests. A
couple notable exceptions were given by Beatrice and Sylvia.
“We’re supposed to have respect for all life and you can’t do that if you just go 
out and trash everything.... Maybe what I’m saying is that we have a responsibility 
to make sure that some areas are protected.” (Beatrice)
“W e... everyone should all try harder to protect forest and rivers and stuff. It’s 
not just here for us either, it’s good to take care o f these things for the animals that 
live there too. They’ve got just as much right to be there... maybe more, as we 
do.” (Sylvia)
Note also the tone in these two quotes that suggests the responsibility to non-human 
nature is more obligatory rather than supererogatory. At least to Beatrice and Sylvia, they 
seem willing to accept obligatory responsibilities to non-humans. Although it is also 
worth noting that they were offering fairly general prescriptions to follow: “have respect” 
and “take care of these things.” It is not clear what specific actions would be required (if 
any specific actions) in order to follow these prescriptions. So for Beatrice and Sylvia, 
becoming a moral agent occurs with any influence we might have on nature, regardless if 
there exists a corresponding effect on humans.
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Throughout the narratives there was some evidence to support the suggestion that 
some obligations are owed to non-human collections such as to nature in the abstract or to 
the environment in general or to ecosystems. However, once again it was not clear just 
how committed people were to these positions and whether or not they truly supported an 
obligation to a collection rather than many obligations to many different individuals who 
all happen to be grouped together as in the case o f feeling an obligation to a species, such 
as was suggested by Laurie.
So, in mapping On Becoming a Moral Agent, it seems for most o f those 
interviewed in this study, anthropocentric concern, harm/benefit to individuals, and the 
desire to go above and beyond the call of duty combine to determine when one becomes a 
moral agent. This is in contrast to much of the current arguments broadly defined as 
environmental ethics (see section 2.3 for a review of these current arguments). Most of 
those in this study would stand in contrast to all o f the animal rights positions although 
they would both agree on a focus on individual welfare. The people in this study would 
differ from the animal rights/liberation position because few subscribed to these 
responsibilities as moral minimums and few people approached any o f the environmental 
dilemmas with anything other than an anthropocentric perspective. It seems that most of 
the people would similarly disagree with the ho list ethical community (e.g., Rolston, 
Callicott, Goodpaster, and Leopold) based on uncertain commitments to collections rather 
than individuals and once again a hesitancy to embrace a non-anthropocentric, obligatory 
ethics. Little evidence emerged through the narratives to indicate a direct rejection o f or a 
clear allegiance to either Deep Ecology or Ecofeminism. However, in considering where
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On Becoming a Moral Agent is mapped it seems very unlikely that either o f these views 
would be embraced by those interviewed.
5.6: Summary Thoughts on Discussing the Four Themes
The four primary themes o f Beauty in Nature, Responsibilities to ‘The Other/ 
Public Lands, and On Becoming a Moral Agent go some way towards documenting the 
nature of environmental ethics as it is discussed by some people. These themes illustrate 
both the emergent quality of narrative-based inquiry and the elusive notion of 
environmental ethics, particularly as these results relate to the several standard views of 
environmental ethics (as discussed in Chapter 2).
Despite attempts to corral the discussion of environmental ethics in terms of 
various social ethics studies (Kohlberg, Kahn, Swearingin, and Gilligan) new and 
unanticipated avenues revealed themselves. Returning to the literature, it can be seen that 
the words of the different people interviewed share context with one another and to a 
limited extent with the thoughts o f others who have committed their ideas to writing. The 
literature review in this chapter was intended to illustrate the compatibility o f the emergent 
themes with assorted pieces of environmental ethics writing.
The concluding sections on ‘Mapping’ the various themes across the three 
dimensions was intended to return the discussion of the themes to the general field o f 
environmental ethics and illustrate how each theme differs from the other across one or 
more of the dimensions. The dimensions o f anthropocentric/non-anthropocentric, 
individual/collection, and obligatory/supererogatory are tensions that exist across all
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environmental ethics and it is therefore valid to use this grid to compare one theme to 
another and the themes to the standard views in the field.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations
I begin this final chapter with a consoling piece o f advice I received when 
wrapping up my Master’s thesis: “If you haven’t discovered more questions than those 
you have answered, then you haven’t done your research right.” Indeed this was the case. 
Many o f these new questions followed clearly and directly from the data collection and 
data analysis processes. Other questions arose in response to reading any number of 
pieces related to environmental ethics. And still other questions emerged from a wider 
range of influences such as all that has gone into preparing this document as a doctoral 
student in forestry and outdoor recreation.
In this chapter, first I will discuss the myriad o f conclusions which arose from all of 
these processes. Many o f these conclusions are minor compared to a few big ones, but 
they are each important in that they have all furthered my understanding o f outdoor 
recreation, environmental ethics, qualitative research, and the people o f this region among 
other things. The first section of this chapter documents the value and validity o f the four 
themes. The second section is the promised return to various misconceptions of 
environmental ethics. Thirdly, I offer a final recommendation for an environmental ethics 
that incorporates a number o f the major points discussed in the previous two chapters: the 
moral filter, beauty as a guide, and responsibilities o f gift ownership. Additionally, I offer 
my own prescription for an environmental ethics which is based on both the data from this 
research and my own beliefs and feelings which arose from my review o f the literature.
The fourth section o f this chapter concerns the limitations of my research. And I conclude 
this chapter and the document with recommendations for future research.
282
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6.1 Relationships Among the Themes
As previously stated, each o f the four themes is robust at its core, yet when 
considered collectively the relationships between the four themes go further in explaining 
the nature o f environmental ethics discourse. Consider again that the general statement o f 
this research was to engage people in discussions about environmental ethics. And indeed 
this was achieved. Yet, let us now consider how it was that those interviewed did, in fact, 
discuss environmental ethics.
Naturally the words used in each narrative provided the framework for 
understanding the concept o f environmental ethics. And in following the work of 
phenomenological philosopher Edmund Husserl, we all rely on words as expressions of 
things and meanings. Those words that are most accessible to us are those with which we 
express our meanings. As a result, the words used by those in this study should be 
thought of as the means by which the interviewees spoke o f and about environmental 
ethics. Further, the themes themselves represent a coherent discourse on how 
environmental ethics is expressed; and in particular, the themes indicate and illuminate 
those aspects o f environmental ethics which are most accessible to those interviewed.
The term metaphysics is used to describe the study of reality at an even more 
general level than physicists do. Following this progression, I use the term meta-theme to 
describe a class o f themes which reflect a higher-order understanding o f the general field 
o f environmental ethics.
The themes that emerged through this research came in two flavors: themes of 
environmental ethics and themes about environmental ethics. Beauty in Nature and Public
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Lands are the two themes of environmental ethics. In this respect, these themes illuminate 
some previously darkened comers o f the environmental ethics field. Previous conceptions 
of environmental ethics have considered assorted necessary and sufficient conditions for 
membership in the moral community. Previous conceptions have focused on various 
principles and prescriptions borrowed from established traditions in Western moral 
philosophy. Recall the influences o f Kant, Mill, Hume, and even Heidegger in some o f the 
common iterations o f contemporary environmental ethics. However, within the 
boundaries of environmental ethics some corners remain unexplored. It is within these 
unexplored comers that the themes o f Beauty in Nature and Public Lands can be found.
Where the themes Beauty in Nature and Public Lands illuminated darkened corners 
within the traditional views o f environmental ethics, the two meta-themes challenged the 
existing boundaries o f the field. In this regard, they expose ontological questions about 
environmental ethics. Responsibilities to ‘The Other’ and On Becoming a Moral Agent 
are not themes of environmental ethics, but rather themes about environmental ethics.
This shift in a simple preposition moves the focus o f the themes from the inside to the 
outside o f the environmental ethics box. Examining environmental ethics through the 
subthemes associated with Responsibilities to ‘The Other’ and On Becoming a Moral 
Agent yields a more fundamental understanding o f the entire ethics project. To the extent 
that Responsibility to ‘The Other’ and On Becoming a Moral Agent represent challenges 
to the boundaries of environmental ethics, these meta-themes offer perhaps the most 
valuable insight into this field. And more, the two meta-themes serve to recast empirical 
approaches to the field o f environmental ethics through a more careful consideration of 
underlying assumptions.
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To clarify, themes o f environmental ethics exist within the coexisting traditions 
that collectively define the field. In contrast, themes about environmental ethics raise 
questions about the boundaries o f those coexisting traditions in such a way that the 
modem project of environmental ethics must be reconsidered in light o f suspect 
boundaries.
6.2 Misconceptions o f Environmental Ethics
My original intention during each interview was to avoid using the term 
environmental ethics if at all possible. However, several interviewees asked pointed 
questions of me that resulted in this term coming out. For example, Nathan wanted to 
know if I was an “environmental wacko like those PETA people.” Howard responded to 
one of my questions asking if it was an environmental ethics question. And Sylvia, who 
admitted to reading some philosophy said that this interview sounded like environmental 
ethics stuff*. In subsequent exchanges with these three and other people, it became 
apparent that ‘environmental ethics’ was often a loaded term and meant very specific, and 
often different things, to different people.
As stated previously, environmental ethics resists any convenient categorization. 
Environmental ethics may or may not involve any o f the following: recycling, eating 
vegan, protesting nuclear power, donating money or time to the World Wildlife Fund. Of 
course environmental ethics may involve none o f those things as well. There is a poor 
correlation between assorted specific, pro-environmental behaviors and an overall 
evaluation of environmentalism (Tracy and Oskamp 1984; Mainieri, Barnett et al. 1997).
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My concern with the varied and sometimes misguided conceptions of 
environmental ethics is that it may have prevented some things from being discussed. 
Where some people thought that they knew what environmental ethics was, it typically 
was restricted to a narrow and specific environmental issue. Thus, although my research 
can be viewed broadly as a foray into environmental ethics, those with whom I spoke 
often seemed to partition off their own definitions o f environmental ethics; and these 
definitions were frequently limited in scope. This seems to suggest the burgeoning aspect 
o f environmental ethics in public consciousness as the term lacks precision, yet it evokes 
specific and sometimes contrasting views. For instance, where one may describe 
environmental ethics as not littering another may say that not littering isn’t environmental 
ethics at all but “no hunting and fishing” is. If our ethics, in general, are judged to be 
those things that are of supreme importance, then environmental ethics have clearly not 
reached this level. If environmental ethics are meant to convey a set of prescriptions for 
right and wrong behaviors, then this set is incomplete because it lacks consensus.
6 3  The Moral Filter Redux and My Environmental Ethics
If my supposition is true—that there exists a moral filter of sorts through which the 
moral is separated from the non-moral—then where does this separation occur? With 
respect to the questions asked in this study, it seemed that many people foiled to see any 
direct connection to environmental ethics. Those who did appear to sense some degree o f 
moral value saw it only with regards to fellow humans. Thus, nature or the environment 
or the park were not owed any direct duties, but rather indirect insofar as the duties might 
aid fellow humans.
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That this ambiguity exists is telling about the clarity o f ethical options and the 
convictions that people may hold. Stated another way, if there is confusion about the 
nature or the scope o f environmental ethics, then it should not be surprising that there are 
few obvious prescriptions and proscriptions.
In the one instance where I specifically pushed one o f the interviewees for his 
reasons why we should support some environmental ethics, his responses seemed to spiral 
into themselves such that any justification could be found within a previously answered 
question. More, there seemed to be an element of circular reasoning in some other 
answers. This too is a problem with the moral filter because what may not be moral on 
first blush is forced into the moral realm through repeated questions. In an effort to 
answer specific ‘why’ questions, the interviewee may resort to some ethical principle that 
he or she does not truly hold in an attempt to stop the line o f questioning.
Ultimately the significance of the moral filter rests in recognizing the threshold 
beyond which the unequivocally moral are separated from the clearly non-moral. Yet as 
mentioned previously, this filter is in need o f adjustment from the perspective of 
environmental ethics. If the results o f this study are an indication o f a broader segment of 
society, then it would appear that few issues o f environmental import make the moral cut 
and pass through the filter. In other words, there appears to be a relatively small number 
o f environmental ethics cases.
My suggested solution for this rests upon that which has guided my professional 
training: outdoor recreation. In recalibrating the moral filter, I offered the two-part 
recommendation of encouraging greater sentiment towards the non-human world and 
developing a more dignified understanding o f natural processes—specifically the science
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of ecology. Outdoor recreation is quite possibly the most convenient means through 
which we encounter the natural world and this encountering can’t help but build 
knowledge and wisdom and this may well lead to a refocusing o f our sentiments.
As I see it, there are four factors that combine to contribute to the sensitivity o f the 
moral filter. If the overall goal is recalibrating the moral filter, then each of these four 
factors must be adjusted in some way. Not coincidentally these four factors relate directly 
to the four themes derived from the narratives. Also, perhaps not coincidentally, each o f 
the four moral filter factors can be accessed and influenced by outdoor recreation—that 
vehicle which may encourage a more facile adoption of a  wide-spread and rigorous 
environmental ethics. Table 6 illustrates the relationship between the themes and the 
moral filter factors and the different influences of outdoor recreation on each o f the
factors.
Theme Corresponding Morel 
F ilter Factor
Factor as It Relates to Outdoor 
Recreation
Beauty in Nature Beauty can inform 
knowledge.
Much outdoor recreation is 
motivated by a desire to see and/or 
experience natural beauty.
Responsibilities to 
‘The Other’
Responsibilities go beyond 
a non-interference 
libertarian position..
Participating in outdoor recreation 
demands respect for others who 
share the resource and the resource 
itself.
Public Lands Public lands are gifts to 
cherish.
Public Lands are the most common 
place for people to encounter 
nature and come to understand its 
beauty.
On Becoming a 
Moral Agent
Ethics surrounds us in 
everyday life.
Through participating in 
recreational pursuits on public land 
we must acknowledge our 
ownership in these lands and our 
responsibilities as citizens.
Table 6: Illustration of the moral filter factors as features o f the four themes and the 
corresponding influence of outdoor recreation.
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The theme Beauty in Nature generates a  factor in the moral filter through 
emphasizing that beauty is a  diverse concept that is intimately tied to knowledge o f 
ecology and evolution. Thus, the factor must be adjusted in such a way that greater 
aesthetic appreciation is garnered through a greater understanding o f ecology and 
evolution. Since much outdoor recreation is motivated in some sense by a desire to 
experience natural beauty, the challenge is in encouraging people to come to a more 
enlightened understanding o f those natural forces which combined to produce such a 
magnificent object of aesthetic appreciation.
We have to know that responsibilities to protect nature are unavoidably coupled 
with more widely accepted responsibilities to our responsibilities towards protecting the 
welfare of our fellow humans. Yet, our responsibilities to others must go beyond the 
minimal proscriptions of the libertarians. Any environmental ethics cannot long withstand 
challenges if the sole measure of good/bad or right/wrong is calculated in terms o f human 
welfare. At some point, the leap must be made to embrace a new set o f obligations, one 
with, perhaps, only tangential ties to human interests. Outdoor recreation participation 
can encourage a greater level of appreciation for the resource, although it may be viewed 
instrumentally at first. Continued participation can lead to greater degrees o f respect and 
care for specific natural areas as shown by some sense of place studies (Schroeder, 1996).
The factor related to public land demands a refined view of public land as gift that 
carries with it its own set o f responsibilities. Each and every generation would be required 
to accept the gift and hold it in trust for future generations. Public lands are one o f the 
most common places to encounter natural beauty and through this encounter we can
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renew our commitment to the ideals that gave birth to public land in the first place. The 
feet that our nation’s public lands play such a large role in opportunities to pursue outdoor 
recreation focuses our attention from outdoor recreation in general to that gift of the 
citizenry—outdoor recreation on public land.
Finally, and perhaps the greatest challenge in adjusting the moral filter rests with 
adjusting that factor o f moral agency. How do we convince people that they are indeed 
moral agents with responsibilities and commitments? First, we might choose to emphasize 
the ubiquitous nature of environmental ethics in all its forms: hard and soft 
anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism. Despite the absence o f clearly expressed 
environmental ethics, I noted previously that I am not convinced that these ethics are 
entirety missing from the interviewees’ moral frameworks. On the contrary, I remain 
optimistic that many o f the people have some sort o f environmental ethic, teasing it out in 
a discourse is the difficulty. Efforts to increase participation in outdoor recreation pursuits 
will only result in people reconsidering their commitments to those natural areas they use 
for pleasure and to the other people who make use of them as well.
6.4 Methodological Limitations of the Research
Always a difficult pill to swallow is acknowledging the shortcomings and 
limitations o f any research effort. This section here is designed to be a critical treatment 
o f the methods and approach to this study. There were, perhaps, three general problems 
with this study. First, the type of information captured was fundamentally different from 
that originally conceived. Second, the sample did not represent the passionate, place- 
attached people who might have been able to express ethical sentiment to the familiar
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nature at Cumberland Falls. That is, none of those interviewed expressed a passionate 
commitment to Cumberland Falls as a place that was supremely important to them. And 
lastly, the nature o f the objects (i.e., Cumberland Falls, Yellowstone, the environment, 
etc.) used in various questions may well have been problematic. These three M ures do 
not stand alone as the second and third may combine in part to explain the first.
In reference to the first problem—M ing to capture the type o f information I had 
originally hoped for—I only consider this a soft failure in the sense that my original 
suspicions remain untested. However, I am generally quite pleased with the many 
unexpected and interesting things that did emerge from these interviews. The four themes 
opened, what I believe, are new and quite possibly rich avenues in term o f theoretical and 
empirical inquiry. In this regard, it would be better to conceive of this problem as a net 
benefit because it not only identified new avenues, but it also went some way towards 
marking the boundaries of environmental ethics discourse.
I equated local residence and in some cases park attendance as appropriate proxies 
for familiarity. I suspect that familiarity needs to be more sufficiently defined and most 
certainly needs to be operationalized more than I attempted. One way this might be done 
is to explore the nature o f familiarity  more fully with respect to park visitation.
Traditional notions o f familiarity  with places have tended to focus on the perceptual and 
cognitive aspects o f knowing one's own neighborhood or place o f residence (Kaplan,
1978; Stea, 1978). Without a doubt, some o f the work in these areas can be mined in 
advancing the understanding o f park familiarity and further, what this might mean towards 
a situated environmental ethic. O f those people I interviewed, a good number o f them had 
lived within an hour’s drive o f Cumberland Falls for many, many years (if not their whole
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lives). However, this temporal measure o f experience with place did not give any 
indication that those living here the longest would express greater degrees o f attachment 
to the area. In feet, Judy, a relatively recent transplant to southeastern Kentucky offered 
what was one of the few comments about one’s attachment to Cumberland Falls.
“I’m glad you’re asking me about coming here, because this is one of my favorite
spots in this part o f the country.”
Certainly, this is not a ringing endorsement o f a deep attachment to Cumberland Falls, but 
it is odd that none o f the long-time residents o f this area expressed anything approaching 
even a fondness for the area. My suspicions for this are just that, suspicions; I have no 
empirical data to validate this claim. The questions asked in this study shied away from 
focusing on place attachment or sense of place. Although, incorporating those aspects 
may have benefited the study. In contrast to the open-ended questions asked by 
Schroeder (1996), my questions were less about “what this place means to you” as they 
were about ’‘what do you like about this place.” When Schroeder asked people in his 
sample to describe what places in Michigan’s Black River meant to them, he prompted 
them to explore their own thoughts, feelings, memories and associations. My approach 
was to ask people about what they liked about Cumberland Falls and/or Yellowstone in an 
effort to gauge value which might lead to an understanding of ethical obligation. In 
retrospect, grounding the place-specific questions in meaning (a la Schroeder) rather than 
preference, might have resulted in a sturdier anchor for the subsequently asked questions 
on ethics. Additionally, these meaning-based questions would likely be a good source for 
judging familiarity- So, as a result of my choice o f place-centered questions, those who 
had spent many years in the vicinity of Cumberland Falls may not have had an opportunity
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to explore their own feelings, thoughts, and memories in such a way that an environmental 
ethic would naturally flow from. From this perspective, then, this is a sampling problem as 
much as it is a problem in question focus, because the independent and screening variable 
o f familiarity was gauged in another way.
In an attempt to rectify this sampling problem, I might suggest that a more 
purposive sampling be followed. Attendance at the park was clearly no measure o f 
familiarity, evidenced by the large numbers o f non-locals who were visiting Cumberland 
Falls midway through the sampling period. In an effort to find people more familiar with 
Cumberland Falls, I went to another state park, but one that is entirely day-use and there 
several locals were interviewed. In the end, though, it mattered not if one had lived in the 
area a long time, nor if one expressed familiarity with Cumberland Falls. I suspect the best 
approach would have been to begin with a few interviews with park employees and follow 
a snowball sampling scheme whereby I would ask each person I interviewed if they could 
direct me to someone they thought would help to contribute to the study. In this way, 
focus could be given towards those people who were identified as holding some degree of 
attachment to the park.
It would appear that familiarity might be confounded with utility. I am familiar 
with Cumberland Falls because it is useful to me—I can go there pretty much whenever I 
want. Yellowstone on the other hand is less familiar because it is less useful—I have 
never been and may never go there. This confounding poses problems for establishing an 
environmental ethic in which natural objects are not viewed as tools purely for human use. 
Because familiarity seems to be so closely associated with utility, it may not be an easy 
task to consider familiarity outside the context o f that which is and has been used by
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humans. If this is true, then care must be taken when exploring an environmental ethic to 
discern if this ethic is rooted in utility or some other thing.
The third problem with this research may have been in the objects of concern 
themselves. My concern is that asking people about ethical obligations to Cumberland 
Falls or to Yellowstone or to nature in general yields more uncertainty than the questions 
were intended to clear up. In asking people to talk about ethics o f justice or care to either 
Cumberland Falls, Yellowstone or nature thrusts the respondent into an abstract world 
where the subject and object do not belong in the same sentence together. For instance, it 
may be easy for many people to talk about duties and responsibilities with respect to 
fellow humans, either individually or as a group. However, it becomes less clear in 
discussing duties and responsibilities with respect to collectives o f non-human things— 
Cumberland Falls, Yellowstone, and nature are all examples o f collectives. This level of 
abstractness is especially troubling when attempting to entice an ethic o f care, which 
demands particulars and specifics. This too, I think, reflects a failure of the traditional 
language associated with ethics o f care and justice being uniformly applied to issues o f 
environmental concern. In other words, the ethics language documented by Kohlberg and 
Gilligan may not overlay well in situations where the object o f an ethic is not rightly 
human; we may simply not be ready for this yet. Notwithstanding Christopher Stone’s 
suggestion about appropriating legal standing for trees (Stone, 1974/1998), it seems clear 
that notions o f rights, justice, real care, empathy and the right and the good have a long 
way to go in the world of environmental ethics, at least in terms of the language we are 
accustomed to using for such notions. I’ll return to this idea in the next section.
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Rick O’Neil (2000) suggests that “trees, rivers, and mountains are not sentient
beings with desires and feelings and therefore while they can be objects o f aesthetic
appreciation, they cannot properly be foci o f moral concern” (p. 183). Perhaps William
Cronon (1996) gets to the heart of the matter when he describes the labeling problem with
the word nature, noting that it “is always singular, suggesting that its referent is a unified
holistic entity, whereas the things it describes are in feet plural, diverse, and perhaps not so
holistic as they seem” (p. 477). Michael (2001) made a similar observation in stating,
[Njature is too bulky and diffuse; it is not the sort o f thing on which one’s actions 
can have an effect. Rather, one can have an effect on individual animals or plants, 
or on species or ecosystems, or perhaps other sorts of natural things, but not on 
nature in the abstract... Because individual living things can be the subjects of 
causal relations, there is no conceptual difficulty in talk of interfering with them. 
However, matters are not so clear when the subject is a species or ecosystem or 
‘object’ such as Niagara Falls. These things must be real individuals and not just 
fortuitous collections, and they must be stable enough so that we can talk about 
them undergoing changes (Michael, 2001 pp. 138-139).
So asking people if they support protection o f this park or that forest or just nature,
creates an ocean of possible responses each aiming to narrow the field a little more:
“Protect the park so I can’t use it?’ “Protect the forest like it is now?’ “What part of
nature are you talking about?”
6.5 Recommendations for Future Research
My first recommendation for any future research is to determine further the scope 
and understanding o f this curious term—environmental ethics. I’ve noted that there was 
not only much disagreement about what environmental ethics was, but also much 
confusion surrounding the term. I think that this large degree of disagreement and 
uncertainty is at the root o f what is wrong with so many other studies that purport to
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study environmental ethics. Note, that I am not suggesting that indeed there exists a real
and true thing called ‘environmental ethics,’ I am simply proposing that what many people
on the research and/or theoretical end o f things consider to be environmental ethics, may
be very different from what lay people (for lack of a better term) consider to be
environmental ethics. And from this, I contend that studies such as those which offer
conclusions on various people’s environmental ethics (Borden & Schettino, 1979; Dunlap
& van Liere, 1978; Manning & Valliere, 1996; Minteer & Manning, 1999; Schindler,
1999; Seguin, Pelletier, & Hunsley, 1998; Swearingen, 1989) ethics are premature at best.
I am not convinced that traditional expressions o f environmental ethics, such as
those found in environmental philosophy anthologies, are widely held or even adequately
expressed by those who have been interviewed in the few qualitative approaches to
environmental ethics research. For example, Kahn (1998) gives the following example of
a biocentric perspective for protecting wild animals.
“It is important to have some [wild animals] in order to continue to have [them] 
always.”
Or consider this quote provided by Kahn as an example o f an ecocentrically-based
environmental ethics.
“[It’s not all right to cut the trees] because it destroys all the ecosystem that is 
interconnected. For instance, the animals that live around those trees, if they are 
cut down, they disappear and affect the whole ecosystem.”
With both o f these quotes provided by Kahn, the respondents seem to gently 
endorse the non-anthropocentric perspective that Kahn says they do. However, upon re­
reading these quotes again (following my own data analysis), I’m left with the feeling that 
the quotes stop short o f that noble ethic. Earlier in this document, I cautioned against
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pushing the interviewees too much and to some extent forcing them to search for more 
and more secure foundations upon which they can build an ethics. Forcing the discussion 
this way inevitably leads to an ultimately abstracted, general theory; yet this theory may 
not reflect the true feelings of those interviewed. This pushing represents one extreme; on 
the other extreme is the danger o f allowing a single statement to stand on its own without 
question or further support. I believe my interview guide did provide clear opportunities 
to express various iterations of non-anthropocentric ethics, however these were not 
forthcoming. Kahn's work did not allow for this variety o f non-anthropocentric 
expression, but he claims to have found it. My conclusion is that Kahn was too quick to 
draw the conclusion based on, what I believe to be, weak evidence.
To clarify my recommendation above, substantial unpacking o f the term 
environmental ethics is needed. As there is for from widespread agreement on what ethics 
is, much more work needs to be done to determine what environmental ethics is. I noted 
earlier that asking people about their obligations and/or responsibilities to the environment 
and nature likely casts too broad a net. Nature and the environment are concepts too 
large and diffuse for many people to apply their ethics towards. At the other extreme, in 
studies where very specific questions were asked about recycling, support for the ESA, 
buying ‘green’ products, etc., the narrowness o f this approach seems to miss the mark of 
environmental ethics as well. Yet, it is not obvious that an empirical approach to studying 
environmental ethics must necessarily lie somewhere between the overly broad “nature” 
and the too specific examples listed above.
The suggestion to unpack and more precisely define the term environmental ethics 
follows from the limitations o f the data for this report which I identified in the previous
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section. Similarly, I’m suspect o f the conclusions of Kahn (1999) and Swearingen (1989) 
who seemed to come closest to measuring environmental ethics. B r ie fly , the shortcomings 
o f each of the studies conducted by these researchers are their wholesale subscriptions to 
environmental ethics as coincident with only an obligatory, justice-based perspective. At 
this point, I’m prepared to go further and question whether they, in feet, studied 
environmental ethics at a ll My own failure and the failure o f the other researchers is less 
a methodological issue as it is a conceptual one. Looking back on my own research now 
and considering all that I’ve read by others who purported to study environmental ethics, 
I’m left with the feeling that we all, to some extent, put the cart before the horse. As 
much effort as I put into trying to conceptually partition environmental ethics, in the end, 
my parameters were not the necessary and sufficient conditions needed to accurately and 
specifically describe such a concept. That is, how I conceived o f environmental ethics was 
not necessarily consistent with how many o f the interviewees conceived o f environmental 
ethics, and this difference in interpretation was discovered somewhat late in the game. I 
suspect that other researchers met with this same barrier as well. In the end, each of us 
plowed ahead in search o f something to measure and understand which exists in such an 
ill-defined form that studying it inevitably yields questionable conclusions. I’m reminded 
o f the folk story where three blind men are each describing specific parts o f an elephant 
somewhat accurately, yet they are all missing the mark on putting the parts together as a 
conceptual whole.
All that said, I am convinced that this research did document environmental ethics 
at least in part. Recalling some of the conditions of ethics in general; I believe that some 
people felt very strongly about certain aspects of nature or the environment. Howard’s
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cogent comments on natural beauty showed me that, to him, beauty in nature was o f 
supreme importance. Others echoed this sentiment with somewhat less articulated 
language. In those instances where people did show glimpses o f environmental ethics, I 
think their words may have failed them where their feelings and passions did not. This, 
then leads to my second recommendation for further study.
I have a strong suspicion that the language required for discussing environmental 
ethics may not be coincident with language needed to study social ethics. My research 
approach throughout this study was to rely on the work o f Kohlberg (1971b) to identify 
justice-based language, Gilligan (1982) to identify care-based language, and Kahn (1999) 
to discern obligatory from supererogatory ethics. However, Kahn’s work was simply a 
close adaptation of Kohlberg’s work and thus the concerns I now have with using 
Kohlberg to study environmental ethics percolate up to Kahn’s work as well. In short, my 
recommendation is to determine the appropriateness o f general ethics research in studying 
environmental ethics.
Kohlberg and Gilligan both developed their theories on moral development based 
on a number of interviews and qualitative analyses o f the narratives. I am not contesting 
their findings here. What I am suggesting is that it may be inappropriate to assume that 
the justice-based language described extensively by Kohlberg and others (Colby et al., 
1987), and the care-based language described by Gilligan be uniformly applied to 
environmental ethics research. In short, the language described by Kohlberg and Gilligan 
were well-suited to framing their respective social ethics, but this language may foil quite 
short with regards to identifying an environmental ethic. Stated another way, h is not a 
priori evident when and if nature in whole or in part has rights that justice- language can be
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directed towards. By the same token, the multiple interpretations of the term care do not 
obviously apply to a care-based environmental ethic. It is a  large leap to presume that the 
language we use to describe our social obligations and commitments can be smoothly laid 
over our environmental obligations and commitments as well
Note that my concern with the use of traditional justice-based and care-based 
language is not equivalent to a denial of the existence o f these types o f environmental 
ethics. I stated earlier that while I did not find unequivocal evidence for any 
environmental ethics as I had laid them out, I am not ready to concede that all o f these 
ethics are absent in the hearts and minds of the people I interviewed. I am simply 
suggesting that a thorough empirical study is warranted to determine if traditional 
language used to describe social ethics is perfectly appropriate to describe environmental 
ethics. My suspicion is that the social ethics language may miss the marie, if for the only 
reason that many people are not equipped to speak o f rights and duties to obtuse 
collections o f things nor to speak of nature as another being with whom we have a real, 
reciprocal relationship. Therefore, new conceptions of language to describe 
environmental ethics are needed. In an effort to understand the relationship between 
social ethics’ language and environmental ethics’ language, a study might begin by 
questioning people on their more well-worn social ethics and, noting the language used, 
then ask them if the same thing could be said for, say, a single grizzly bear, all spotted 
owls, an ecosystem, and/or a National Park. If  the language cannot be transferred over, 
which is my suspicion, then the challenge is to document the language which is used in 
these non-human contexts.
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A final recommendation for future research is to follow up on some of the specific 
information gained from my own research. My original goals o f this study remain unmet, 
as such I would be remiss to ignore this obvious line of inquiry. However, some o f my 
recommendations listed above in terms of defining environmental ethics and determining 
the appropriate use of ethics language may inhibit any speedy conclusion to that research. 
My final recommendation follows from the serendipitous discovery o f two themes 
pregnant with much more meaning and value that I was able to extract from them. I 
suspect that there remain vast riches to  be mined in at least two o f the themes that 
emerged from my study: ethics related to natural beauty and ethics related to public land.
As previously noted, the theme o f Beauty in Nature emerged somewhat early on in 
my research, yet my attention to the value o f this theme remained within the confines and 
boundaries o f my original study. I think much more could be learned about the 
intersection o f environmental ethics and natural beauty without the limitations of 
familiarity and justice/care and obligatory or supererogatory ethics. Or more specifically, 
constructing an ethical framework based on language which may not even be appropriate 
(i.e., justice/care) girdles the scope that this study might embrace. I’d recommend that 
someone begin from the generic assumption that beauty is somehow tied to morality.
From a philosophical perspective both ethics and aesthetics share a normative component 
(Herman, 1999), thus, the link between beauty and morality is already there. Proceeding 
from this starting point, one might determine the extent of moral obligation to beautiful 
areas, the degree of sanction or reprobation following a transgression against beauty, and 
host o f other things.
301
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I suspect that interviewing people about environmental ethics with regards to 
various examples o f public lands confounded some o f what might have been found 
otherwise. In the context that public lands, specifically park lands are bundled together 
with a number o f tightly wound values, it is hard to determine if people are expressing an 
environmental ethic or if they are expressing a public land ethic. Clearly these two things 
are not the same. In the United States, public land has a long and august tradition. Many 
people would express the continuance of public lands as an American birthright. With this 
level o f sentiment attached to public lands, I’d suggest that there may be a sub-category to 
environmental ethics that only apply to public lands, at least, perhaps, in this country.
Vast expanses of land are nearly always held in public trust in the United States.
However, there are large tracts o f private land here and elsewhere that might not be 
subject to the same ethical evaluation. Now, much environmental philosophy would 
attempt to circumnavigate this distinction by framing the discussion in terms o f nature, or 
the environment, or the wilderness. However, this glossing over o f the “ownership” o f the 
land ignores the assumptions and values that many people have towards public and private 
land and these values may be very deeply held. My suggestion would be for a research 
program to be conducted which explores in-depth the fundamental assumptions and values 
in American public land today. And it is from these assumptions and values that we may 
shed more light on our individual and collective environmental ethics.
I sense that the adolescent nature of environmental ethics contributed to both the 
empirical limitations and the thematic successes o f this research. In hindsight, I am 
content in the uncertainty o f the questions left unanswered and intrigued by the previously 
hidden paths that now stand ready to accept other travelers in the form of environmental
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ethics researchers. This work, hopefully, has highlighted those paths that most fruitfully 
advanced the recognition and articulation o f held narratives of environmental ethics. In 
particular, the discovery o f the four themes should provide additional insight and 
understanding into the field of environmental ethics.
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APPENDIX A 
List of Interview Sites and People Interviewed at Each
Interview Site # 1: Cumberland Falls State Resort Park, Whitley County, Kentucky
•  Michael
•  Stuart
•  Thomas and Chris
•  Tom and Carol
•  Jon and Amy
• Steve
• Howard
• Judy
•  Mary and Nathan
• Ed
• John and Julie
•  Debbie
Interview Site # 2: Dr. Thomas Walker State Historic Park, Knox County, Kentucky
•  Sylvia
•  M ikeS.
• Deborah
• Laurie
•  MikeW.
• Don
• Tammy and Nicole
Interview Site # 3: Union College, Knox County, Kentucky
• Sharon
•  Trent
• Beatrice
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APPENDIX B 
Biographical Sketches of Interviewees
1. Michael: Construction contractor. Originally from northern Kentucky, near 
Cincinnati. Has lived in Colorado, Montana and Alaska. Moved to southeastern 
Kentucky about a year prior to the interview. He had visited this area several times 
over the course of several years prior to moving here. Age guess is 37-38— 
mentioned graduating high school in 1980. Single. Was visiting Cumberland Falls 
with a female companion, who was not interviewed for the study.
2. Thomas and Chris: Thomas is the husband, Chris is the wife. Married just four years 
they have two kids from his previous marriage. They live in Ohio near Cincinnati, but 
visit all the Kentucky State Parks very often. Both are practicing Roman Catholics. 
Thomas is an attorney and Chris stays at home with the children. They are both 
involved in various, non-specified social causes.
3. Stuart: Visiting Cumberland Falls with his parents. Former employee o f the U.S. 
Forest Service and a private forestry company in Idaho. Now he works for the State 
o f Kentucky Division of Forestry in Lexington. Articulated a utilitarian conservation 
approach to public land management and didn’t see the need for more preservation 
efforts. Age: 34.
4. Deborah: Artist and musician by trade. She’s lived in the southeastern Kentucky area 
for 11 years at the time o f the interview. Visits Cumberland Falls only a couple times 
a year and usually when family and friends are visiting from out of town.
5. Trent: Newlywed. Has lived in the area for about 20 years after moving here when he 
was just 11. He couldn’t say how many times he had visited Cumberland Falls except 
to say that it must be “more than 20.”
6. Sharon: Works as a secretary and has lived in this area all her life. She said that she 
has been to Cumberland Falls “more times than I could count.”
7. Howard: At the time of the interview, Howard was 43 years old and was completely 
blind. He had been completely blind for the past seven years. He tost his sight slowly 
over about 10 years. He could still recollect with much detail what various aspects of 
nature looked like.
8. Judy: A long-time resident o f Oregon, she only recently (five years ago) moved to 
southeastern Kentucky. She has been to Cumberland Falls probably 10 times but lives 
just about five minutes away. She enjoys living so close to the park.
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9. Mary and Nathan: Married couple who were visiting the park for their anniversary. 
Mary works as a custodian and Nathan is on disability. They both grew up in this area 
and attend the Living Waters Pentecostal Church. They have two teenage children.
10. Gd: Works for the United States Fish and Wildlife Service in Frankfort, Kentucky. He 
didn’t specify his job, but he did seem to know some about different public land 
agencies. He is single and was visiting the park alone. He comes to this park and 
others in the Kentucky Park System fairly often—“most every weekend during the 
summer.”
11. John and Julie: Older married couple, both retired. They have lived in this area most 
o f their married life and just recently moved away. They had come back to visit 
friends and see the park again. They brought their children here many times when the 
kids were growing up.
12. Debbie: Married to Hank who didn’t want to be interviewed and was not present 
during the interview with Debbie. Southern Baptist who does not believe in evolution. 
Age is estimated to be early 40’s based on the comment that she moved here after high 
school and that was 25 years ago.
13. Steve: Just finished basic training in the Army and was back home visiting before 
going on his deployment. Grew up in Corbin which is about 15 miles from 
Cumberland Falls. Age is estimated to be 19. I suspect he joined the Army shortly 
after high school.
14. Mike S. Engaged but was interviewed alone. Roman Catholic who once considered 
being a priest. Said that he’s been all over this area and always takes people to see 
Cumberland Falls.
15. Tom and Carol: Married couple who were passing through on their way to Florida. 
They live in St. Louis and drive down to Florida for a yearly vacation every summer. 
They stop at Cumberland Falls every year and thought that this must be their 11th or 12 
yearly stop here.
16. Jon and Amy: Unspecified Christian denomenation who have been married for almost 
8 years. They were visiting Cumberland Falls to see if it would be a good place for a 
Church Retreat. Both had lived in southeastern Kentucky their whole lives, but Jon 
had only been to Cumberland Falls 3-4 times previously and Amy had never been.
17. Mike W.: College student attending Asbury College, a small, private Christian Liberal 
Arts College “in the Wesleyan-Arminian and Holiness traditions.” (Quote taken from 
Asbury’s website). Lives locally but hasn’t been to Cumberland Falls very much, 
thought that he had been there maybe 6 or 7 times altogether. Age is estimated to be 
20 or 21.
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18. Don: Described himself as a soft atheist interested in the geology o f the whole 
Appalachian area. He enjoys caving and rock climbing. He had been to Cumberland 
Falls a lot during the 80’s and early 90’s, but he hasn’t gone much in the last few 
years.
19. Tammy and Nicole: Both college students at University o f Kentucky in Lexington. 
Tammy used to live locally, but her family moved to Lexington last year. Nicole still 
lives in the area. They have both been to Cumberland Falls several times.
20. Sylvia: Mother of two, who was with her high school aged daughter (not interviewed). 
Says she has studied some philosophy. She says she gets to go to Cumberland Falls 
about twice a year.
21. Laurie: Divorced mother of two who lives nearby and likes visiting Cumberland Falls 
before it gets too hot. She thinks it’s one of the nicest places around and a good place 
to bring her kids when the weather is nice.
22. Beatrice: Says she wasn’t brought up religious, but now practices Buddhism and that 
is the basis for her ethics. Knows Cumberland Falls fairly well from visiting it maybe 
once or twice a year over the past 10-15 years.
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APPENDIX C
General approximation of my introduction to all potential interviewees
Hello, my name is Jim Harding and I am a faculty member at Union College in 
Barbourville. I’m doing a  study on how people think about different parks and natural 
areas. One of these areas I’m interested in is Cumberland Falls. Do you come here often? 
(Alternatively—Do you know that area well?)
(Assuming an affirmative response, I continued.)
Would you be interested in telling me a little bit about your thoughts and experiences in 
Cumberland Falls and other places?
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